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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
1. Mandate ofthe working group and scope of the analysis 
In the EU Budget Review adopted on 19 October 2010 1, the Commission decided to submit 
proposals regarding the future financing of the EU budget by the end of June 2011. This 
communication mentioned seven criteria to assess possible new own resources, as well as an 
explicit list of financing means, which could be possible candidates for new own resources to 
gradually displace part of the current GNI-based own resource. 
This Annex identifies the particular characteristics and the advantages and disadvantages of 
potential new own resources using, primarily, the assessment criteria put forward in the 
Budget Review communication. It focuses on the potential candidates mentioned in the 
Budget Review, trying to envisage the main possible variants for any given option. Other 
candidates not identified in the Budget Review have also been briefly reviewed. However, no 
additional promising candidate was discovered. 
2. Assumptions and limitations 
The analysis presented in the report relies on important working assumptions. In particular, 
options for which the timeframe for implementation would extend beyond the next financial 
framework or for which a revision of the Treaty would be necessary have not been taken into 
consideration. 
Furthermore, as indicated in the Budget Review, "[i]t should be underlined that this is not an 
argument about the size of the budget - it is a debate about the right mix of resources. The 
progressive introduction of a new resource would open the door for other resources to be 
reduced, phased out or dropped". Accordingly, it has been assumed that the introduction of a 
new resource to finance the EU budget would be done in a context of "constant budget" size. 
Consequently, revenues from new own resources would replace the current VAT -based own 
resource and to reduce the GNI-based own resource provided by the Member States. It would 
be up to the Member States to decide how best to take advantage of this reduction of their 
contributions. 
Such an in-depth analysis performed over a limited period of time relies mainly on existing 
studies and material. It has not always been possible to provide robust information and 
assessment on some aspects of candidates as an own resource. The report indicates ongoing 
assessments undertaken by the Commission and potential avenues for future research or 
where an additional preparatory work could be envisaged in priority. 
1 COM(2010) 700 final 
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3. Structure of this report 
This report proposes a systematic and structured presentation and assessment of potential new 
own resources. 
It starts with a small methodological presentation in Part II, which clarifies a number of 
concepts used for the assessment. This section allows understanding how the final assessment 
table has been constructed and how to interpret results. 
Each potential resource is analysed in details in Part III based on a common analytical 
framework. 
• The first step in the analysis is to set the scene for each potential candidate with a view to 
understanding the specific political context surrounding an eventual proposal. This 
involves an examination of the main policy initiatives, political declarations, stakeholder 
positions and/or technical reports one needs to be aware of when assessing the options. 
This overview is presented in each section 1 "Political context". 
• The second step consists in identifying the potential variants of a potential own resource. 
The objective is to define the scope of a proposal. It also helps assessing the potential 
resource in specific, rather than general terms. Where differences between several variants 
are substantial and can have an impact on the overall assessment of the potential resource, 
the variants are assessed separately. This scope definition is performed in each section 2 
"Outline of the proposal". 
• The third step in the analysis proposes a qualitative assessment of the potential own 
resource. This implies first examining potential issues or problems that are specific to the 
potential own resource and which require a particular attention. This covers, inter alia, 
legal issues or the link to existing instruments in the policy area under examination. This 
analysis also involves examining the potential resource with regard to the criteria defined 
in the Budget Review communication. This analysis can be found in each section 3 
"Qualitative assessment". 
• The fourth step is the quantitative assessment of the potential own resource. This involves 
examining the potential revenue and, where appropriate, distributional impacts. This 
quantification is made in each section 4 "Quantitative assessment". 
An overview of the assessments is presented in the "Report on the operation of the own 
resources system". This overview provides a summary based on the ground work made in this 
Annex. 
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PART II: ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
This section presents the criteria that are used in this Annex to carry out an assessment of 
possible new EU own resources. Section I focuses on the criteria identified in the Budget 
Review. Section 2 presents essential additional criteria. 
It should be noted that, although the list of criteria may appear already lengthy, many 
more criteria could have been added. Additional possibilities would include economic 
efficiency, budgetary sufficiency, potential difficulties regarding taxation in the Member 
States, the impact on- and acceptance by citizens, the administrative burden for Member 
States. In practice, most of these criteria are covered by the list of criteria set out in the 
Budget Review or by the supplementary criteria defined below. And criteria such as the 
acceptance by the citizens and the link with national tax systems are analysed in the part 
on political context in each technical chapter. 
It is considered here that the technical analysis should not place emphasis on any specific 
criterion. At this stage, many uncertainties remain that call for a cautious and balanced 
approach to the matter. 
It should also be noted that the analysis places little emphasis on the trans1lion costs 
towards a new own resource. The decision not to deal with these costs in details was 
made owing to the difficulty of assessing both the economic and the political costs of 
such a transition. 
1. Budget Review framework 
1.1. Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
The Budget Review defines this criterion as follows: candidates as own resources 
"should be more closely linked to the acquis and the objectives of the EU to increase the 
coherence and effectiveness of the entire budget in the achievement of EU policy 
priorities. In this respect it is important to keep in mind Article 2.2 of the Own Resources 
Decision2 which states that 'revenue deriving from any new charges introduced within 
the framework of a common policy shall also constitute own resources entered in the 
general budget of the European Union". 
This criterion thus covers two dimensions: the link to the acquis and the relation to the 
EU objectives. The link to the acquis mainly refers to what already exists, whereas the 
link to EU policy objectives can also refer to a policy orientation for the future. Although 
the two aspects are usually strongly related, some discrepancies could be observed. It 
should be noted that the existence of a harmonized base and its implications for the 
development of a new resource are examined in section 1.3 below. The focus is placed 
here mainly on the policy dimension. 
Council Decision of 7 June 2007 on the system of the European Communities' own resources 
(2007/436/EC, Euratom). 
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The analysis presented in Part III focuses first on whether a new own resource would 
derive directly from the implementation of an EU policy, in the spirit of the above-
mentioned article 2.2 ORD. It also looks at whether the resource could serve EU policy 
objectives, for instance by creating a bridge between the revenue side and the 
expenditure side of the budget. 
I. 2. Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
The Budget Review states that the candidate own resources "should be cross-border in 
nature, based on a system covering the whole internal market". This criterion relates to 
the subsidiarity principle. Levying the duty at the EU level should bring added value over 
and above what could be achieved by Member States acting alone. Resources for which 
the bases are highly mobile across boundaries would be particularly relevant. 
The analysis in Part III examines whether a new own resource would have a clear cross-
border nature and whether it would cover the whole EU. The focus of this criterion 
would be on the type of products, activities or processes involved. 
A way to make the analysis of this criterion more operational is to test whether the own 
resource could be levied easily by a Member State independently of others: in cases of 
genuinely cross-border activities it is unlikely to be the case. 
I.3. Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
The Budget Review indicates that the candidate own resource "should have a harmonised 
base to ensure an equal application of the resource throughout the Union". 
The analysis examines the legislative dimension of a policy. It looks at whether a 
common legislative framework already exists which could facilitate the development of 
the new own resource. 
There is an important caveat, though. The absence, so far, of a harmonised base does not 
necessarily imply that having such a base in the future would be particularly problematic 
from a technical point of view. Building a completely new legal base in an area where 
nothing exists might in some cases be easier to achieve than obtaining a higher degree of 
harmonisation in an area where a complex set of legislations has been in place for many 
years. 
I. 4. Autonomous resource collection 
The Budget Review states that "{i}f feasible, the proceeds of a new resource should be 
collected directly by the EU outside national budgets". An autonomous resource would 
not need to transit via Member States administration. The underlying motivation is to 
avoid Member States considering the resource as a form of spending to be minimized and 
reduce the ']uste retour" considerations. 
The issue of autonomy should not be misunderstood as meaning a change of sovereignty 
regarding taxation. The power to raise taxes independently at the European level is not 
permitted under the Lisbon Treaty. National tax sovereignty is not at stake. What is 
suggested is rather to return to financing mechanisms closer to those designed by the 
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founding fathers such as the customs duties collected on the basis of the common custom 
tariff. 
Part III thus looks at the potential mechanisms which could be used to collect revenues. 
In some cases, several collection models are envisaged. 
1.5. Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
The Budget Review indicates that the candidates as own resource "should be applied in 
an equitable and fair way, and not exacerbate the question of corrections". This criterion 
relates to a will that a new own resource would contribute positively to the debate on 
fairness in the budget and play a role in reducing the need for corrective mechanisms. 
The communication also recalls the core principles behind the correction system as set 
out in the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council: "expenditure policy is ultimately the 
essential means of resolving the question of budgetary imbalances", and "any member 
State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative 
prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time". 
Conflicts could arise if it appeared that a resource falls disproportionally on some 
Member States and not on others, or would increase existing perceived budgetary 
imbalances in the budget. 
It is generally considered that if the national origin of a resource is difficult to estimate 
and relates very closely to a EU policy, as is the case for the traditional own resources, 
tensions on net balances can be reduced. 
1. 6. Additional burden on specific sectors 
The Budget Review indicates that "[t] he cumulative impact on particular sectors should 
be taken into account". 
The focus is placed here on additional impacts, in particular the tax burden, compared to 
the existing situation. 
• 
• 
An own resource based on a revenue-sharing system would not generate an additional 
burden for taxpayers: the contribution from a sector would end up in a different 
account, but remain identical overall. 
An own resource coming in addition to existing resources could, on the other hand, 
lead to an additional burden for specific sectors. 
Furthermore, a difference has to be made between those resources which have a very 
broad base and those which relate to specific sectors in the economy. An analysis is also 
necessary to identify what is the incidence of the resource and the market structure. In 
some cases, a sector in the economy could appear to be hit more heavily, but it could 
have the potential to pass on the burden of the resource to a large group of consumers. 
Another relevant element here is the financial capacity of the sectors involved, and in 
particular the yearly profits or cash flow which would allow contributing to the own 
resources system. 
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The focus of this analysis is economic and financial. However, there can also be highly 
relevant political concerns related to specific sectors. These are presented at the start of 
each chapter. 
1. 7. Administrative burden for the EU administration 
The Budget Review states that new own resources "should seek to avoid a heavy new 
administrative responsibility for the EU in terms of collection". This criterion reflects the 
limited size of the EU administration and possible administrative constraints to undertake 
new tasks. 
Levying a resource autonomously at EU level can be expected to entail administrative 
costs for the EU administration. Therefore, a trade-off between autonomous collection 
(see above) and the administrative burden can be expected. At the same time, due to 
economies of scale, substantial administrative cost-saving may be obtained overall, that 
is, taking into account also the administrative costs in 27 Member States. 
2. Additional criteria 
2.1. Revenue estimate 
For each candidate own resource a revenue estimate is proposed. These estimates are 
usually based on simple and easily understandable assumptions. The amounts should be 
seen as indicative orders of magnitude rather than the produce of state of the art dynamic 
modelling. 
Some caution is also necessary when comparing revenue estimates. Depending on data 
available, the estimate may relate to a recent year or, on the contrary, to future 
projections. Comparisons of absolute amounts should therefore take into account 
expected inflation, and comparisons in relative terms, the evolution of GNI. 
Although there is no absolute level of revenue that would be considered as ideal for a 
new own resource, a working assumption used in the analysis is that a resource which 
would bring less than EUR 15 bn per year (when fully implemented) would probably not 
be suitable for the EU budget. This corresponds broadly to the revenue of the VAT-based 
own resource, which could be ended in parallel with the introduction of a new own 
resource. 
2.2. Time needed for implementation 
An indicative time needed for implementation has been provided in the tables. This 
timing reflects a conservative estimate of time needed for negotiating detailed provisions 
and having them effectively implemented, following a political agreement. Faster 
implementation could generally be envisaged if sufficient political support was found. 
The working assumption was to exclude candidates which could probably not be made 
operational by the end of the forthcoming financial framework. 
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2.3. Legal issues 
The technical analysis devoted particular attention to a number of legal matters, for 
which specific legal contributions were provided. In a number of cases, the existing legal 
framework could involve important complexities, which could delay or even exclude 
some variants or options. 
BOX 1: TEN ASSESSMENT CRITERIA FORAN EU OWN RESOURCE 
Criterion n°l: Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
Would the own resource stem from - or directly relate to the acquis and would it 
contribute to EU policy objectives? 
Criterion n°2: Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
Would the own resource relate to primarily cross-border activities extending on the 
whole internal market? 
Criterion n°3: Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
Would the development of an own resource be facilitated by the existence of a 
harmonised base applicable on the entire EU? 
Criterion n°4: Autonomous resource collection 
Would the own resource be collected and managed outside the national budgets? 
Criterion n°5: Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
Would it be difficult for the Member States to estimate the origin of the own resource 
and/or would the resource relate closely to the level of economic prosperity of the 
Member States? 
Criterion n°6: Additional burden on specific sectors 
Would the resource constitute a revenue-sharing mechanism or would its impact be 
widely spread in the economy? 
Criterion n°7: Administrative burden for the EU administration 
Would the own resource have a very limited or no impact on the EU administration? 
Criterion n°8: Revenue estimate 
How much revenue would the own resource bring to the EU budget? 
Criterion n°9: Time needed for implementation 
How long would it take to implement the own resource following a political decision? 
Criterion n°10: Legal issues 
Would the own resource be faced with complex legal issues? 
II EN 

PART Ill: ANALYSIS OF THE CANDIDATE 
1. FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAXATION 
1.1. Political context 
1.1.1 Financial Transaction Taxation in the EU and beyond 
As indicated in the Communication on the financial sector taxation3, "the recent financial 
crisis stressed the need for a more robust financial system, given the cost of financial 
instability for the real economy". 
The same communication recalled the state of EU and international discussions: 
• "The European Council concluded on 17 June 2010, in preparation for the G-20 
Toronto Summit, that '[t} he EU should lead efforts to set a global approach for 
introducing systems for levies and taxes on financial institutions with a view to 
maintaining a world-wide level playing field and will strongly defend this position 
with its G-20 partners. The introduction of a global financial transaction tax should 
be explored and developed further in that context." 
• The European Parliament has also been debating issues related to the financial sector 
and taxation. In particular its Resolution of 10 March 2010 asks the Commission and 
Council to look at how a financial transaction tax could be used to finance 
development cooperation, help developing countries to combat climate change and 
contribute to the EU budget. 
• Such debates are not limited to the European Union. In addition to discussions in the 
G-20, the issue of taxing financial transactions has been prominently discussed 
during the UN High Level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals. 
Moreover, the High Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing established 
by the UN Secretary General has also looked at the revenue-raising potential of key 
sectors active at the global scale, including the financial sector. 
More recently, the conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro area of 
11 March 20 II indicated that "the Heads of State or Government agree that the 
introduction of a financial transaction tax should be explored and developed further at 
the Euro area, EU and international levels". 
The above-mentioned communication also indicated that, regardless of the tax instrument 
considered, the Commission sees several arguments for adapting the tax system to make 
the financial sector contribute in a fair and substantial way to public budgets: 
• "The financial sector is seen to bear an important responsibility for the occurrence 
and scale of the crisis and its negative effects on government debt levels worldwide. 
Additional taxes could also be justified by the fact that some governments provided 
See Communication on the Financial Sector Taxation, COM(2010)549 of7.10.2010. 
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substantial support to the sector during the crisis and it should hence make a fair 
contribution in return. 
• By contributing to fiscal consolidation and auxiliary resources as well as economic 
efficiency, new financial sector taxes could help to create the conditions for more 
sustainable growth, as envisaged in the Europe 2020 strategy. 
• Most financial services are exempt from value added taxation in the EU. The reason 
is that the major part of financial services' income is margin based and therefore not 
easily taxable under current VAT. 
There are therefore arguments that the financial sector could make a fairer and more 
substantial contribution to government finances. This debate takes place in a general 
context of fiscal consolidation in the EU and elsewhere and when the world faces at least 
two urgent global policy challenges with significant budgetary implications. The EU has 
made substantial pledges to climate protection and development. To meet the 
commitments new revenue sources should be explored further." 
1.1.2. FTT as an own resource 
The FTT is perceived favourably by a number of MEPs, including in the own resources 
context. The European Parliament resolution of 29 March 2007 on the future of the EU's 
own resources "notes that in the discussions in the European Parliament other possible 
avenues [for the creation of a new own resource} were also explored such as: taxes on 
currency transactions [and] taxes on financial transactions"'. In a more recent 
resolution, the European Parliament "calls on the Commission and the Council to assess 
the potential of different financial transaction tax options to contribute to the EU 
budget''5• 
In absence of significant progress at G-20 level, an EU initiative on a broad-based FTT 
could be presented as a first step towards the longer-term development of a broad-based 
FTT at global level. Introducing such a FTT on a EU-wide scale would reduce the 
possibilities of tax avoidance currently found with existing Member States transaction 
taxes, ensure a more coherent tax framework, and eliminate one source of fragmentation 
of the Internal Market. Using elements like the tax residence principle could mitigate 
some of the relocation risks and ease administration of the tax. 
To conclude, the FTT benefits from a large popular support and there is also a growing 
consensus on the introduction of some form of specific taxation of the financial sector. 
However, there is currently a proliferation of proposals and I 0 Member States have 
already taken individual actions to tax one part of the financial sector, namely banks in 
different ways. The Commission also announced the creation of a framework for crisis 
management, which could require the creation of a Fund to finance resolution activities. 
Cumulative impacts of new taxation and regulation proposals should therefore not be 
underestimated. And the coherence and coordination of these parallel initiatives will be 
necessary to avoid creating confusion. 
4 See doc. 2006/2205(INI), §40. 
European Parliament resolution of I 0 March 20 I 0 on "financial transaction taxes - making them 
work", P7 _ TA(2010)0056, adopted by 529 votes against 127 and 19 abstentions. 
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1.2. Outline ofthe proposal 
1.2.1. Identifying variants 
A number of financial transaction taxes have been discussed in recent months. It is 
important to distinguish these proposals as they are often mixed in the public debate. 
• The narrow-based Financial Transaction Tax would be applied mainly to transactions 
on stocks and bonds traded on EU exchanges. 
• The Currency Transactions Levy (CTL) would be applied mainly on currency 
transactions on EU currencies at the level of central banks. This would have the same 
principle as the FTT but would target currency conversions only; 
• The broad-based Financial Transaction Tax would be applied to most financial 
transactions, such as the trade of stocks and bonds (like the narrow-based FTT), 
currencies (like the CTL), and derivatives.6 
All proposals have in common that they would tax the turnover on some forms of 
financial transactions. They would be levied at a relatively low statutory rate and would 
apply each time the underlying asset was traded or transferred, which characterises them 
as cumulative taxes. The tax collection or the legal tax incidence should be - as far as 
possible - via the trading system which executes the transfer. However, the scope of 
these taxes is very different as are the types of products taxed and the implementation 
conditions. 
Based on existing evidences and recent Commission analyses, the CTL could be faced 
with significant legal obstacles (see Box 2), which is why it is not the main subject of this 
analysis, despite its undeniable popularity. 
BOX 2: LEGAL ISSUES FACING THE CURRENCY TRANSACTION LEVY (CTL) 
A Currency Transaction Levy, i.e. a levy the taxable event of which is the exchange of 
currencies, indirectly restricts the underlying transactions of different currencies, both 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries, by rendering 
them more costly. This may affect payments for the supply of goods or services (current 
payments) and investments made, for example, by pension funds (capital movements). 
Although the levy would not apply to the cross-border flow of money as such, it could, 
absent similar effects on purely national flows, restrict free movement of capital within 
the meaning of Article 63 TFEU. This provision is applicable not only to Member States, 
but also to the Union. 
In principle, nothing could justify this restriction, since the cross-border flows affected 
would not be objectively different from purely national flows (or flows within a single 
currency zone, i.e. the Euro zone), nor could any overriding reason relating to the public 
interest serve as a justification. Even if e.g. raising funds to benefit stability funding were 
to be considered as an overriding requirement of general interest, that requirement could 
6 Directive 2004/39/EC establishes clear definitions of regulatory market and multilateral trading 
systems. 
15 EN 
not explain why transactions involving countries with different currencies would be 
treated less favourably than those involving only one currency. Furthermore, the tax 
could be considered disproportionate as funds could alternatively be raised by other 
means of budget attribution without affecting a basic freedom of the Treaty and, in any 
event, because the scope of the tax would be unrelated to the risks to be covered by the 
tax revenue raised. Even a very low tax rate could constitute an infringement, and it 
would not be possible to establish a threshold of insignificance. 7 
As regards Council Directive 200817/EC, its Article 5(2) provides that Member States 
shall not be subject to any form of indirect tax on the creation, issue, admission to 
quotation on a stock exchange, trading with stocks, shares or other securities of the same 
type, or of the certificates representing such securities. This concerns also loans, 
including government bonds, raised through the issuance of debentures or other 
negotiable securities, or any formalities relating thereto. Article 6(l)(a) of the Directive 
200817/EC expressly states that "[n]otwithstanding Article 5, Member States may charge 
duties on the transfer of securities, whether charged at a flat rate or not". 
As a result, a distinction needs to be drawn between the first issue of shares, bonds etc. 
and their subsequent trade. Only the former can be affected by Directive 200817/EC. In 
this regard, jurisprudence suggests that a Currency Transaction Levy would be 
considered a tax on the "issue" of the securities in question, prohibited by the Directive 
( cf. Case C-415/02, Commission v Belgium). Indeed, the issue of the securities would be 
meaningless without their acquisition by interested persons, and this acquisition in tum 
implies an exchange of currencies, in case it has a cross-border character and involves 
two different currency zones. 
That said, any obstacle resulting from Directive 2008/7/EC would be relative in nature, 
because the CTL could be modified so as to contain an exception for the first issuance of 
instruments. 
1.2.2. Tax basis 
The FTT is a turnover tax on gross volumes of financial transactions. 
As a general principle, all stocks, bonds and derivative transactions traded on European 
exchanges and OTC could be subject to the tax. 
More specifically, the FTT could apply to: 
• 
• 
• 
7 
All stock and bond transactions on European exchanges; 
Spot transactions on stocks and bonds traded directly between financial operators 
(over the counter transactions); 
Derivative products traded on exchanges or over-the-counter; 
On free movement of capital and CTL, cf. also Opinion of the ECB on the 4 November 2004 at 
the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a draft law introducing a tax on exchange 
operations involving foreign exchange, banknotes and currency (CON/2004/34). 
http://www.ecb.int/ ecb/legaVpdf/en _con_ 2004 _ 34 _ f_ sign. pdf 
16 EN 
• Derivatives that would be developed as close substitutes to the products subject to the 
FIT (in order to avoid the tax). 
For spot transactions (like transactions on stocks and bonds) the value of the transaction 
would constitute the tax base. "For example, if an investor buys 20 shares of a 
corporation worth EUR 100 per share the tax base would be EUR 2,000. In this sense, it 
is easy to define tax bases for transactions where the asset price is determined by the 
market at the time when the transaction is executed"8• 
For derivative products, the notional value could be used as the basis for the value of the 
transaction. 
For the definition of the scope of the tax, a challenge would be to define which types of 
investment funds would be covered by the tax. In addition, there are legal concerns 
which should be addressed on the link with the capital duty directive, which prohibits 
taxing primary issuance. 
1.2.3. Tax rate 
In order to reduce the risk of market disruptions, a very low tax rate would be imposed 
on these transactions. 
It is assumed here that the rate would be set in a range of 0.0 I% to 0.5% maximum. This 
means a tax of EUR 1.0 for a transaction of EUR I 0,000 or EUR 200 respectively. The 
lowest rate could be considered for the more volatile products. 
Important principles should be respected when setting the rates: 
• For a given transaction, the rate applicable in regulated exchanges or markets should 
always be more favourable than the rate applicable in other circumstances. The rate 
structure should promote virtuous behaviours; 
• In order to reduce distortions and related welfare ("deadweight") losses, the rate 
should take into account, to the extent possible, the price elasticity of the products 
traded (this in tum would reflect underlying transaction costs); 
• The rate should take into account the effective rates of taxation rather than the 
nominal rates. In particular, where the notional value of a transaction would be used 
to determine the value of a transaction using derivative products, it could be 
appropriate to use a lower tax rate to reflect the underlying value of the premium, etc. 
Lastly, a lower rate should be used as the system is put in place, in order to avoid any 
shock in the markets. The rate could be cautiously increased subsequently. 
1.2.4 Implementation 
In order to reduce the operating costs of the system (administrative collection costs and 
compliance costs for taxpayers), the collection of the tax should to the extent possible be 
operated automatically through the trading platforms used on European exchanges and/or 
SEC(20 10) 1166. 
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based on the trading books of financial institutions. This way the tax would focus on the 
trading activity of the financial sector and could reduce relocation risks since trading 
books may be more difficult to transfer than transaction if taxed under the source 
principle. Settlement systems used by financial operators or interbank financial 
telecommunication system could also play a role, notably as control mechanisms, in the 
tax collection. 
To increase the effectiveness of the tax collection and reduce the risk of avoidance, a 
series of accompanying measures should also be envisaged as discussed in section 4.1.1 
below. 
• Similar to the UK approach, avoidance could be mitigated by imposing that the 
owner of a share or bond can only enforce his legal position where registration of his 
ownership has taken place (and, by and large taxation); such obligation could, 
however, be difficult to justify under the normal legal basis the Treaty offers. 
• As indicated by the Commission in October 20 I 0, to "effectively reduce activities 
with a potential negative externality at global level and to avoid relocation of 
trading, the tax should be applied in all financial centres. These global centres are 
widely interconnected and companies face low costs when shifting trade between 
them. In addition, many financial companies operate with worldwide subsidiaries. 
Therefore, the fact that the FTT needs a broad base to reach its efficiency and 
revenue goals also implies that it would need a considerable amount of global 
coordination to reduce the risk of relocation and avoidance"9• Cooperation should in 
priority be envisaged with non-EU countries, such as Switzerland and Iceland, which 
use exchange platforms with EU Member States. 
Since the FTT could build in part on regulatory proposals which are not yet adopted, it 
could be made conditional on the adoption of such proposals. 
1.3. Qualitative assessment of the own resource 
1. 3.1. Preliminary questions 
(I) Experience in European countries 
Annex A and B of the Staff working document accompanying the Communication on 
financial sector taxation provide an overview of experience with financial sector taxation 
in the Member States and other relevant countries10• They focus in particular on 
experience with transfer taxes and stamp duties in specific Member States, notably in the 
UK, Sweden and Switzerland. 
• 
9 
10 
In the UK, stamp duties are collected on documents used to operate the sale and 
transfer of ownership in shares and other securities of UK-based companies. In order 
to collect duties on transactions carried out through electronic share dealing systems, 
the Stamp Duty Reserve Tax (SDRT) was introduced in 1986. The SDRT is a 
transaction tax, levied on agreements to transfer chargeable securities while the 
"standard" Stamp Duty is charged upon documents. Professional traders are excluded 
See COM(2010)549, p. 6. 
See SEC(2010)1166. 
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from the tax. Both SDRT and standard Stamp Duty are levied on share transactions in 
UK incorporated companies currently and in principle taxed at 0.5% of the purchase 
price of shares. It is charged whether the transaction takes place in the UK or 
overseas, and whether either party is resident of the UK or not. Securities issued by 
companies overseas are not taxed. This means that the tax is paid by foreign and UK-
based investors who invest in UK incorporated companies. To put it differently, the 
tax is connected to the location of headquarters. 
• Sweden introduced a 50 basis points tax on the purchase or sale of equity securities in 
January 1984. The tax applied to all equity security trades in Sweden using local 
brokerage services as well as to stock options. The fact that only local brokerage 
services were taxed is in the literature seen as the main design problem of the 
Swedish system. Avoiding the tax only required using foreign broker services. In July 
1986, the tax rate was increased to 100 basis points. In 1987, the tax base was 
extended and half the normal rate was also applied to transactions between dealers. In 
January 1989, the tax base was widened again and a tax on fixed-income securities 
was introduced. The tax rate was considerably lower than on equities, as low as 0.2 
basis points for a security with a maturity of 90 days or less. On a bond with a 
maturity of five years or more, the tax was three basis points. Only 15 months later, 
on 15 April 1990, the tax on fixed-income securities was abolished. In January 1991 
the rates on the remaining taxes were cut by half and by the end of the year, they 
were also abolished completely. 
• In Switzerland a transfer tax (Umsatzabgabe) is levied on the transfer of domestic or 
foreign securities where one of the parties is a Swiss security broker. Swiss brokers 
include banks and bank-linked financial institutions. A broker who acts as a party to 
the transaction must pay one half of the transfer tax for himself and another half on 
behalf of each party who is not a broker. The taxable base is equal to the 
consideration paid; if there is no consideration, the taxable base is the fair market 
value of the security. The duty is levied at a rate of 0.15% for domestic securities and 
0.3% for foreign securities. Eurobonds, other bonds denominated in a foreign 
currency and the trading stock of professional security brokers are exempt. Certain 
types of transactions are also exempt. 
The main lessons from these experiences are as follows: 
• First, a number of Member States apply "financial transaction taxes" in the form of 
transfer taxes (BE, FI, FR, EL, HU, NL, PL) or stamp duties or other duties (BE, CY, 
FI, EL, EI, IT, MT, PT, UK). The exact provisions differ widely between the 
Member States. A number of these taxes relate to operations undertaken on 
exchanges. 
• 
11 
Second, the Swedish experience with transaction taxes shows that if evasion and 
relocation is easy and cheap, the market effects can be dramatic 11 However, legal 
60% of the trading volume of the eleven most actively traded Swedish share classes moved to the 
UK after the announcement in 1986 that the tax rate would double. 30% of all Swedish equity 
trading moved offshore. By 1990, more than 50% of all Swedish trading had moved to London. 
Even though the tax on fixed-income securities was much lower than that on equities, the impact 
on the traded volume was much more dramatic. During the first week after the introduction of the 
tax, the volume of bond trading fell by 85%, even though the tax rate on five-year bonds was only 
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security could be a means to decrease the potential for relocation. For example the 
UK stamp duty that covers only transaction in securities of UK-registered corporate 
companies seems to be rather resistant to relocation. The risk for relocation might be 
mitigated for exchanges trading domestic stocks and bonds; it is less clear whether 
this would also be possible for foreign stocks and bonds traded domestically. 
Attaching a system of licensing for brokers or trading platforms to the payment of the 
tax may also contribute to its effectiveness. 
• Third, administrative costs of collecting a financial transactions tax could be 
relatively low. Data from the United Kingdom (UK), where a stamp duty is levied, 
show that the collection cost is only 0.21 pence per pound collected. The main reason 
is that the vast majority of UK company shares are held in the CREST settlement 
system which automatically debits the duty when shares are transferred. In contrast to 
that, for the income tax, the value is 1.24 pence and 0.76 pence for the corporation 
tax12• 
• Last, although observation of the current systems suggest that uncoordinated taxation 
of some transactions is possible, it is highly advisable, as a prerequisite for a 
unilateral introduction of a transaction tax at EU level, to achieve a high degree of co-
ordination of tax bases and tax rates. The financial products covered by the tax as 
well as the applicable tax base, rates and possible exemptions should be the same in 
all Member States to reduce incentives for shifting to markets with lower tax rates 
and smaller product coverage. There might also be a need to find solutions with 
financial centres outside the EU in order to reduce the migration of transactions. 
(2) Legal issues related to a FTT 
The long-lasting implementation of stamp duties in the UK and other comparable taxes 
in other Member States, which do not seem to be questioned with regard to Treaty of 
GATS provisions, suggests that a FTT would not face the traditional legal arguments 
opposed to a CTL or a scheme with similar discriminatory features (see Box 2 above). 
(3) Lessons from economic theory 
As a general principle, "the rationale for the FTT is based on two assertions about the 
tax. Firstly, it is seen to improve the functioning of financial markets through curbing 
harmful short-term speculation and reducing volatility by making it less profitable. 
Secondly, it is expected to raise significant amounts of revenue, even if the tax rate is 
very low (e.g. 0.1 %)" ll. 
12 
13 
Effects on the financial markets 
First, as a general principle, the FTT is often promoted on efficiency grounds. "This 
argument is based on the idea that short-term and high speed trading is particularly 
three basis points. The volume of futures trading fell by 98% and the options trading market 
disappeared. Trading in money market securities, which faced a tax as low as 0.2 basis points, fell 
by 20%. This reaction was due in large part to the existence of a wide variety of non-taxed 
substitutes. Once the taxes were eliminated, trading volumes returned and grew substantially in 
the 1990s. Source: SEC(20 I 0) 1166. 
See the Departmental Autumn Perfonnance Report 2009 ofHM Revenue & Customs available at: 
http://www.official-documents. gov. uk/documentlcm 771777 4/777 4.pdf 
See SEC(2010)1166. Most of the analysis and quotes below are drawn from the same document. 
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harmful and speculative. Proponents of a financial transactions tax argue that the tax 
would reduce speculation, thereby linking trade more closely to the underlying 
fundamental economic market conditions and make financial markets less volatile. In 
reality, it turns out to be difficult to make a meaningful and operational distinction 
between speculative and non-speculative transactionsN It is impossible to 
disentangle harmful from beneficial transactions simply based on their time-horizon. 
Besides, most of the short term ('harmful') speculation is done via derivatives - in 
particular under scrutiny in the aftermath of the financial crisis - and not with the 
underlying assets (bonds or stocks)". In the case of a very low tax imposed on bonds 
and stocks only, the impact on volatility- and efficiency- would therefore likely be 
limited. 
Second, "the FTT is at variance with the requirement of "production neutrality", as 
it changes relative input prices for business15• It is comparable to a sales tax and 
since it is levied on transactions rather than value added it is cumulative. Products 
which are more frequently traded than others, e.g. the shares of large companies with 
many shareholders will face higher tax burdens". In practice, if a specific stock is 
traded 10 times over one year, the cumulated impact could be up to I% (I 0 times 
0.1 %) of the share value. This tax burden would be spread over all the traders and the 
other economic agents concerned (see below). As a consequence the tax could also 
marginally increase the cost of financing for companies and governments among 
other via higher interest rates. Furthermore, the FTT could have an impact on GDP, 
which could have an incidence on other tax revenues. 
Tax Incidence- Would the Financial Sector carry the burden? 
There is no empirical evidence on the real incidence of a FTT. Transactions taxes are 
under the political and public spotlight because they are perceived as a contribution 
of the highly speculative financial institutions to the costs of the financial crisis. 
However, there is often a difference between the legal tax payer (legal incidence) and 
the economic agent who actually carries the economic burden of a tax (economic 
incidence). In the context of a FTT, the economic incidence of the tax could fall 
either on traders, on stock exchanges, on companies and governments (via higher 
capital costs) or on final consumers via higher prices for financial services. 
To conclude, an FTT could be administratively feasible. However, the impact would 
depend to a large extent on the overall design of the proposal, and notably the room left 
to substitution effects like the use of credits and loans instead of bonds. In any event, an 
important motivation of the tax would be in the revenue brought to the EU budget. Given 
the distortions that would likely arise from the tax, this revenue could however have an 
economic cost. 
14 
15 
It must be said that there is no agreement among economists on which operations may be 
considered as "speculative" and which ones may not. 
This is the result of the production efficiency theorem. Since taxing production reduces total 
output, it is more efficient to tax output directly. (Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Optimal Taxation 
and Public Production. The American Economic Review, Vol. 61) 
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1.3.2. Criteria set out in the budget review 
{I) Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
First, as a new revenue stream, the FTT could play a role in budgetary consolidation 
efforts in the EU. Member States contributions to the EU budget could be reduced 
accordingly. 
Second, the financial and economic crisis highlighted a number of misaligned incentives 
in the financial sector as well as weaknesses in the regulatory and supervisory framework 
for the financial system. As a result, significant regulatory reforms have been adopted or 
are in the pipeline. 16 There is a broad consensus that regulatory and supervisory reforms 
are essential in order to enhance the resilience and the stability of the financial system. 
The Commission has proposed new crisis management arrangements aimed at improving 
the capacity of public authorities to manage failures arising within the banking sector. 17 It 
is, however, unlikely that the FTT could play a significant role as a complement to these 
regulatory reforms. The design of the tax would need to be envisaged in that context. 
Third, various new charges or taxes are imposed on- or envisaged in relation to the 
financial sector. This includes the implementation of a network of national resolution 
funds financed by a bank levy18. The coherence and coordination of these parallel 
initiatives will be necessary to avoid creating confusion. 
(2) Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
Past experiences, for instance in Sweden, show that risks of tax avoidance or market 
relocation are high in relation to financial transaction taxation. As indicated in the 
Communication on Financial Sector Taxation, the EU Member States are starting to put 
in place national tax instruments to respond to a number of challenges related to the 
financial sector. It is important that such developments take place in a coordinated 
framework. If not, different national systems levied on diverging tax bases could create 
incentives for tax arbitrage and result in allocation distortions between financial markets 
in the EU. The emergence of uncoordinated national solutions could also lead to double 
taxation and fragmentation of the fmancial sector, hampering the proper functioning of 
the Single Market. In other words, due to the very high mobility of tax bases, conceiving 
a FTT, even in its most conservative form- the narrow-based FTT, requires an action at 
global level or, as a second-best solution, at EU level 19• 
(3) Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
In order to reduce the extent of tax avoidance, the FTT should leave no room for tax 
arbitrages. It should ideally be fully harmonized across the EU. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
The Commission set out initiatives in its Communication COM(2010)301. 
COM(2009)561. 
COM(2010)254. 
In recognition of the cross-border nature of financial transaction taxation, the Commission of 
Finance and Budget in the Belgian Federal Parliament approved a bill implementing a Spahn tax 
on 15 June 2004. According to this legislation, Belgium will introduce the Tobin tax once all 
countries of the Eurozone introduce a similar law. 
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As shown in section 3.1.1, a number of transaction taxes can already be found in the EU. 
Based on the experience in the Member States, a system could be developed, which 
would ensure a level-playing field between the existing systems. 
(4) Autonomous resource collection 
Autonomous collection of the FTT by the Commission or an EU agency could be a key 
element of the proposal. It would critically depend on the design and implementation of 
the tax. A very preliminary analysis suggests that the tax could be levied directly by the 
19 EU exchanges (see Table I below) on behalf of the EU or through centralised 
settlement or interbank telecommunication systems. Whether such an approach could be 
extended to other segments of the spot transactions or derivative markets, and what role 
the Member States could play in this context, would need to be examined as a matter of 
priority during the preparation oflegislative proposals. 
Table I: Volumes on EU exchanges, trades executed and reported on the same day 
(World Federation of Exchanges, 2009) 
bill10n US $ (2008) 
share tradina bond tradinq 
athens 113.67 0.04 
BME spanish 2 410.72 6 839.48 
borsa italiana 1 499.46 258.06 
bratislava SE 0,02 33.90 
bucharest SE 2.35 0.07 
budapest SE 30.71 2.37 
bulgarian SE 1.86 0.18 
cyprus SE 2.06 0.02 
deutsche borse 4.678.83 182.30 
irish SE 81.92 36.69 
Ijubljana SE 2.34 0.37 
london SE 6.271.52 6 567.40 
Luxemboury SE 1.91 0.08 
maltaSE 0.07 0.64 
nordic 1.338.18 2929.51 
nyse euronext 4.411.25 48.68 
prague SE 43.95 33.36 
warsaw SE 69.50 1.03 
wiener borse 104.69 1.18 
TOTAL 21.064,99 16.935,38 
shares+bonds 38.000,37 
( 5) Addi tiona! burden on specific sectors 
The impact of a tax on transactions of stocks and bonds would be widely spread in the 
economy. 
The FTT may have, in particular, some impact on the financial sector profitability, either 
directly, by taxing operations operated between financial institutions, or indirectly, by 
reducing the amount of transactions of their clients or by leading to market displacements 
to other financial institutions outside the EU. Exchanges themselves may suffer from 
reduced transactions. 
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It should be recalled that "in most if not all Member States, one element of the financial 
sector, the banking sector20, is both of high economic importance and relatively 
concentrated. For the EU-27, the assets of banks and the amount of private credit 
represent about 140% and 130% of GDP respectively, while the amount of bank deposits 
and the stock market capitalisation of the banking sector are about as high as GDP. The 
average combined share of assets of the three largest banks in each Member State is 
about 70%21 . However, national shares range widely across Member States22". 
At the same time, it is probably useful to underline that the financial sector benefits from 
particular circumstances, as highlighted by the Staff working paper accompanying the 
Communication on the Financial Sector Taxation: 
"The debate on a fair contribution of the financial sector to (corporate) tax collection 
cannot be disconnected from the issue of profitability of the sector. There is evidence that 
the financial sector has been more profitable than the non-financial sector over the last 
two decades23 This is not problematic as such if higher profit is related to high 
productivity. However, the high profitability of the sector could result from certain sector 
specific characteristics. For example, the financial sector is different from other sectors 
in respect of the existence of an (implicit or explicit) safety net which, combined with 
banking regulation may enable some institutions to enjoy economic rents; and in the 
relative ability of certain financial institutions to use leverage to increase returns". High 
profitability can possibly point to the existence of economic rents that are captured either 
by managers in the form of higher remuneration or by shareholders in the form of higher 
returns. Current available data is unfortunately scarce and patchy. Return on equity in the 
financial sector has broadly been at par with that of the non-financial sector. However, 
these median values hide large variations across institutions, years and countries. Turning 
to remuneration, there is some piecemeal evidence which would suggest that 
remuneration in the financial sector is or has been higher than in other sectors24. 
At the same time, any possible tax measures must also be seen put into a broader context 
of current efforts on regulatory reform of the financial sector, in particular with likely 
higher capital requirements, and discussions on a possible introduction of bank levies. 
The cumulative impact of such measures must be borne in mind (especially if they are 
not carefully coordinated and phased in), so that a viable financial sector, able to properly 
and efficiently finance the broader economy, is not put at risk. 
An open issue is how to avoid product substitution. As in the case for the UK stamp duty 
there are a number of possibilities to avoid the tax, notably American Depository 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
The banking sector is only a part of the whole financial sector which also includes credit card 
companies, insurance companies, consumer finance companies, stock brokerages, investment 
funds and some government sponsored enterprises. 
Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks. 
2008 Data from Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgily-Kunt, Financial Institutions and Markets 
Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4943, May 2009. Quote from SEC(2010)1166. 
See Devereux, M.; Griffith, R; and A. Klemm (2004), Why has the UK Corporation Tax Raised 
so Much Revenue?, Fiscal Studies, 25(4): 367-388. 
See for example Philippon, Thomas, and Ariel! Reshef (2009), Wages and Human Capital in the 
US Financial Industry: 1909 - 2006. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7282. They found for the US 
that starting in the 1990s 30% to 50% of the wage differential between the financial and non-
financial sectors is due to rents. 
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Receipts and Exchange-Traded Funds. As was already mentioned, the easiest example to 
circumvent a tax on bonds is to use loans instead. Since bonds are usually used by large 
companies it is not entirely clear which effect a higher demand from large companies for 
loans would have on SMEs which in most cases rely more strongly on direct loans from 
banks. 
( 6) Administrative burden for the EU administration 
The administrative burden for the EU administration would mainly depend on the exact 
design and implementation of the FTT. Further work is necessary to determine to what 
extent a centralised collection mechanism is feasible and whether one should rely on 
Member States administrations for the collection of part of the FTT. 
Whereas a centralised collection system may lead to some economies of scale and 
reduced total collection costs, it would presumably entail higher costs for the EU 
administration. A system relying on national administrations may prove more costly 
overall, but would likely entail reduced costs at EU level. 
In any event, experience in the UK suggests that administration costs related to a stamp 
duty could be relatively limited. 
1.4. Quantitative assessment of the own resource 
1.4.1. Revenue estimates 
Revenue estimates vary widely depending on the rates, the tax base, and assumptions on 
the market reactions. The following estimates are therefore provided on an illustrative 
basis, using relatively conservative assumptions for 2010 data: 
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A narrow-based FTT levied on all bonds and stock transactions executed in regulated 
markets could bring revenues ofEUR 14.8 billion for a rate ofO.l %25 
Imposing a rate of 0.0 I% on Exchange Derivatives, notably Single Stock Futures, 
Stock Index Options, Stock Index Futures, Bond Options and Bond Futures, could 
bring an additional EUR 4.5 billion26. 
The same rate applied to OTC interest rates derivatives, including Forward Rate 
Agreements, Swaps and Options, could bring EUR 3.1 billion27 • 
A Currency Transaction Tax, on spot transactions and currency derivatives levied at a 
tax rate of 0.1% could lead to revenues of around EUR 21.2 bn28 • It should be noted, 
however, that a CTT could restrict the free movement of capital within the meaning 
of Article 63 TFEU. It therefore remains subject to considerable uncertainties. 
Assuming transaction costs of0.6%, relocation and evasion of 10% and elasticity of -1.5. 
Assuming transaction costs of0.3%, relocation and evasion of90% and elasticity of -1.5. 
Assuming transaction costs of 0. 7%, fiscal evasion of 90% and elasticity of -1.5. 
Assuming an elasticity of -1.0 for spot transactions and -1.5 for derivatives. 
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A broad-based FTT, consisting of all the above categories, including CTT, could 
bring EUR 43.6 billion (again subject to considerable legal uncertainties). Excluding 
the CTT, the broad-based FTT could bring an estimated EUR 22.4 billion. 
Due to the large degree of uncertainty related to behavioural changes, tax avoidance, and 
the characteristics of individual markets, these revenue estimates have to be interpreted 
with caution29. 
1.4.2. Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
Based on differences in the volumes of transactions on the various exchanges or OTC 
operated in the Member States, it could be argued that the potential tax revenues would 
be unevenly distributed from a geographical point of view. 
However, whereas the bulk of transactions on regulated EU exchanges are operated on 5 
or 6 exchanges, it would be incorrect to say that the corresponding tax revenues would be 
attributable to the country where the exchange is located. The financial institutions and 
their clients are located 
It should also be recalled that a number of exchanges cover various countries (NASDAQ: 
DK, EE, FI, IS, LT, LV, SE; NYSE Euronext: BE, FR, NL, PT; Euronext Liffe: UK, FR, 
NL, BE, PT; EUREX: DE, SW; OMX Nordic Exchange: OK, SE, FI, IS), which would 
make it virtually impossible to identify the national origin of the tax. 
29 For a critical review of revenue collection from transactions taxes see also Honohan and Yoder 
(2010): Financial Transactions Tax - Panacea, Threat, or Damp Squib? World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 5230, March 2010. 
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2. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES TAX 
2.1. Political context 
2.1.1. FAT 
The idea to develop a Financial Activities Tax (FAT) gained prominence following an 
IMF report on financial sector taxation to the G-2030• The IMF proposed two possible 
forms of contribution from the financial sector, serving distinct purposes: a "Financial 
Stability Contribution" (FSC) linked to a credible and effective resolution mechanism, 
and a "Financial Activities Tax" (FAT) levied on the sum of the profit and remunerations 
of financial institutions, which could also be designed to target economic rents or 
excessive risk taking. 
The European Commission adopted a Communication on Financial Sector Taxation in 
October 20 l 0. It examined in particular the Financial Transactions Tax (FTT - see 
chapter III.l) and the Financial Activities Tax (F AT)31 • The Communication mentions 
three main arguments for adapting the tax system to make the financial sector contribute 
in a fair and substantial way to public budgets - as shown below, all three are directly 
relevant for a FAT: 
• "First, to complement the extensive financial sector reforms underway, taxes could 
contribute to enhancing the efficiency and stability of financial markets and reducing 
their volatility as well as the harmful effects of excessive risk-taking. In particular, 
the financial sector might take too much risk due to a range of factors, from actual or 
expected state support (resulting in moral hazard) and information asymmetries to 
remuneration structures which together with macroeconomic developments 
contributed to the recent crisis32 There is thus a case for a corrective tax to 
internalise such externalities. 
• Second, the financial sector is seen to bear an important responsibility for the 
occurrence and scale of the crisis and its negative effects on government debt levels 
worldwide. Additional taxes could also be justified by the fact that some governments 
provided substantial support to the sector during the crisis and it should hence make 
a fair contribution in return. By contributing to fiscal consolidation and auxiliary 
resources as well as economic efficiency, new financial sector taxes could help to 
create the conditions for more sustainable growth, as envisaged in the Europe 2020 
strategy. 
• 
30 
31 
32 
Third, most financial services are exempt from value added taxation in the EU. The 
reason is that the major part of financial services' income is margin based and 
therefore not easily taxable under current VAT''. 
Claessens, S., Keen, M. and C. Pazarbasioglu (20 1 0), "Financial Sector taxation. The lMF's 
Report to the G-20 and Background material", September 2010. 
http://www. imf.org/ external/np/seminars/ eng/20 1 0/parislpdf/090 110. pdf 
COM(201 0)549 of7.1 0.2010. 
The occurrence of the crisis has also other important roots at macroeconomic level. (See for 
example surveys on this by Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme, 2010; UK Financial Service Authority, 
2009; and the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, 2009). 
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"There are therefore arguments that the financial sector could make a fairer and more 
substantial contribution to government finances. This debate takes place in a general 
context of fiscal consolidation in the EU and elsewhere and when the world faces at least 
two urgent global policy challenges with significant budgetary implications. The EU has 
made substantial pledges to climate protection and development. To meet the 
commitments new revenue sources should be explored further. 
EU Member States are starting to put in place national tax instruments to respond to 
these challenges. It is important that such developments take place in a coordinated 
framework. If not, different national systems levied on diverging tax bases could create 
incentives for tax arbitrage and result in allocation distortions between financial markets 
in the EU. The emergence of uncoordinated national solutions could also lead to double 
taxation and fragmentation of the financial sector, hampering the proper functioning of 
the Single Market. 
Any possible tax measures must also be seen put into a broader context of current efforts 
on regulatory reform of the financial sector, in particular with likely higher capital 
requirements, and discussions on a possible introduction of bank levies. The cumulative 
impact of such measures must be borne in mind (especially if they are not carefully 
coordinated and phased in), so that a viable financial sector, able to properly and 
efficiently finance the broader economy, is not put at risk." 
In conclusion, the Communication indicated that there is potential for a Financial 
Activities Tax at EU-level. The Commission has more closely analysed the possibility 
and the effects of introducing a FAT at EU level as part of the ongoing preparatory work 
for a comprehensive Impact Assessment on financial sector taxation. 
This option could deal with the current VAT exemption of the financial sector and raise 
substantial revenues. The debate following the green paper on the future of VAT, to take 
place later this year, will be a most appropriate opportunity to discuss FAT as a 
compensation scheme for VAT exemption on financial services. 
2.1.2. FATasanownresource 
The idea of a FAT is new in the public debate and it has never been discussed in the 
context of own resources. 
This analysis therefore constitutes a first assessment ofF AT as a potential own resource. 
2.2. Outline of the proposal 
2.2.1. IdentifYing variants 
As explained in the Staff Working Document (hereafter "the Staff Working Document") 
accompanying the Communication on Financial Sector Taxation (hereafter "the 
Communication")33, several taxes on the financial sector have been discussed, such as 
bonus taxes, a surcharge to the corporate income tax for the financial sector or a 
Currency Transaction Levy (CTL). Together with regulatory and other tax initiatives, 
this raises a concern of policy coherence and the necessity to examine closely at the 
33 Respectively SEC(2010)1166 and COM(2010)549 of7.10.2010. 
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combined effect of EU initiatives. Box 3 below presents a brief overview of short term 
issues related to financial levies (based on a recent report to the ECOFIN)34 
Technically, there are different ways of defining profit and remuneration for FAT 
purposes. The choice of the method depends on the ultimate objective sought with the 
introduction of the FAT. 
The addition method FAT (FAT!) 
The addition-method FAT intends to tax value added of financial institutions on an 
aggregated basis. In order to be effectively levied on economic rents, the profit and 
remuneration of the financial institutions could be calculated on a cash-flow basis for 
FAT! purposes, defined as (i) the sum of cash-in from sales, borrowed funds, interest 
received and loan repayments, minus (ii) the sum of cash-out from purchases and 
investments, interest paid, debt repaid and lent funds. There are different technical 
methods for calculating the FAT taxable base in cash-flow terms, using the data of 
accrual accounting. 
The rent-taxing FAT (FAT2) 
The rent-taxing FAT aims at taxing the rents accruing to the financial sector while 
leaving untaxed the normal return to capital and labour factors. The profit item would be 
calculated by adjusting the result of the profit and loss account (P&L result) with an 
Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE). This would allow a deduction for a notional 
return to equity, which would be calculated by reference to the interest rate payable on 
low-risk debt (government bonds, for instance). The normal return to labour would be 
exempted by providing an allowance for 'normal' remuneration. 
The risk-taxing FAT (FAT3) 
A third version of the FAT would tax excess return due to unduly risky activities. The 
risk-taxing FAT would determine the 'normal profit' by adjusting the P&L result with a 
higher ACE (i.e. higher 'normal' return for corporate equity), so that only the excessive 
return to (average) equity is taxed. The reason is that this excessive return is arguably the 
result of high risk-taking activities. Therefore, parts of the rents could theoretically be 
untaxed as long as the return to equity does not exceed this threshold. Similarly to the 
FA T2, only expenses for remuneration for labour over a certain threshold would also be 
added-back to the P&L result and be, consequently, taxed. 
Most recent analysis conducted as part of the ongoing preparatory work for the Impact 
Assessment on financial sector taxation shows that the FAT would be most convincing in 
the form of the addition-method FAT applied at source. 
"Report on financial levies - short term issues", as drawn up by the Economic and Financial 
Committee. Ref. 17009110, FISC 148, 30 November 20 I 0. 
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BOX 3: FINANCIAL LEVIES- SHORT TERM ISSUES 
The June 2010 European Council agreed that "Member States should introduce systems 
of levies and taxes on financial institutions to ensure fair burden-sharing and to set 
incentives to contain systemic risk Such levies or taxes should be part of a credible 
resolution framework." Although the working assumption is that all Member States35 , 
should introduce systems of levies or taxes, in the very short term this is rather unlikely 
to be achieved by all Member States as ten Member States have indicated they consider 
introducing a levy at a late stage. 
Member States have so far introduced country specific systems of levies for which the 
parameters (base, rate and scope) differ considerably. This raised concerns of double 
charging and competitive distortions arising in the short term within the single market. 
The national systems, with different parameters, are likely to co-exist in the short term. 
This will result in some double charging of financial institutions, in particular in those 
cases where a country introduces a levy that also covers i) subsidiaries of its own 
financial institutions in other EU countries or, ii) on its own territory, foreign branches of 
EU banks. However, based on a preliminary analysis, the risk of double charging is 
limited under current circumstances to some member states. The potential problem of 
double charging may nevertheless become more significant if other Member States were 
to introduce a levy. The Central and Eastern European countries may be particularly 
affected due to the significant share of foreign ownership of their banking sector. 
Other level playing field issues may also be at stake: spill-over effects, distortion of 
competition and relocation of businesses. Considering that levies should ensure a fair 
contribution of the financial sector to the cost of financial crises and mitigate systemic 
risk, their impact on the level playing field can be considered relevant. The sheer fact that 
some Member States will introduce a levy with different features, and some will not 
introduce them at all, in the short term may create further distortions in EU level playing 
field. It seems unlikely that financial institutions would geographically relocate their 
business in the short term, in particular if there is an expectation of European solution for 
bank levies in the medium term. There is, however, a potential risk that these levies may 
influence the flow of business, favouring those instruments that enjoy less tax burden. 
Continuous monitoring is essential to address timely potential negative effects. 
Going forward, in view of minimising the risk of further double charging or disruptions 
in the level playing field and enhancing harmonization and coordination in the short 
term, a number of practical recommendations in respect of scope, base and rate for the 
levy could guide Member States. Finally, an absence of coordination of the introduction 
oflevies in the short term will complicate agreement in the medium term on an EU-wide 
solution in the context of a crisis resolution framework. In light of this, and in view of the 
cumulative effects of such a levy with other regulatory changes, including on the credit 
supply to the economy, these recommendations and structures of the national systems of 
levies and taxes could be revisited in the course of 2011. 
35 
"The Czech Republic reserves its rights not to introduce these measures". 
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2.2.2. Tax basis 
The potential tax basis is briefly described in the previous section for the three variants. 
A FAT is in theory a relatively simple tax in the sense that it draws on existing 
information in company accounts. It would tax the profits and remuneration in the 
financial sector, which could help increasing efficiency and stability of financial markets. 
Besides, from a pure economic point of view, the tax base should be as wide as possible. 
Otherwise there is the danger that activities might move to untaxed parts of the financial 
sector, in particular to areas often referred to as the shadow banking sector. Since the 
FAT requires a clear definition of what the financial sector is, this could induce a large 
amount of lobbying of some parts of the financial sector to convince policy makers that 
they should not be part of the tax base. 
The exact delineation of the tax basis will also require defining concepts such as 
remunerations, (normal) profits (cash-flow or based on profit and loss accounts), for tax 
purposes. This may be a complex task. 
2.2.3. Tax rate(s) 
The tax rate would depend on the revenue and other objectives of the tax, as well as the 
definition retained for the tax basis. 
As an illustration, the rate considered so far has been 5%. 
2.2.4 Implementation 
Considering the variety and the number of financial institutions that would be concerned 
by a FAT, the tax should be levied by Member States administrations. 
In this respect it would be important to see whether the tax should be defined by elements 
used for determining the usual corporate tax base (so that the FAT declaration could be 
linked to the corporation tax) or if a cash flow definition of profits should be used (thus 
requiring data that tax authorities do not currently use). In the first case, issues about the 
definition of the tax base across the EU would arise, while in the latter case the 
increasing administrative burden for tax authorities would need to be examined. 
An important concern would be to ensure effective tax compliance and limit possibilities 
for tax avoidance, for instance through profit-shifting or displacements of highly 
profitable parts of the banking and insurance industry (e.g. investment banking) towards 
jurisdictions that would not be subject to the FAT. 
2.3. Qualitative assessment of the own resource 
2.3.1. Preliminary questions 
(I) International experience 
The forthcoming Commission Impact Assessment on financial sector taxation will 
provide an overview of the taxes on the financial sector which are currently being applied 
by the Member States. 
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Some Member States have experience with FAT-type taxes- Denmark with the labour 
tax on banks, Italy with the !RAP and France with the "taxe professionelle". It seems that 
FAT provokes less relocation risks than taxes on transactions. 
The Commission launched three studies in the context of the above-mentioned Impact 
Assessment. A study contracted to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) analyses four areas of 
the tax system in order to identify potential legal provisions which might lead to tax 
advantages or disadvantages for the financial sector. The taxes considered are the 
Corporate Income Tax, the Personal Income Tax, the Value-added Tax (VAT) and the 
tax treatment of financial products. Broadly speaking, the study does not find any 
significant differences in the tax treatment of the financial sector compared to other 
sectors, with the main exception of VAT for which the financial sector is granted an 
exemption. 
(2) Lessons from economic theory 
The rationale for the FAT is to target specifically financial sector activities, without 
intervening into the direct operation of financial markets. It can, however, be designed 
(rent- taxing FAT and risk-taxing FAT) in such a way as to improve market efficiency 
and discourage high risk taking. 
Although alternative designs exist, a FAT essentially targets the sum of profit and 
remuneration of a financial institution. The FAT is therefore not based on sales or 
turnover, but relies instead on items of the financial statements of financial institutions 
(i.e. profit and remunerations). The FAT should not be confused with the concept of a 
bank levy. Whereas the tax base of a bank levy is the balance sheet, the tax base for a 
FAT would be profit and remuneration and come from the profit and loss statement or in 
the cash-flow case company accounts. The idea here is to tax the outcome of a company's 
activity in terms of profit and wages rather than levy a duty based on a structural 
indicator like leverage. 
Effects on financial markets: 
• First, in terms of its effects on market structures and risk-taking, the addition method 
FAT would not directly alter the markets structures within the EU where financial 
institutions are active since it would tax profits independently from how they are 
earned. In this sense, it would not discriminate between different products nor depend 
on the level of turnover, and hence bring no corrective mechanism per se. For all 
versions of the FAT, however, by making financial services more expensive, the tax 
would decrease the size of the financial sector. The rent-taxing FAT that tax rents 
only would not distort marginal investment decisions. If the financial sector earns 
economic rents and experiences a higher profitability due to its unique role in the 
economy, economic rents translate into higher before-tax company profits. If the 
policy goal is to reduce these rents in order to correct for the potentially distorted size 
and behaviour of the financial sector, a tax that falls directly on this profit is a 
solution. The risk-taxing FAT attempts to tax excess return due to unduly risky 
activities. Such a tax would directly target the harmful effects of excessive risk-
taking. This would be done via applying a relatively high tax rate (as to discourage 
risk) on returns above a defined level. This FAT therefore introduces some elements 
of progressivity. For capital, the interest rate on risk-free investments could be taken 
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and increased by a rate of return for the risk component. The latter is of course 
difficult to estimate. For wages, the average wages in other sectors could serve as a 
proxy. This would however not account for structural differences in sectors which 
might lead to different wage structures in addition to potentially untaxed rents. In 
addition, this FAT cannot distinguish between high returns due to unduly risky 
behaviour or due to skills and efforts. This makes the threshold somewhat arbitrary. 
Second, all versions of the FAT could be designed to be neutral vis-a-vis financing 
and investment decisions, and hence not distort the activities of the financial sector 
while still reducing its size. This can be achieved by the application of either an 
Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) or a definition of profit which would include 
both real transactions and financial transactions in cash-flow terms. 
Third, any version of the FAT could lead to differences in treatment between 
financial institutions subject to such a tax and quasi-financial institutions outside its 
scope. The implementation of a FAT should therefore cover as large as possible 
range of financial institutions. The whole financial sector indeed includes banks, 
credit card companies, insurance companies, consumer finance companies, stock 
brokerages, investment funds, management funds companies and some government 
sponsored enterprises. In this context, it should also be mentioned that quite a number 
of MNEs have very large financial activities without qualifying them as financial 
institutions. In order to catch also intra-group financing and shadow-banking 
activities, all the enterprises conducting more than a certain threshold of financial 
activities would become subject to the FAT too. 
Fourth, all versions of the FAT can be seen as tax on the profits from net transactions 
and other financial sector business. This is an important difference compared to the 
FTT which would tax gross transactions and have a cumulative effect. 
Fifth, in the technical design of the risk- and rent-taxing FAT important parameters 
deriving from "normal" profit rates or wage levels would need to be determined, 
which illustrates the potential practical complexity of such taxes. 
Finally, given the ongoing regulatory work, the assessment of the possible 
introduction of a FAT would have to take into account the cumulative impact of the 
regulatory plus the tax changes. 
Tax Incidence: 
There is no empirical evidence on the real incidence of a FAT. However, the incidence of 
the addition method FAT when all remuneration and (cash-flow) profit is taxed could 
possibly fall on the consumers of financial services via higher interest rates spreads. 
Indeed, in case the tax is shifted to the customer and since there is no deduction for 
business consumers the tax burden could also partly fall on all users of financial services. 
Both the rent-taxing and the risk-taxing FAT provide less incentive to shift the tax to 
customers since the profit maximization condition would be unaffected and therefore 
marginal investments would remain undistorted. 
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(3) Legal issues 
FAT could raise issues of inequality of treatment across sectors. This is mainly an issue 
in Germany. A tax on one sector only might conflict with equal treatment article in the 
Constitution. 
In addition depending on the definition and harmonisation of the tax base it could raise 
concerns about equal treatment across Member States. 
2. 3. 2. Criteria set out in the budget review 
(I) Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
As indicated in section I, to complement the extensive financial sector reforms 
underway, a FAT could contribute to enhancing the efficiency and stability of financial 
markets and reducing their volatility as well as the harmful effects of excessive risk-
taking. 
A FAT could also be justified by the fact that some governments provided substantial 
support to the sector during the crisis and it should hence make a fair contribution in 
return. By contributing to fiscal consolidation and auxiliary resources as well as 
economic efficiency, new financial sector taxes could help to create the conditions for 
more sustainable growth, as envisaged in the Europe 2020 strategy. 
In addition, a theoretical arguments supporting the introduction of new taxes on the 
financial sector, particularly FAT, is that most financial services are exempt from value 
added taxation in the EU. The reason is that the major part of financial services' income 
is margin based and therefore not easily taxable under current VAT. The extent to which 
applying VAT to the financial sector would raise additional tax revenues and -
consequently- the extent to which the exemption constitutes an under-taxation case for 
the financial sector is, however, an unsettled empirical question. Whereas the exemption 
means that the financial sector does not charge VAT on most of its output, it cannot 
deduct the VAT charged on its inputs. This is known as the 'irrecoverable VAT problem'. 
Based on case studies, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) found that VAT recovery rates in 
the financial sector varied from 0% to 74%36• The variations in recovery rates could be 
explained by differences in the way in which the Member States interpret the scope of 
the exemption and the option to tax. Further work on the matter is expected as part of the 
impact assessment on financial sector taxation to be carried out by the Commission by 
summer 20 II. 
(2) Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
Although an important part of financial activities are cross-border in nature, the tax in 
itself would not be specifically targeted at this cross-border dimension. (Excessive) risk-
taking by financial institutions, revenue-raising and a level playing field with other 
sectors of the economy (which are subject to VAT) would be central considerations in 
the design of a FAT. 
36 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006), Economic effects of the VAT exemption for financial and 
insurance services, Report to the European Commission. 
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However, considering the high mobility of financial activities and institutions, 
conceiving a FAT at EU level could reduce the risks and the extent of tax avoidance. In 
that sense, the cross-border, EU, dimension of the project would be a highly relevant 
issue. 
(3) Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
The FAT would need to cover the entire Internal Market. Not doing so would entail the 
risk of significant distortions of competition and fragmenting the Internal Market in the 
area of financial services. 
A concern relates to the fact that some financial institutions may not be covered by the 
FAT whereas others would. This may lead to distortions of competition. 
( 4) Autonomous resource collection 
As indicated above, a FAT would not lend itself to autonomous revenue collection at EU 
level. Considering the scope of the tax, the number of operators potentially involved, the 
complexity of tax accounting and the potential for tax avoidance, national 
administrations will play the central role in the tax collection and recovery process. It 
would be almost impossible to have the FAT collected at EU level autonomously. 
(5) Additional burden on specific sectors 
The impact will be examined in the impact assessment to be prepared by the Commission 
by summer 2011. 
It can be expected that the impact of the FAT would be widely spread on the economy 
because the financial institutions would pass on the tax burden onto their customers. 
Furthermore, the FAT could have an impact on the cost of capital, investment, 
employment and, ultimately, GDP. 
At the sectoral level, the FAT could nevertheless have an impact on business relocation 
(physical, profit-shifting, payroll-shifting), on market stability and on risk. It is 
particularly important to keep the cumulative effects of regulatory evolutions and the tax 
proposals into account. 
In so far as important negative externalities in the financial sector could be addressed by 
the FAT and the revenue could be recycled into welfare enhancing projects, global 
economic efficiency and macroeconomic variables could be positively impacted by the 
measure. 
(6) Administrative burden for the EU administration 
Although the national administrations would deal with the bulk of administrative issues, 
the EU administration would need to control work done at national level (in the same 
way that traditional own resources are controlled today). 
An important concern, in the case the FAT would be envisaged as an EU own resource, 
is that the (national) administrations collecting the FAT would not have strong incentives 
to collect the tax effectively, since it would finance another level of government. This 
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may in turn require specific measures, such as a sharing of the FAT revenue (as 
'collection costs'), and reinforced control procedures from the EU administration. 
Lastly, depending on the definition of the tax base for FAT purposes (whether or not it 
would rely on national accounting rules), a high degree of technical knowledge of the 
different Member States accounting and corporate income tax rules would be necessary 
at EU level to monitor the correct application and collection of the FAT at national level. 
2.4. Quantitative assessment of the own resource 
2.4.1. Revenue estimates 
The revenue potential of the FAT depends on the type of FAT that is chosen and on the 
assumptions. An appropriate estimation of revenues would require comprehensive firm-
level data as with aggregate data profits of some companies are compensated by losses of 
others37 . 
The addition-method FAT could provide revenue of about 0.26% of GDP (EUR 30 
billion) if levied at a rate of 5% and, based on one model, would lead to a small decrease 
in GDP of 0.04% in the long-run. The FAT is not immune from relocation effects. If it 
was assumed that 40% of foreign non-EU subsidiaries could relocate and that the taxable 
profit part of the remaining companies could decrease by 35% - a rather conservative 
scenario - the revenues estimate for the FAT I is EUR 24.6 billion for 2009. 
It should be stressed, in this context, that a link between a FAT and an own resource to 
finance the EU budget was not made in previous Commission work. Considering the 
considerable administrative capacities necessary throughout the Union to levy the tax and 
check tax declarations based on companies' accounts, Member State administrations 
would therefore need to collect and manage the tax. 
Furthermore, a FAT would face similar obstacles towards harmonization as any form of 
corporate tax, as further described in the chapter on EU CIT. As an own resource, a FAT 
could thus only be conceived as a system of revenue-sharing, whereby Member States 
would transfer a limited share of the FAT levied by their administration to the EU 
budget. The revenue estimates above should therefore be seen as a global amount, of 
which only a small proportion would accrue to the EU budget should an own resource be 
based on FAT. 
The FAT would probably be very cyclical in the amounts collected. Given that it would 
use a tax base which is not necessarily based on accrual accounting, the influence of 
losses in a downturn would be immediately felt in the tax revenue. However, in the EU 
budget context, where the GNI-based resource is automatically adjusted to ensure a 
balanced budget, the revenue stability of a specific own resources does not constitute a 
problem to the same extent than in the Member States. 
37 Profits are defined as gross operating surplus and mixed income in the financial intermediation 
sector. 
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2.4.2. Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
The FAT would be collected by national administrations. They would know the origin of 
the revenue and would see the EU FAT as a form of national contribution to the EU 
budget. 
The geographical distribution of revenues would by large reflect the actual distribution of 
the financial sector in the EU. The base of the FAT is not trading activity, which takes 
place mainly in a few financial centres, but rather remuneration and profit, which is more 
evenly spread. In this sense the FAT would be well suited to raising revenue for national 
budget consolidation either via direct tax collection of Member States or through reduced 
national contributions for the EU budget. 
In the context of an own resource based on national legislations that would be 
approximated at EU level, differences in national FATs would be likely to exist. Due to 
these differences a revenue-sharing mechanism applying the same share of transfer to the 
EU budget in all the Member States would likely raise opposition from a number of them 
on fairness grounds. 
Besides, FAT could pose issues of inequality of treatment across sectors. This issue may 
conflict with legislation or general tax practices in some countries. On the other hand, a 
FAT could arguably also be seen as a tax surcharge that aims at correcting inequalities of 
treatment across sectors (e.g. VAT exemption) as well as excessive risk taxing. 
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Table 5. Estimates for FAT with tax rate of 5% in EU-27 in 2009 
Member Number of Coverage in FAT! {EUR FAT2(EUR FAT3 (EUR banks in State 
sample assets m) m) m) 
AT 181 30.4% 604.8 378.0 262.7 
BE 24 82.3% 1,000.5 700.9 406.1 
BG 15 38.2% 48.9 42.0 29.9 
CY 6 41.7% 410.6 359.4 282.2 
cz 13 20.7% 119.4 92.5 40.9 
DE 1,495 43.2% 6,315.4 3,821.0 2,828.9 
DK 99 70.8% 513.2 257.0 53.3 
EE I 4.7% 13.7 0.0 2.2 
EL 15 65.2% 78.2 6.3 36.2 
ES 126 73.0% 1,582.8 799.0 460.7 
FI 9 78.4% 298.3 225.9 101.9 
FR 200 87.5% 5,873.8 2,903.9 1,789.2 
HU II 10.1% 163.8 141.8 105.7 
IE 18 39.9% 80.4 66.9 46.2 
IT 468 81.4% 2,186.7 490.7 332.4 
LT 2 9.2% 9.1 8.3 8.7 
LU 55 65.3% 229.2 186.7 143.4 
LV 4 7.2% 4.5 1.1 1.1 
MT 10 43.8% 43.1 30.4 12.6 
NL 23 79.0% 3,141.8 2,524.3 2,295.3 
PL 24 12.1% 549.2 396.4 280.6 
PT 17 66.5% 95.2 4.4 26.2 
RO II 21.4% 247.1 231.5 222.0 
SE 73 52.4% 85.3 40.7 45.8 
SI 8 21.6% 69.9 53.7 32.8 
SK 8 29.5% 6.6 3.3 3.7 
UK 92 58.1% 6,538.2 5,135.8 3,719.1 
EU27 3,008 30,309.7 18,901.7 13,569.8 
Source: Orbis and DG Taxation and Customs Union calculations 
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3. EU REVENUES FROM AUCTIONING UNDER THE EU EMISSION TRADING SYSTEM 
3.1. Political context 
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the cornerstone of the European Union's 
policy to combat climate change and its key tool for reducing industrial greenhouse gas 
emissions cost-effectively. The EU Emission Trading System (ETS) has been in 
operation since 2005 (1st trading period). Since 1 January 2008 (2nd trading period) it 
applies to 30 countries (EU-27, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). 
Being the first and biggest international scheme for the trading of greenhouse gas 
emission allowances, the EU ETS covers some II ,000 power stations and industrial 
plants, which are collectively responsible for close to 50% of the EU C02 emissions and 
40% of its total greenhouse gas emissions. An amendment to the EU ETS Directive 
agreed in July 2008 will bring the aviation sector into the system from 2012. 
Important design changes agreed in the December 2008 European Council will apply 
from 2013 to 2020 (3'd trading period) and beyond. In particular, the significantly 
increased share of auctioning as a method to allocate allowances will further increase the 
effectiveness of the EU ETS. In the context of a discussion on the possible development 
of an EU own resource based on the revenues from auctioning under the ETS, the 
following key elements of the discussion on the climate and energy package need to be 
recalled: 
• The Commission did not propose any share of the allowances to be auctioned by the 
Commission, or any share of revenues to be allocated to the EU budget. 
• Political earmarking of revenues was a sensitive issue. The Commission proposal 
included a provision stipulating that 20% of the auction revenues should (not shall) 
be used for several climate related purposes (for aviation 100% was already agreed). 
Under the pressure of the European Parliament, this share was increased to 50%. 
• The distribution of auction rights was one of the key issues that remained open until 
the very end of the negotiations. 88% of the allowances are distributed on the basis of 
historic emissions, 12% is distributed on the basis of GOP/capita and "achievement 
of the Kyoto-Protocol targets", see Annex 1 to this chapter for the shares of 
individual Member States both for the 88% and the 100% distribution.38 This 
distribution balances the estimated costs not only from the EU ETS revision, but also 
the other elements in the package, notably the Effort Sharing Decision and 
Renewable Energy Directive. 
• 
38 
Pursuant to the revised ETS Directive (2009/29/EC), the Commission adopted an 
Auctioning Regulation. Member States have been keen to preserve control over their 
revenues. Nevertheless, a large majority of Member States is expected to make use of 
a common auction platform procured jointly by the Commission and the Member 
States. The timely and solid conduct of this procurement is of major importance for 
This redistribution does not apply to the auctioning of allowances issues in respect of aviation 
activities. Member States shares in the auctioning of these allowances will be based on their share 
in the total historical emissions from aviation. 
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• 
• 
the smooth functioning of the carbon market. Failure to deliver could undermine not 
only the Commission's reputation, but also the EU ETS itself.39 
The volume to be auctioned equals the total cap on emissions minus the allocation 
free of charge. For the latter, comitology procedure is ongoing to determine the rules 
("Benchmarking Decision"). 'For the third trading period (20 13-2020), sectors 
exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage receive 100% of the benchmark based 
calculations and most industrial sectors covered by the EU ETS have been identified 
to be exposed to such risk. For other sectors the free allocation is gradually phased 
out. For the outcome of the current exercise, but also any later review, the perspective 
of receiving auctioning revenues is an important factor for Member States. 
For the third trading period (2013-2020), ten new Member States may on a 
transitional basis allocate a significant but decreasing volume of allowances free of 
charge to electricity producers. Poland is determined to do so 40, while a number of 
other eligible new Member States have not decided so far to make use of this 
provision. 
Other issues are relevant for this analysis. ln case the EU would decide to step up its 
reduction effort to 30% below 1990 emission levels, the EU ETS can be expected to be 
tightened. The reduction of the cap is more likely to affect the auctioned volume rather 
than the allocations free of charge. The carbon price increase that would result from the 
move to 30% is expected to outweigh the decrease of the auctioned volume, so auction 
revenues would increase. This is one of the arguments to find agreement on such a 
decision in Council. It is sometimes argued that transforming the auctioning revenues 
into an own resource would limit the possibilities for agreeing a step up in emission 
mitigation efforts, as it would not be possible to redistribute auctioning revenues, ifthese 
would be already allocated to the EU budget. However, it should be recalled that any 
increase in auctioning revenue attributed to the EU budget would automatically result in 
a corresponding decrease of the GNI-based residual resource, that is, a decrease of 
Member States contributions to the budget. 
Furthermore, in the medium- or long-term, the scope of the EU ETS may be further 
expanded (see below). Given the need to avoid double regulation, the larger the scope of 
the EU ETS, the smaller the potential scope for energy taxation. 
Finally, auction revenues could be a source for the financial means that are to be made 
available in the context of the outcome of international negotiations on climate change. 
Such financing could go through the Commission's budget; it could also be a direct 
transfer to the relevant funding mechanism. 
ln the current context, a re-opening of the ETS Directive for the sake of making auction 
revenue an own resource could trigger pressure to revise provisions beyond those that 
would directly concern the development of a new own resource. This could create a lot of 
regulatory uncertainty at a time when stability is needed, as both authorities and market 
participants prepare for the substantial changes to the EU ETS that were agreed in 2008 
and will be implemented as of2013. 
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DE, PL and UK notified their intention to opt-out from the common auction platform. 
For Poland, a very rough estimate is that this could concern some 100 million allowances in 2013. 
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3.2. Outline of the proposal 
3.2.1. IdentifYing variants 
Three main variants can be envisaged for a new own resources based on ETS auctioning 
revenue: 
• 
• 
• 
Simple revenue-sharing. An obligation would be imposed on Member States to 
transfer a specified share of the auction revenues to the EU budget. This would be 
straightforward and it would best preserve regulatory stability for the EU ETS. With 
this variant, no change to the ETS Directive would be necessary. 
Auction-based revenue-sharing. Instead of organising the revenue-sharing system at 
the level of the ministries of finance, the revenue-sharing system could be organised 
as part of the auctioning mechanism itself. An obligation would be imposed on the 
auctioneer appointed by each Member State pursuant to Article 22 of the Auctioning 
Regulation to transfer a specified share of the auction revenues it receives from the 
settlement or clearing system( s) to the EU budget, or agree with the settlement or 
clearing system a corresponding direct transfer. 
Centralised revenue collection. The Staff Working Document accompanying the 
Budget Review Communication suggests that fully centralised auctioning could be 
organized by the Commission 41 . The proceeds from allowances auctioning would 
accrue to the EU budget instead of the Member States budgets. Part of the revenue 
collected could be removed from EU revenues and transferred to Member States to 
maintain the redistribution agreed in the legislation. This would however impose 
revising a number of provisions from the ETS Directive, which makes it more 
problematic to envisage as a short-term option. 
All three mechanisms are conceptually simple. The first two options could relatively 
easily be set up from a practical point of view, while the third option does not appear 
suitable in the short-term. However, they would have increasing implications for the 
degree of regulatory stability of the European carbon market. 
3.2.2. Scope of the resource 
In all variants, the revenue collected would arise from the auctioning of emission 
allowances under the ETS. The basis for an own resource is already defined in EU 
legislation. 
As indicated in section 1, the cap could be adjusted in order to reach more ambitious 
emission reduction targets in the future, for instance a reduction of 30% in 2020. 
Furthermore, the scope of the EU ETS may be further expanded. 
41 See SEC(201 0)7000 and COM(201 0)700 of 19.10.2010, respectively. 
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• New Member States may be added and the ETS may be linked to systems in non-
Member States (a mandate for negotiations with Switzerland has been agreed 
recent! y t 2. 
• New sectors may be included in the system. As regards transport, the inclusion of 
maritime transport is an option. Emissions from maritime transport are estimated at a 
range between 135 Mt (representing domestic and intra-EU shipping emissions) and 
300Mt (including also outgoing shipping emissions). Whether and how to include 
maritime transport, or whether to impose a carbon tax, is under investigation43 • The 
largest potential extension would be the inclusion of the road transport sector, which 
would be a major change to the architecture of the EU ETS and would for reasons of 
preserving regulatory stability be introduced with several years of lead-time after a 
legislative process. 
3.2.3. Rate of the resource 
The price of emission allowances is determined on the emission trading market based on 
the supply and demand of allowances. In this sense, this potential own resource is very 
different from tax-based own resources. 
The most important regulatory factors determining the market price (and the revenue) are 
the ambition level of the cap and the scope of the ETS Directive. 
3.2.4. Implementation 
The simple revenue-sharing would require indicating in the own resources decision or its 
implementing regulation which share of the auctioning revenue collected by the Member 
States should be transferred to the EU budget. The transfer of the resource could be 
organised in a way similar to that of the GNI-based own resource. 
The auction-based revenue-sharing would require, in particular, changing the distribution 
of auctioning rights foreseen in Article 1 0(2) of the EU ETS Directive in order to give a 
specified share to the Commission, and Article I 0(3) which specifies that the Member 
States shall determine the use of revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances. 
A number of other amendments to the Auctioning Regulation would be necessary. 
The centralised revenue collection, as a medium- to long-term option, would go one step 
further. It would make the Commission the sole auctioneer of emission allowances, thus 
simplifying the auctioning system. A system of revenue redistribution for 12% of the 
proceeds on the basis of GDP/capita and "achievement of the Kyoto-Protocol targets" 
42 
43 
Linking of the EU ETS with third countries, including Switzerland, would not imply more 
auctioning revenue accruing to the EU budget. 
So far, no simple method has been identified for free allocation to the shipping industry; in order 
to reach an agreement on eventual inclusion in the EU ETS it may be more likely to provide for 
earmarking a significant share of the revenues for measures to reduce emissions in the sector, such 
as has been done for CCS and renewables, which could result in very significant effects given the 
potential for emission reductions in the shipping sector. 
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could be included in the system. Additional changes to the ETS Directive, the Auctioning 
Regulation and other legal acts may be necessary44. 
Furthermore, a step-by-step approach could be explored, starting, for instance, from a 
simple revenue-sharing system, with a view to shifting to an auction-based revenue-
sharing or a centralised auctioning revenue collection at a later stage. Such a step-by-step 
approach should ideally be consistent with the foreseen developments of the ETS. The 
timing of any development of the new own resources could take into account the 
following aspects: 
• The adjustments applicable upon the approval by the Community of an international 
agreement on climate change (Article 28 of the ETS Directive). A substantial re-
opening of some of the key provisions of the Directive cannot be excluded, in order 
to move to the more ambitious 30% reduction target in a balanced, transparent and 
equitable way. 
• Pursuant to the Auctioning Regulation, an auction platform will be appointed for a 
maximum of five years. For protecting the stability of the carbon market and the EU 
ETS itself, it is imperative to avoid any delay in the joint procurement of the auction 
platform. The Commission will have to seek approval from (participating) Member 
States for all major decisions in the procurement process and will not be able to 
unilaterally impose its own views. This has to be taken into account throughout the 
discussion on own resources. 
• The use of the common auction platform by the Commission would be possible only 
as from the procurement procedure for the next appointment period45 . 
• Pursuant to Article 9, the Commission shall review the linear factor and submit a 
proposal, where appropriate, to the European Parliament and to the Council as from 
2020, with a view to the adoption of a decision by 2025. 
3.3. Qualitative assessment of the own resource 
3.3.1. Preliminary questions 
(I) Earmarking and the ETS 
The ETS Directive foresees that, from 2013, a part of the revenues from the auctioning of 
allowances in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) should be used, inter alia, to 
tackle climate change in the EU and third countries. Therefore, some concerns have been 
raised that the transfer of auctioning revenue to the EU budget could ultimately reduce 
spending on climate and energy issues in the EU. 
44 
45 
In order to make use of the common auction platform, an amendment of the Joint Procurement 
Agreement pursuant to Article 91 ( 1) of the Financial Regulation and Article 125c of the 
Implementing Rules, which is to be agreed by the Commission and the Member States, would be 
required. 
Art. 33 of Regulation n'1031/2010 of 12 November 2010 contains a general revision clause. but 
this clause has not been conceived as a basis for rethinking essential elements of the EU ETS 
Directive itself. 
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It should, however, be underlined that the earmarking requirement is not a legally 
binding obligation, even though Member States must justify in case they would not meet 
it and this underlines the importance of the requirement to report on the actual 
spending46• In some Member States, there is a political agreement on the spending of 
auction revenues and/or the auction revenues are directly transferred to the relevant 
budget/bodies that will take care of the spending. But, overall, it is difficult to identify 
which part of the relevant spending would be done in absence of this earmarking 
requirement. 
The ETS directive offers a large room for interpretation. It specifies that at least 50% of 
auction revenues "or the equivalent in financial values" should be spent for a number of 
energy and climate-related purposes specified in the directive (including meeting the 
targets for renewables and energy efficiency). It also states that the Member States "shall 
be deemed to have fulfilled the provisions [on use of auction revenues} if they have in 
place and implement fiscal or financial support policies... which leverage financial 
support which have a value equivalent to at least 50% of the revenues generated from the 
auctioning of allowances ... ". This could imply that if Member States have existing 
policies in place that leverage an equivalent amount then they have met the requirements. 
In any event, the case for an own resource based on ETS auctioning revenue would 
probably be reinforced if it led to a visibly increased, additional allocation of funds to 
climate and energy action in the EU budget. But even in that case, it is unclear whether 
total spending on climate related purposes would actually increase. One cannot exclude 
the possibility that Member States spending on climate and energy priorities would be 
adjusted accordingly. This issue could be relevant i.a. for the financing aspects of any 
outcome of the ongoing international negotiations on climate change. 
(2) Decision-making procedures 
An element which could trigger resistance to auctioning revenue becoming part of the 
system of own resources, in particular under the auction-based revenue-sharing and the 
centralised collection variants described above, is the fear that decisions on future 
developments of the ETS would need to be taken by unanimity rather than qualified 
majority in the Council. 
It is useful to recall the current legal framework: 
• 
46 
47 
The own resources decision (ORD) requires a unanimous decision by the Council and 
approval by the Member States in accordance to their respective constitutional 
requirements47• Due to these specific requirements, the own resource decision is 
sometimes considered as a "quasi-treaty". In the past 20 years, reforms of the own 
resource decision have been agreed in the context of (successful) financial package 
negotiations covering the financial framework, the multiannual programmes, and all 
aspects related to the EU financing system, including correction mechanisms. 
Interestingly, the Lisbon Treaty made explicit the notion that the ORD "may establish 
new categories of own resources or abolish new categories". 
Reporting requirements will be elaborated in a revised Monitoring Decision to be adopted under 
co-decision. 
See Art. 311 of the treaty on the functioning of the EU. 
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• The ORD does not need to include all the details of an own resource. Already today, 
a number of other legal acts play an important role in the EU financing system48 • 
Moreover, a clear functional distinction must be drawn between instruments which 
govern the own resource as such and harmonising instruments which regulate the tax 
or other source of finance from which the own resource is drawn. Thus for example, 
the existing rules on the VAT own resource are quite separate from the legislation 
governing the charging of VAT. 
Accordingly, a measure establishing ETS revenue as an own resource would be wholly 
separate from the legislation governing the ETS. Even after a (unanimous) European 
Council decision was taken on including ETS auctioning revenue in the own resources 
system, the ETS system itself would continue to be regulated in accordance with the 
appropriate legal base, namely Article 192(1) TFEU, under the ordinary legislative 
procedure (which entails qualified majority in the Council). That is not to say that the 
ORD would have no influence on the legislation governing the ETS; on the contrary, 
depending on the variant adopted, amendments would need to be made to the Auctioning 
Regulation or the ETS Directive (or both). 
3.3.2. Criteria set out in the budget review 
(l) Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
The EU ETS is an EU scheme and it forms part of the acquis. Given the existence of an 
EU cluster in the international emission reduction efforts and the high level of 
externalities involved in C02 emissions, it could be argued that the EU should not only 
play a very important role in running the ETS, but it should also collect the revenue. 
At the same time, our analysis highlights that, under some variants, there is a risk related 
to re-opening the ETS Directive. An own resource based on auctioning revenues would 
have to preserve the key elements of the political agreement on the Climate and Energy 
Package. 
Besides, such an own resource could potentially facilitate additional climate-related 
actions through the EU budget, thus contributing further to EU climate objectives, in 
particular if a suitable form of earmarking for this new source of finance could be put in 
place. 
(2) Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
The EU ETS itself is an EU-wide instrument and the carbon market is truly European, if 
not wider, in its geographical scope. 
Centralized auctioning at European level would be more efficient than auctioning by 27 
Member States, in particular if the Commission was the sole auctioneer to auction all 
allowances. Under such a scenario, no joint procurement procedure with Member States 
48 See in particular Council Regulation 1150/2000 on the implementation of the ORD. Commission 
Decision 97/245 on TOR-related information, Council Regulation 1026/1999 on Commission OR 
inspections, Council Regulation 1553/89 on the collection of the VAT-based OR, Council 
Regulation 1287/2003 on the harmonisation ofGNl and Council Decision 2010/196 on the FlSIM 
allocation. 
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would be required and the implementation cost for Member States would fall away 
completel/9. 
In any event, the use of a single auction platform to be used by all Member States (as 
strongly advocated by the Commission) would already reduce administrative costs for 
the Member States to a very large extent. Most Member States supported this idea and 
are expected to make use of a common auction platform anyway. Adding the 
Commission as an auctioneer would add to operational complexity and costs - unless it 
came in replacement of the Member States auctioneers, which is proposed in the third 
variant above. 
(3) Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
The ETS Directive would constitute the basis for the implementation of the new own 
resource. 
For the purpose of an own resource, the auctions would be fully harmonised and open 
without discrimination as regards nationality across the internal market50. 
However, during the third trading period (2013-2020), ten new Member States may on a 
transitional basis allocate a significant but decreasing volume of allowances free of 
charge to electricity producers. Poland is determined to do so 5 1, while a number of other 
eligible new Member States have not decided so far to make use of this provision. This 
implies that some installations in some Member States would benefit from a different 
treatment than others until the end of 2020. This could slow down the implementation of 
a centralised collection mechanism. 
(4) Autonomous resource collection 
The simple revenue-sharing would rely fully on the Member States, as is currently the 
case with the VAT- and GNI-based contributions. This form of payments could be seen 
as a form of expenditure to be minimized for the Member States. 
With the auction-based revenue-sharing, the revenue could be transferred to the EU 
budget by the auctioneer and it would therefore not need to transit via the Member States 
budgets. However, each Member State would be able to know exactly how much was 
transferred by its auctioneer. 
Fully autonomous collection would only be possible with a centralised collection of 
auctioning revenue by the Commission. Even in this case, however, it could be possible 
for the Member States to estimate the share of the auctioning revenue borne by their 
economic operators. Due to the transparency in verified emissions reported by covered 
installations, each Member State could estimate how much money power generators 
operating on their territory have spent for purchasing the needed allowances. 
49 
50 
51 
Question would remain how to allow EEA-EFTA states to make use of the common auction 
platform. 
The Auctioning Regulation already provides rules in this respect that apply to the common 
auction platform as well as to any opt-out platform that would not wish to make use of the 
common auction platform. 
For Poland, a very rough estimate is that this could concern some 100 million allowances in 2013. 
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(5) Additional burden on specific sectors 
The ETS focuses on a limited number of installations (about 11.000) and sectors. 
However, using auctioning revenue as a new own resource would have no impact on 
these as the (re-)allocation of auctioning rights has no sector-specific impact. 
In a system of revenue-sharing as in a system of centralised revenue collection, (a part 
of) the auctioning revenue would accrue to the EU budget rather than to the Member 
States budgets. The impact would be fully neutral for installations subject to the 
auctioning system. 
It is debatable whether making auctioning revenue an EU own resource would have an 
impact on the policy developments, e.g. as regards expansion of the scope of the EU ETS 
and the corresponding reduction in the scope of energy taxation. In case new own 
resources would make use of the ETS auctioning revenues as well as part of the revenue 
of the energy tax, negative incentives on the expansion of the ETS could be minimized. 
In any event, the decision making process for the EU budget should not jeopardise 
regulatory stability of the EU ETS, as this would harm all sectors covered by the system. 
(6) Administrative burden for the EU administration 
The administrative burden of the simple revenue-sharing would be negligible. 
There may be limited costs under a system of auction-based revenue-sharing if the 
Member States ask the Commission to bear a share of the cost of the auction monitor. 
The most expensive option for the EU administration is the one where the Commission 
would be in charge of the auctioning. However, the total cost for the EU and its Member 
States would be significantly lower than under the current structure. 
3.4. Quantitative assessment of the own resource 
3 .4. 1. Revenue estimates 
The precise volume of allowances to be auctioned is not yet known and will depend on 
the implementation of the rules for free allocation. The amount of allowances auctioned 
is the difference between the total and the amount handed out for free: a) on the basis of 
the benchmarks and b) pursuant to the optional derogation for ten new Member States to 
continue to allocate free allowances to the power sector on a transitional basis 52• 
a) 
b) 
52 
The benchmarking decision was adopted in the Climate Change Committee in 
December 2010. It will only be known with a reasonable degree of certainty 
towards the end of 20 II how many free allowances will be handed out pursuant 
to this decision. 
A Commission guidance document ts m preparation; applications by eligible 
Member States have to be submitted to the Commission by September 20 II. 
Article JOe of the revised ETS Directive specifies that such use would directly reduce the Member 
State's share in the total volume of allowances to be auctioned. 
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Ample use of this provision would reduce the auction revenue, in particular in 
the early years of the third trading period. 
Until now, a rough estimate has been that about half of all allowances under the cap 
would be auctioned at the start of the third auctioning period. 
The cap on emissions, taking into account the extended scope, has been determined at 
just under 2.04 billion allowances. It should be noted, however, that this cap does not 
include the allowances for aviation, of which also 15% will be auctioned from 2012. The 
volume will decline by I. 74% per annum, also beyond 2020 (though subject to revision 
no later than by 2025). The current carbon price is around EUR 15. 
12% of the auction rights are distributed in view of achieving a balance in the Energy and 
Climate Package. See Annex 1 for the distribution over Member States. 
In case the EU would decide to aim at a 30% reduction of greenhouse gases by 2020 
instead of 20%, the volume of allowances to be auctioned is likely to decrease. The 
impact on auctioning revenues would, however, be offset by an increase of the carbon 
price. The Staff Working Paper accompanying the Commission's "Background 
information and analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission 
reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage"53 estimates this increase for the 
reference year 2020 at EUR 8 billion. This is one of the relevant arguments for Member 
States when defining their position. 
As indicated in the Staff Working Document accompanying the Budget Review 
Communication, "the revenue for the EU budget resulting from auctioning could amount 
to some EUR 20 billion54 in 2020 after the transfer of 12% of the revenues to some 
Member States in line with the European Council agreement of December 2008. 
Revenues for earlier years would probably be lower due to the reduced share of 
auctioning and likely lower price of emission allowances as the EU economy recovers 
from the crisis". This estimate would need to be revised upward should a decision be 
taken to increase the emission reduction objective. 
3.4.2. Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
Under the revenue-sharing mechanisms, the Member States would be able to easily 
identify their contribution to the EU budget based on the volume that they would auction. 
(See Annex 1 for an overview per Member States based on historical values). 
Even under the centralised auction by the Commission, Member States could still 
estimate, with some delay, the contributions of their operators using verified emissions 
data reported by covered installations. 
Distributional impacts could prove a sensitive issue for a number of Member States. The 
share of revenues that would come from Member States installations under this 
mechanism would be influenced by their shares of ETS emissions. Annex 1 highlights 
53 
54 
Communication SEC(2010)650 of26 May 2010. 
Estimate assuming a price per emission allowance of EUR 20.3 and an auctioning of 65% of total 
allowances. This estimate does not include the revenue from auctioning in the aviation sector and 
other potential sectors included in the scope of the EU ETS as of2013. 
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important discrepancies between Member States. Redistribution of auction rights 
between Member States was a key element in the final deal on the climate and energy 
package, and may also have been a reason not to consider a centralised EU approach. The 
balance found then would constitute an important element in the design of any own 
resource based on emissions auctioning revenue. 
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ANNEX 1 
MEMBER STATES' SHARES IN AUCTION RIGHTS 
Shares 
Shares according to 
according to Art. I 0(2) of 
historic share in the ETS 
emissions only Directive 
EU 100,00% 100,00% 
AT 1,55% 1,36% 
BE 2,57% 2,48% 
BG 1,99% 2,96% 
CY 0,24% 0,26% 
cz 3,92% 4,57% 
DK 1,39% 1,22% 
EE 0,62% 0,89% 
FI 1,86% 1,63% 
FR 6,08% 5,35% 
DE 22,24% 19,57% 
GR 3,30% 3,39% 
HU 1,22% 1,46% 
IE 1,04% 0,92% 
IT 10,50% 9,42% 
LV 0,13% 0,20% 
LT 0,31% 0,53% 
LU 0,12% 0,17% 
MT 0,09% 0,10% 
NL 3,72% 3,28% 
PL 9,61% 12,21% 
PT 1,69% 1,72% 
RO 3,23% 4,88% 
SK 1,17% 1,50% 
SI 0,41% 0,43% 
ES 8,51% 8,44% 
SE 0,90% 0,87% 
UK 11,59% 10,16% 
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4. EU CHARGE RELATED TO AIR TRANSPORT 
4.1. Political context 
4.1.1. Aviation in the EU 
Air transport performs many important functions in modern societies. Making a major 
contribution to- and benefiting from the European integration, aviation facilitates 
economic and cultural exchanges and is a significant source of employment and 
economic growth in many regions. The aviation industry constitutes also the source of 
intensive research and technological developments that lead to commercialisation of the 
state of art advanced products promoting European logistical and technological 
excellence. 
The aviation sector is also an example of how the Community presence and competences 
help achieving safe, orderly, efficient business air transport operations throughout 
Europe, while somewhat mitigating unfavourable environmental impact. Air transport is 
one of the EU's success stories. The liberalisation of the EU air transport market in the 
early 1990s was a cornerstone of EU transport policy, and has generated broad economic 
benefits, notably through expanded air services, greater competition and lower air fares. 
The EU has responded to challenges resulting from 27 separate airspaces in the Single 
European Sky initiatives, which includes the establishment of the EUR 2.1 billion 
SESAR Joint Undertaking55 • 
Four issues are particularly important for the debate on an EU charge related to air 
transport: 
Firstly, as shown below, several Member States have introduced an airline ticket tax or 
are introducing it (most recently, Germany on 11112011 and Austria on 3113/2011). 
Mushrooming aviation taxes could have a negative impact on the proper functioning of 
the Internal Market and lead to tax-related distortions of competition in the air transport 
sector. Setting up a new own resource related to air transport could be an opportunity to 
ensure a more coherent taxation of the sector across the EU. 
Secondly, a new own resource based on the aviation sector could help ensuring a more 
level-playing field in the area of transport. Aviation currently benefits from a very 
favourable tax regime (virtually no taxation of kerosene and no VAT on air tickets) 
compared to, for instance, road- and rail transport. 
The Commission adopted recently a White Paper on transport56, which states that "many 
branches of transport [including air transport} are treated favourably in terms of 
taxation, in comparison to the rest of the economy". "Generally, these arrangements 
provide conflicting incentives with respect to the efforts to improve the efficiency of the 
transport system and reduce its external costs. The Commission will examine proposals 
to achieve greater consistency between the various elements of transport taxation". 
55 
l6 
EUR 350 million 7th FP, € 350 million TEN-T, EUR 700 million EUROCONTROL and 
EUR 200 million other. 
COM(2011)144 of28.3.2011. 
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In this context, it should also be recalled that the subsidies granted to various branches of 
the transport sector as well as their mode of operation differ widely. At the same time, 
the aviation industry remains historically a sector with very low average rates of return 
on capital, and it is subject to strong cycles in activity and highly vulnerable to external 
shocks (e.g. terrorism, health alerts, natural disasters). Nevertheless, current differences 
create the risk of tax-related distortions of transportation decisions and investments. 
Thirdly, in the EU and international context, aviation taxation is often mentioned in 
relation to two other issues, namely climate change and the financing of development57• 
Even though there has been significant improvement in aircraft technology and 
operational efficiency this has not been enough to neutralise the effect of increased 
traffic, and the growth in emissions is likely to continue in the decades to come58. 
It should be recalled that the inclusion of the aviation into the EU ETS will only partly 
mitigate the industry's climate impact, notably due to the fact that it does not cover its 
non-C02 impacts 59. Aviation will benefit from a large free allocation of emission 
allowances (85%) under the ETS. While scientific uncertainties remain over such 
impacts, the Commission made commitments to the European Parliament that it would 
act on aviation NOx emissions. Thus, having regards to the "polluter pays" principle 
enshrined in the Lisbon treaty (art. 191 §2), the question arises as to whether an EU own 
resource could play a role in this respect. 
Lastly, these arguments have to be weighed against concerns about the impact on 
cohesion, competitiveness, mobility and sustainability. The White Paper on transport 
places a strong emphasis on these themes. An aviation tax could potentially have an 
adverse economic impact on Member States or regions that are particularly dependent on 
aviation for their economic development, such as island states or peripheral regions, and 
regions heavily dependent on inbound tourism. The European air transport industry is 
also facing growing international competitive pressures, and any tax which falls 
disproportionately on European airlines relative to their global competitors could 
intensify those pressures. 
Such concerns were raised by the aviation industry, as reflected by the recent Bruges 
Declaration (October 2010). The European aviation community called for action to 
"maintain and improve a competitive European aviation industry to create additional 
employment opportunities in Europe; in that context, [to] avoid additional burdens (e.g. 
taxes on aviation) affecting European carriers' competitiveness". The industry considers 
that an EU aviation charge would negatively imfoact a sector which contributes 
significantly to the EU's socio-economic development 0. 
57 
58 
59 
60 
See http://unfccc.int/methods _and_ science/emissions_ from _intl_transport/items/1 057.php and the 
Landau report on http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/LandauENG !.pdf. 
While the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions fell by 5.7% from 1990 to 2005, emissions from 
civil aviation increased by almost 79% - see "EU energy and transport in figures. Statistical 
pocketbook 2007 /2008", p. 186. 
EU ETS covers only carbon dioxide (C02) emissions leaving aside other components 
characteristic for aviation such as NOx, water vapour emitted at high altitude and sulphate and 
soot particles. 
Following the adoption of the Budget Review on 19 October 2010, industry stakeholders have 
expressed their concerns in two joint letters sent to President Barroso. 
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Therefore, the aviation sector can be expected to oppose strongly to any new tax that 
would simply be added to existing Member States' taxes and to the Emission Trading 
System (which will start being applied to the aviation sector from 2012). However, 
Member States and the industry itself could have an interest to streamline different 
national tax schemes via an EU aviation duty in order to ensure a level playing field for 
aviation companies, taking also into account future initiatives to be financed through the 
EU budget. 
4. I. 2. Aviation and the own resource debate 
The Commission took a favourable stance on the idea of a duty related to aviation in the 
2005 report on EU financing61 . The idea is also mentioned in the EP Resolution on EU 
financing of March 2007. 
More recently, the idea has been supported by several MEPs during the Budget Review 
consultation process: H. Triipel (Greens-EFA, DE) and G. Onesta (Greens-EFA, FR) 
proposed the introduction of "a new income source only for the additional expenditure 
considered necessary, e.g. an air traffic levy". A similar position has been supported by 
the Union of European Federalists62 • 
A duty related to aviation has been pointed out as a feasible new own resource to the EU 
budget63 . However, no detailed proposals have been made so far. 
4.2. Outline of the proposal 
4.2.1. Identifying variants 
Two variants appear potentially suitable in the context of the own resource discussion. 
• The departure tax is an airline ticket tax per passenger on departures from an EU 
airport. Inspired by existing taxes (being) set up by a number of Member States, it 
could permit a modulation depending, for instance, on distance and travel class. 
• The flight duty is a tax on each freight and passenger .llighl entering, operating within 
and/or leaving the "EU Flight Information Region", i.e. the combined FIRs of the EU 
Member States, or departing from an EU airport. It could be based on one or several 
technical variables, such as a distance factor. 
On the other hand, two potential variants have been discarded in the context of this 
analysis. 
61 
62 
63 
See COM(2004)505, Vol. II, p. 50. The Commission also actively pursued the idea of an air ticket 
tax as a means to finance development aid. See for instance SEC(2005)1067 and SEC(2005)733. 
"a direct EU-tax should replace the national contributions and establish a direct link between the 
citizens and the EU. A Eurotax could take the form of .. an air traffic levy". Reply to the budget 
review consultation, ref: 13.04.2008- UEF Groupe Europe- Worldwide- (20080413_NG_l6). 
See http:// ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/issues/read _ en.htm 
See for instance Begg, 1., Enderlein, H., Le Cacheux, J. and M. Mrak (2008), "Financing the 
European Union budget", Study for the European Commission, Directorate General for Budget, 
Final Report. 
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• Kerosene taxation has been discarded for legal reasons. Although fuel used for 
commercial aviation is generally exempt from excise duties, following the adoption 
of Council Directive 2003/96/EC ("the Energy Taxation Directive" or "ETD") 
Member States can already introduce fuel taxation for domestic flights. In the EU 
only the Netherlands has so far decided to do so. The ETD also allows, subject to 
mutual agreement, fuel taxation to be introduced for flights between two Member 
States (intra-Community flights). In such cases it would apply to all EU carriers. 
However, the ETD in its present form 64 does not allow to tax fuel for international 
aviation. This comes from the past when it has been common practice for aircraft fuel 
for international flights to be exempted from all taxes - a policy originally established 
to promote civil aviation during its infancy. The legally binding exemptions are found 
in the bilateral air service agreements (ASAs). Avoiding discrimination against EU 
carriers could therefore be difficult on routes where non-EU carriers have traffic 
rights and continue to enjoy tax exemptions under the relevant ASAs. In this context, 
the judgments delivered on 5 November 2002 by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities in the "Open Skies" cases are significant. They triggered a 
comprehensive reform of the EU' s external aviation relations. As part of this process, 
more than 500 ASAs between EU Member States and non-EU countries have already 
been amended to open the possibility of taxing fuel supplied to EU and non-EU 
carriers on an equal basis (see Box 4 for more details). As acknowledged by the 
Commission in its 2005 communication "Reducing the climate change impact of 
aviation", this present specificity and the related timing issues were among the 
reasons why the Commission suggested instead addressing the climate change impact 
of aviation by incorporating it into the EU Emission Trading System. 
Box 4: BILATERAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES 
As regards bilateral air services agreements (ASAs) with third countries, the Commission 
has been engaged since 2003 in a process of negotiating EU-level aviation agreements 
with third countries. These agreements have taken two main forms. 
• 
• 
64 
First there are the EU's comprehensive aviation agreements, which replace Member 
States' bilateral agreements with the third country concerned and establish an EU-
wide framework for the provision of air services by the airlines of each side. So far 
such agreements have been reached with a number of neighbouring countries, (e.g. 
the European Common Aviation Area covering the western Balkans, Morocco, 
Jordan and Georgia) and with the United States and Canada (although some of these 
agreements have yet to enter formally into force). 
Second there are so-called horizontal agreements, negotiated at EU level by the 
Commission, which amend only certain provisions in the bilateral ASAs between the 
Member States and the third country concerned. The purpose of these horizontal 
negotiations is to bring Member States' bilateral ASAs into conformity with EU law 
in certain respects through a single EU-level agreement which simultaneously 
amends all Member States' ASAs with the third country concerned. 
A detailed analysis of possible amendments to the ETD has been proposed by ClientEarth (2010), 
"Removing barriers to taxing the supply or use of aviation and maritime fuels. Proposed 
amendments and briefing note to Energy Taxation Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003", 
December 20 I 0. 
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In all of these negottatwns, the Commission has sought to include a clause on the 
taxation of aviation fuel used on intra-EU flights. This clause would allow Member 
States to make use of the possibility of applying to third country carriers a tax on aviation 
fuel as foreseen by Directive 2003/96. The Commission has so far negotiated agreements 
with 45 countries in total. In the majority of cases, the third country has accepted the 
clause on fuel taxation on intra-EU flights. However, seven of those countries did not 
accept the clause - Australia, Canada, India, Israel, Pakistan, Singapore and Vietnam. 
The comprehensive agreement with the United States includes a provision under which 
the Joint Committee would consider a case where two or more Member States envisage 
applying a fuel tax to US carriers on intra-EU routes65 . The Commission had also 
attempted in its air transport negotiations with the US to remove in its entirety the tax 
exemption for aircraft fuel, but this was refused by the US. 
The removal of the tax exemption for aircraft fuel on flights to and from the EU can, in 
theory, be achieved through renegotiation of bilateral ASAs with third countries. 
However, experience of negotiations with third countries to date suggests that this would 
be a difficult and slow process, and that many third countries would be likely simply to 
refuse the removal of the exemption. 
In conclusion: although the situation is evolving there are still legal and practical 
barriers to taxing kerosene stemming from international agreements. In view of the 
existence of alternative approaches which could be more suitable for the development 
of an EU own resource, this specific variant is not examined further in this context. 
• VAT on plane tickets has been discarded due to the fact that it is a less effective way 
to tax passengers than a passenger tax as examined below. The overview of the 
application of VAT to passenger transport in the EU can be found in Annex I. Whilst 
international sea and air transport services are exempt from VAT in the whole of the 
EU-27, VAT is paid, subject to varying conditions, on international passenger 
transport within the EU on inland waterways, rail and road transport in 9 Member 
States. This raises the question of neutrality of VAT application to passenger transport 
which will be a part of the ongoing debate on the future of the VAT in the EU 
launched with the Green Paper on VA T66 . The outcome of this debate is to be 
awaited. 
As a matter of fact VAT is a tax collected at the various stages of the production and 
distribution cycle of a good or service, but which as a rule falls on final consumption. 
This means that in business-to-business transactions preceding the final consumption 
stage (typically sale of good or service to private consumer) the providing business 
charges output VAT which as a rule can be deducted by the receiving business as 
input VAT. Consequently, only the sale of airline tickets to non-business consumers 
Article 11(6) of the EU-US Air Transport Agreement reads as follows: "ln the event that two or 
more Member States envisage applying to the fuel supplied to aircraft of US airlines in the 
territories of such Member States for flights between such Member States any waiver of the 
exemption contained in Article 14(b) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003, the 
Joint Committee shall consider that issue, in accordance with paragraph 4(e) of Article 18." 
Article 18(4) reads as follows: "The Joint Committee shall also develop cooperation by: (e) 
making decisions, on the basis of consensus, concerning any matters with respect to application of 
paragraph 6 of Article 11." 
COM(2010)695 final. 
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who cannot deduct input VAT will yield revenue. This VAT option is then similar to 
a straightforward airline ticket tax with the difference however that in the latter case 
business customers are also taxed which results in higher revenues. 
Second, a number of technical complications would need to be addressed. For the 
sake of simplicity and compliance cost reasons, it seems appropriate to apply the 
harmonized rules laid down in the EU VAT Directive 2006/112/EC to the surcharged 
VAT (as an EU resource on top of national VAT) on plane tickets. Currently, the 
place of supply of passenger transport is the place where the transport takes place, 
proportionate to the distances covered. The area outside the EU would thus not be 
taxed. However, this rule is difficult to apply and would possibly need to be adapted 
in the light of the discussions on the future of VAT. Furthermore, business travelers 
would pay VAT for example to the operating airline company which is remitted to 
the EU budget, but would be entitled to deduct this VAT paid. Where and against 
which tax administrations would they claim the input VAT refund (e.g. a Dutch 
national working for a UK corporation flying from Brussels to Spain)? 
In conclusion, a departure ticket tax is more straightforward and would be levied on a 
larger tax basis than a VAT on plane tickets. 
4.2.2. Tax basis 
(I) Departure tax 
This tax could be levied on the carriage, from an EU airport, of chargeable passengers on 
chargeable aircraft: 
• 
• 
A chargeable passenger is anyone carried on the aircraft with the exception of a 
limited number of exemptions. These could include transit passengers, i.e. the tax 
could apply to the journey as a whole - when an aircraft makes a stop 'en route' and 
passengers do not change aircraft, then no additional duty should be due for the leg of 
the journey immediately after the stop. Similarly, for connecting flights, a passenger 
who has a ticket would not be a chargeable passenger on the second or subsequent 
flight of his journey if that flight and the previous flight are connected67• 
A chargeable aircraft is anl aircraft which is designed or adapted to carry persons in 
addition to the flight crew6 . 
The amount due could be dependent on the final destination and class of travel of the 
chargeable passenger. 
67 
68 
Some categories of airline employees could also be exempted, for instance flight crews, cabin 
attendants, employees escorting a passenger or goods, employees undertaking repair, 
maintenance, safety or security work and employees ensuring the hygienic preparation and 
handling of food and drinks. Exemptions could also apply to children below the age of two who 
are not allocated a separate seat before boarding the aircraft, to passengers who are carried free of 
charge under a statutory obligation (for example deportees) or to inspect aircraft or crew (for 
example CAA flight operations inspectors), and to short pleasure flights. 
Exceptions can be foreseen for small aircraft with a maximum take-off weight under a specified 
amount (e.g. ten tonnes) or with fewer than a certain number of seats for passengers (e.g. 20). 
Private aircrafts can also be exempted. 
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An exemption (or reduced rates) could be foreseen for flights departing from airports 
located in specific territories, such as overseas countries and territories of Member States. 
Specific rules could also be designed for circumstances beyond the control of the airline 
(due to weather conditions, mechanical failure, etc.), for military flights and other flights 
with specific purposes. 
(2) Flight duty 
This tax could apply to all flights entering, operating within and/or leaving the 'EU Flight 
Information Region'69 , except for overflights, or to all flights departing from an EU 
airport. Equal treatment of operators regardless of their nationality would be ensured, 
consistent with the Chicago Convention. 
Certain categories of flights may qualify for exemption from the duty related to aviation 
as a result oflegal obligations for instance the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations 
that provides for special treatment of flights conducted under the auspices of foreign 
diplomatic relations or representations. Similar considerations should apply to military 
forces flights if concurred upon reciprocal agreements of the parties involved70• 
Similar to the departure tax, exemptions (or reduced duties) could be envisaged m 
relation to the specific origin or destination of the flight. 
4.2.3. Duty rate 
( 1 ) Departure tax 
The departure tax offers a large degree of flexibility as to the rate structure. Typically, 
rates could depend on the following main factors: 
• a measure of distance travelled. This could for instance be defined using a destination 
band structure, differentiating European destinations vs. non-European destinations, 
or distance ranges [e.g. 0-2000 krn; 2001-4000 krn, etc.]. The distance factor could be 
based on the distance between the capitals of the origin-destination countries or 
airports 71 ; 
69 
70 
71 
a differentiation based on the class of travel, to reflect the ability-to-pay of passengers 
and reduce the impact on tourism. This factor could take into account the seating 
configuration (seat pitch), the existence of premium classes, etc. 
That is, the area corresponding to the combined EU Member States flight information regions. 
Exemptions could apply to flight under visual flight routes, public or special service flights, 
emergency service flights, calibration flights, humanitarian relief flights, training, maintenance 
and circular flights. 
The UK approach of using the distance between capitals as a basis to determine in which band the 
flights should be has been criticized for having distorting effects, in particular for the Caribbeans: 
"The current banding system places the Caribbean at a competitive disadvantage to holiday 
destinations in the USA, as Washington is significantly closer to London than are any of the 
Caribbean capitals". See ABTA, "The Economic and Social Implications of Air Passenger Duty: 
Passengers, UK pic, and Destinations". 
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Specific provisions may be required for connecting flights, inter alia. 
(2) Flight duty 
The amount of the duty would depend on the aircraft technical characteristic and other 
relevant parameters. The parameters could be calibrated in order to provide the necessary 
incentive to air operators and according to the budgetary needs. The duty could, m 
principle, be such that the more efficient planes would pay less, ceteris paribus. 
The following indicative list of parameters could be considered, although it would have 
to be ensured that the basis of the duty did not amount in effect to a tax on fuel 
consumption: 
• an indicative measure of resource consumption (the maximum take-off weight -
MTOW) or an indicative performance measure such as engine limitation (e.g. 
maximum static thrust at take-off- MTOT); 
• a measure of the origin-destination distance of the flight in question within the "EU 
Flight Information Region" or another form of measure of distance from the EU 
airport of departure based on solutions already experienced by Member States (e.g. 
the UK banding system); 
• other relevant readily available parameters based on airplane characteristics (for 
instance NOx emissions, noise characteristics, etc.). 
4.2.4 Implementation 
(I) Departure tax 
Based on existing experiences, the most straightforward approach would be to levy the 
tax through the airlines. 
In practice, companies operating chargeable aircrafts used for the carriage of chargeable 
passengers from EU airports would need to register for the departure tax. Registration 
would need to take place before or within a limited period after the chargeable flight take 
place, that is, when a chargeable passenger would have been carried on a chargeable 
aircraft. Non compliance would lead to financial penalties. 
Registration could be done using a simple form, to be sent either to the EU 
administration in charge or to a national administration (to be created in most Member 
States). Considering the fact that this would be a new tax (possibly coming in 
replacement of- or credited against national taxes), there could be substantial economies 
of scale by organizing the tax collection at EU level. 
Specific procedures could be set up for companies, which do not have a business 
establishment in the EU (e.g. for fiscal or administrative representatives), and for one-off 
flights. 
Procedures for accounts and records would also need to be defined, based on existing 
procedures proved to be workable at national level. 
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An alternative to this approach could be to rely on EUROCONTROL to compute, bill 
and collect the tax on behalf of the EU, subject to overcoming the legal and institutional 
obstacles described below. This approach would appear more convenient in the case of 
the flight duty but should certainly not be ruled out a priori for the departure tax. 
(2) Flight duty 
Similar to the departure tax, the flight duty could be paid by airlines and collected by an 
EU administration. However, considering the form of the duty and the experience of 
EUROCONTROL in imposing formula-based charges on flights, this institution could be 
used as a collecting agent on behalf of the EU. 
The collection system could be inspired by existing solutions already proved to be 
successfully operational and accepted over the years. In practice, the tax could be based 
on a simple formula and mainly rely on data currently used by EUROCONTROL or 
publicly available information on aircraft characteristics. 
The potential administrative burden would then only encompass limited costs induced by 
the expansion of the existing recording, registration and data management schemes such 
as EUROCONTROL's Route Charges System (RCS)72 managed by the Central Route 
Charging Office (CRCO) based in Brussels. The CRCO already establishes, calculates, 
bills and collects charges levied on aircraft operators using en-route air navigation 
facilities and services on behalf of Contracting Parties. Each airline receives a bill in 
euros, no matter how many States were overflown. The data bases required and the 
technical facilities necessary for precise and timely computing the duty due are already in 
place. Overall, some 80 % of the revenues of air navigation services providers operating 
in the Eurocontrol Member States are collected by the CRCO. 
Although the flight duty would be a tax instead of a charge (corresponding to a service 
rendered to operators), the technical aspects would be basically the same, mutatis 
mutandis. The main issues then would be legal and political- i.e. one should ensure that 
it is legally possible and politically feasible to use the services of EUROCONTROL to 
collect a new EU own resource. These issues are examined in more detail below. 
The flight operator would be liable for the duty on a flight-by-flight basis. Whether or not 
the cost of the duty would be passed further onto the final consumers would be a 
commercial decision to be made by the operators. 
4.3. Qualitative assessment of the own resource 
4. 3.1. Preliminary questions 
(l) Experience in EU Member States 
Several Member States already impose a departure tax or a tax on passengers as shown in 
the survey displayed in Annex 2. 
This survey illustrates that 
72 Central Route Charging Office (CRCO), "Customer Guide to Charges, May 2008, version 3.4" as 
available on http://www.Eurocontrol.int/crco/gallervlcontent/public/docs/other/customerguide.pdf. 
59 EN 
• A tax on the aviation sector is feasible. The most popular existing form of duty 
among the Member States appears to be the departure/passenger tax, with a 
modulation based on range of distances. The flight duty has not been developed at 
Member State level so far (this measure was considered and rejected in the UK). 
• Smaller EU Member States appear to suffer particularly from the (risk of) tax-related 
displacement of air transport activities to neighbouring countries. Due to the 
displacements of flights, passenger taxes had to be withdrawn in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Malta, and to be reduced in Ireland. Attempts to introduce the tax 
failed in Sweden and Belgium. In larger States, such as Germany, France or the UK, 
some displacement of activities are expected or have been observed73 • It seems that it 
takes a certain territorial size to successfully implement and maintain a tax over time. 
This suggests that displacement of traffic could be substantially reduced by 
establishing such a tax at EU level, although displacement to non-EU airports (e.g. 
Switzerland or non-EU tourist destinations on the Mediterranean) would potentially 
occur. 
• Passenger taxes in several Member States provide for specific provisions for transit 
and transfer passengers. This seems to reflect the notion that applying a tax to transit 
and transfer passengers, who make an substantial contribution to the economic 
viability of air services operated by the network airlines, could increase the 
displacement of traffic. 
• A differentiation of the rate between travel classes seems to be driven by social and 
political motives. In case of a passenger departure tax, rate differentiations between 
European and long-haul flights are important and changes in relative price differences 
may also lead to substitution of destinations. 
• Amounts of the tax can be significant (up to EUR 4 billions yearly in the UK). 
• Putting a charge on aviation can be very rapid (a few months were needed to set up 
the system in Germany). 
(2) Lessons from economic theory 
The air transport operators are subject to corporate tax on their earnings in the place of 
the residence. On top of this various indirect taxes or levies have been scrutinized and 
discussed in recent years 74 - some of them followed by policy initiatives. Keen and 
Strand (2006) suggest that the aviation industry taxation is sub-optimal due to a series of 
market failures 75 • 
• 
73 
74 
75 
First, many adverse environmental externalities exist, such as air pollution, including 
carbon emissions and other emission affecting global warming, noise, pollution and 
One example is a study conducted on behalf of Rheinland-Pfalz, which estimates that the German 
ticket tax will lead to a decrease in air traffic of 4.5-6 million passengers and a related loss of 
10,000-15,000 jobs in Germany. 
Commission Staff Working Paper 1067, "A Possible Contribution Based on Airline Tickets as a 
New Source of Financing Development: Technical Reflections in the Run up to the UN High 
Level Event," and Commission Staff Working Paper 467 ''New Sources of Financing for 
Development: A Review of the Options". 
M. Keen and J. Strand (2006), "Indirect Taxes on International Aviation", WP/06/124, IMF. 
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• 
76 
77 
78 
congestion at airports. If the justification of an av1at10n charge is to improve 
allocative efficiency by correcting for externalities, then the optimal policy would be 
to tax the externalities directly. As the principal environmental externalities 
associated with aviation are those related to noise, local air quality and climate 
change, a tax should therefore ideally be applied directly to the emissions of specific 
gases. Having said that, under the principle of subsidiarity local environmental 
externalities are best addressed by local instruments, such as modulation of airport 
charges, and not by an EU-wide tax. However, competition between airports and 
between local authorities may make local taxation of externalities particularly 
difficult and this could call for a national or EU approach. 
One should also recall that the climate change impacts of aviation C02 emissions will 
be mitigated by the participation of the industry into the ETS76• Including a parameter 
related to (NOx) emissions in the flight duty could, in theory, fill in a gap in the 
existing framework, but the scientific basis for such a measure is subject to debates. 
A slight! y less optimal policy would be to tax kerosene, which is at the source of 
emissions. (However, as indicated above, the legal framework still constitutes an 
impediment in this respect.) Lastly, a tax which is not directly related to the 
production of the environmental externalities, such as a passenger tax, would be a 
blunter instrument which would have an effect only by dampening demand and so 
would not give operators an incentive to improve environmental performance77• 
This theoretical analysis is confirmed by impact estimates related to the UK APD and 
potential alternatives78• This study demonstrates that "aviation taxes are unlikely to 
substantially change aviation emissions. The sensitivity analysis does reveal a crucial 
assumption; if we assume that domestic holidays and foreign holidays are not 
substitutes for one another, then a boarding tax would have a perverse effect on 
emissions. That is, the higher the tax, the higher the emissions. However, if domestic 
and foreign holidays are substitutes, then a boarding tax may reduce emissions. We 
also find, not unexpectedly, that an emissions tax would have the desired result of 
reducing emissions, even if domestic and foreign holidays are not substitutes. An 
emissions tax thus has the desired impact, and can be designed to raise the same 
revenue as the boarding taxes currently under discussion". The exact design and the 
differentiation of rates according to distance and/or class of travel may have 
important consequences regarding environmental externalities. 
Second, imposing taxes on the aviation sector could reduce the existing imbalance 
observed in transport taxation and facilitate a modal shift to other modes of 
transportation. However, such a shift is likely to remain modest since aviation and 
other modes of transportation are not close substitutes beyond a few hundred 
kilometres. In addition, from a equity point of view, basing an EU own resource on 
one individual sector has to be weighed against the benefits the sector derives from 
EU policies and the contribution that it makes to the EU's economy and wider EU 
policy objectives. 
85% of the aviation emissions are exempted from auctioning under the ETS directive. 
See Communication on Reducing the Climate Change Impact of Aviation, SEC(2005) 1184. 
Mayor, Karen and To!, Richard S.J. Economic and Social Research Institute. Dublin. Ireland. The 
impact of the UK aviation tax on carbon dioxide emissions and visitor numbers. April 2007. 
61 EN 
Besides, economic arguments also relate to the broader economic impact (the spill-over 
effects) of the aviation sector. Reliance on air transport differs significantly inside the EU 
and so does the dependence of national and regional economies. This is most evident for 
peripheral regions and for countries where the tourism sector is particularly important for 
the level ofGDP. Whereas a number of traditional tourist destinations within and outside 
the EU could be negatively affected by a tax on air transport79, local tourism of (local) 
residents could increase through substitution in a number of EU Member States. 
Moreover, since air transport is a network business, there may be a disproportionate 
effect on those Member States which have the largest hub airports, e.g. London, Paris 
and Frankfurt. 
In general, effects on the industry and specific operators would very much depend not 
only on the design of the tax but also on the business model of aviation sector operators. 
There is for instance potentially an issue about equitable treatment between passenger 
airlines, many of whom also carry freight on their aircraft, and all-cargo airlines. A ticket 
tax, contrarily to a flight duty, would apply to passenger airlines but, by definition, not to 
all-cargo operators. Furthermore, scheduled airlines, which often operate emptier planes, 
could be put at a disadvantage with a flight duty compared to charter companies, which 
operate fuller planes. Conversely, a departure tax could fall more heavily on charter 
companies than on scheduled airlines. 
If the option of an air transport tax were to be pursued further, a number of issues would 
need to be addressed in terms of its design and applicability. This would include whether 
different rates should apply to different flight distances, to different classes of travel, and 
whether it should apply to passengers in transit or transferring. 
(3) Legal issues 
Certain legal provisions reduce possibilities to tax avJatJOn. Those may result from 
international conventions, EU legal provisions or bilateral air service agreements. 
• 
• 
79 
An important distinction has to be made between (i) charges, which constitute 
remunerations for services, e.g. for the use of airports or for air navigation services 
and (ii) taxes, which constitute payments made by citizens to the public purse and 
cannot be considered remuneration for a service but are intended to provide for the 
general expenses of public authorities. The departure tax and the flight duty fall 
clearly in the second category. A flight duty would raise no different concerns than a 
passenger tax, assessed on each flight of a passenger (with differentiations perhaps as 
to the distance flown), so that both can be considered jointly in this specific context. 
Whereas the Chicago convention (Article 15, paragraph 3) provides that "No fees, 
dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of 
the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a 
contracting State or persons or property thereon", statements made by the ICAO 
appear to support the conclusion that this clause does not stand in the way of 
"passenger taxes" or "flight duties", contemplated as genuine taxes. Indeed, the ICAO 
To take extreme cases, according to research produced by Oxford Economics in May 2010, it is 
estimated that tourism in Barbados will account for 47.9% GOP in 2010; 37.8% in St Lucia; and 
78.4% in Antigua & Barbuda. 
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Council Resolution on Taxation of International Air Transport ostensibly moves on 
the premise that such taxes are not incompatible with the convention. 
• However, "passenger taxes" applied by Member States have given rise to litigation in 
national Courts, with conflicting interpretations of Article 15(3), and thus conflicting 
results. Notably: the UK "Air Passenger Duty" has been declared compatible with 
this provision by the High Court of Justice in 2007; by contrast, in a judgment of 
2005, the Belgian Council of State declared incompatible with Article 15(3) the 
yearly tax on the operation of aircraft imposed by the Belgian local Council of 
Zaventem, the amount of which depended on the number of passengers carried. It 
seems that the problem has equally arisen in the Netherlands, where a national judge 
has dismissed an application against the Passenger tax imposed by that State, based 
on Article 15(3) of the Chicago Convention. 
• In summary, it can be noted that passenger taxes appear not to be considered contrary 
to the Chicago convention by the ICAO bodies, but that their compatibility with 
Article 15(3) of the convention has been disputed in national Courts, with diverging 
results. "Flight duties" such as those apparently envisaged would not call for an 
analysis different from passenger taxes. 
• Lastly, regarding the compatibility of these taxes with customs law, a flight duty or 
passenger tax would be levied on events associated to transport activities, but not on 
goods as such, be it directly or indirectly. A comparative examples illustrates this 
difference: whereas flights or travels by passengers with an airplane (in operation ) 
may be subject to a "flight duty" or "passenger tax", the importation of a dismantled 
aeroplane into the customs territory (with the help of an appropriate vehicle) would 
not be subject to these levies. Therefore, the duty is neither a customs duty nor 
comparable to it and cannot thus be contrary to customs law. 
However, some observers consider that a flight duty could be more vulnerable on legal 
grounds than a departure tax, as it could be more prone to being characterised as 
effectively a tax on fuel consumption. Proposing, as was done in 2008 in a UK 
consultation document (see Annex 2), that a flight duty be based on the maximum take-
off weight (MTOW) of the aircraft was regarded as a reasonable proxy for the 
environmental impact of a flight, but at the same time could potentially also be seen as a 
rather imperfect proxy for an aircraft's fuel consumption. Basing the duty specifically on 
an aircraft's C02 emissions (putting aside the difficulties of doing so in the absence of 
any agreed methodology for measuring individual aircraft C02 performance) could have 
made the link to fuel consumption more explicit. Although this approach is not envisaged 
here, the possible inclusion of environmental variables would need to be carefully 
considered in the light of this argument. 
(4) Role ofEUROCONTROL 
As indicated above, a practical option that could be envisaged is to have the passenger 
tax or the flight duty be levied by EUROCONTROL on behalf of the EU. This could in 
particular be suitable for the flight duty as EUROCONTROL currently operates a 
number of charges (as described in the legal section above), which have a number of 
common features with the tax under consideration. 
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Under such a model, EUROCONTROL could compute, bill and collect the duties from 
the operators. Factual information on this organization is provided in Box 5 below. 
However, this would be a practical option only if certain legal and institutional obstacles 
could be overcome, as explained below. 
Box 5: THE EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION (EUROCONTROL) 
EUROCONTROL is a civil-military intergovermnental organisation with 39 Member 
States across the European continent: 26 Member States of the EU as well as Albania, 
Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, 
Serbia, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine. 
Estonia is the only EU country not being a member80• 
It was established by the "EUROCONTROL International Convention relating to 
Cooperation for the Safey of Air Navigation" of 13 December 1960. This Convention 
was amended on 12 February 1981. In 1997, the amended Convention (hereafter "the 
Convention") was revised to take into account changes in the political and operational 
environment of air traffic management81 . On 8 October 2002, the Member States and the 
European Cormnunity have signed a Protocol on the Accession of the European 
Community to the revised EUROCONTROL Convention82. The headquarters and the 
Central Route Charging Office (CRCO) are located in Brussels. 
Its mission is to harmonise and integrate air navigation services in Europe, aiming at the 
creation of a uniform air traffic management system for civil and military users, in order 
to achieve the safe, secure, orderly, expeditious and economic flow of traffic throughout 
Europe, while minimising adverse environmental impact. In terms of strategic priorities, 
"coordinated implementation of the Single European Sky and the Single European Sky 
ATM Research Programme (SESAR), has the highest priority. It will drive the change 
from the current system to the future one." 
• 
80 
81 
82 
From a legal perspective, instituting EUROCONTROL as a collecting agent would 
suppose changes at two levels. First, at the level of EUROCONTROL itself, the new 
task would have to be agreed to by the EUROCONTROL Member States, which may 
require an amendment of the Convention. Let us just note here that collecting taxes 
for the EU does not seem in the remit nor in the objectives of Eurocontrol, whose role 
is to support its 39 Member States in improving air traffic management. Articles 
2.l.i, 2.2.c and 2.3.b of the Eurocontrol Convention limit the scope of the 
Organisation's role as a "collector" to I) assisting at their request its Member States 
or third States having an agreement (and not a third party); 2) in the collection of 
charges (and not taxes); and 3) due only in relation to air navigation services. Any 
The Estonian Air Navigation Services is organised by a I 00% State owned company. See 
www.eans.ee and 
http:/ /www.Eurocontrol.int/prc/gallery/content/public/Docs/ace2006/factsheets/factsheet/EANS _ 2 
006.pdf. For the levying of taxes relating to the Estonian airspace, special measures would 
therefore be necessary. 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/03%20Eurocontrol.PDF. Although not all parties have 
ratified the Convention, some of its provisions have already been implemented. 
Again, it should be stressed that the Convention has not been ratified by all member countries. 
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change to these articles could require a Diplomatic Conference and the agreement, 
signature and ratification of the modified Treaty by the 39 member States of 
Eurocontrol. Alternatively, an ad hoc extension by the Eurocontrol decision-making 
bodies of the tasks of the Organisation would require the unanimous approval of the 
39 Member States. 
Although obtaining a unanimous agreement of all members of EUROCONTROL 
would not be a simple task, 26 of the 39 member countries are EU Member States 
and most of the other members have close ties with the EU. It is possible, but far 
from certain, that they may also see some advantage in having a say in the 
development of a system, which they could join on a voluntary basis. 
• Second, the Union would need to conclude an agreement with EUROCONTROL, so 
as to create the necessary legal obligation for EUROCONTROL to collect the levies 
in question, as well as in order to fix the modalities of the collection. 
From an economic point of view, the best alternative could be setting-up a new EU 
agency charged with calculating and billing the tax to operators. This would involve 
higher total administrative costs (partial duplication with EUROCONTRO L functions), 
higher compliance costs for the airlines (which would have to face two billing systems, 
one for the charges operated by EUROCONTROL, one for the tax operated by the new 
agency). And it would also sideline non EU members of EUROCONTROL, which may 
also potentially benefit from a broad-based tax on the aviation sector operated by an 
organisation they belong to. 
( 5) Link to the ETS 
In general, aviation sector taxation would indirectly interact with ETS, to the extent that 
less C02 emissions as a consequence of the tax could lower prices of ETS emission 
allowances in the very long term, and conversely. In this sense, a part of the aviation tax 
payments by the industry could be compensated by a reduction in its payments to buy 
emission allowances. 
Regarding more specifically the departure tax, there is no additional link to the EU ETS. 
The aviation duty would not tax C02 emissions already covered in the ETS. But it could 
in theory tax other greenhouse gas emissions. The inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS 
covers on! y C02 emissions, whereas there are other non C02 climate impacts associated 
with aviation, such as those from NOx emissions, soot and water vapour, the latter of 
which contributes to the formation of contrails and cirrus clouds. 
However, there remains significant scientific uncertainty surrounding these non-C02 
impacts, and it could be premature to base a policy instrument upon them at this point in 
time. (Indeed, the Commission decided in 2009 to postpone the development of a specific 
policy instrument to address the climate impacts of aviation NOx emissions pending 
further scientific studies.) In the light of evolving scientific and political circumstances, it 
remains to be seen whether it would be appropriate to include variables such as NOx in a 
flight duty formula. 
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( 6) Risks of market relocation 
Relocation issues could stem from neighbouring, non-taxing jurisdictions (Switzerland, 
North Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle-East). The tax level should therefore take 
account of the costs of travel83 to or from such countries that could be motivated in order 
to avoid the tax. The extension of the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) to 
include progressively more non-EU states opens the possibility that such airlines may 
reconfigure their networks away from intra-EU routes to routes within and between the 
non-EU ECAA states. 
The potential for market relocation is particularly high for connecting traffic at EU hub 
airports where passengers have alternatives outside the EU (e.g. traffic between Asia and 
the Americas). The EU aviation industry faces already today many competitive 
disadvantages compared to alternative airport hubs in the Middle East (Dubai, Doha, Abu 
Dhabi). Additional taxes could delocate part of the transit traffic away from EU hub 
airports, with associated impact on revenues and profitability of EU airlines. 
Existing regimes of airline ticket (departure) taxes take account of transit passengers, and 
connecting flights: in Germany for example, for stop-over flights starting in Germany 
account is taken of the final destination to determine the tax rate as long as the flights are 
booked together. For flights with a stop in Germany, there is no tax on departure in 
Germany unless the time of stay in Germany exceeds 12 respectively 24 hours depending 
on the entire distance covered. 
Low cost airlines could be more affected than traditional ones by a departure tax, both 
because the tax would represent a higher share of the average ticket price, and because of 
a higher price elasticity of demand, unless there is a tax rate differentiation. On the other 
hand, with a flight duty, these effects could be compensated by the fact that low cost 
carriers often operate with fuller planes than the network carriers (see above). 
(7) Island states, peripheral regions and distant territories 
Peripheral Countries and regions that are more dependent on aviation for transport, e.g. 
overseas countries and territories of Member States, could be more affected by a tax. 
This remoteness and economic dependence on air transport could be taken into account 
in the design of the tax. 
To the extent that a distance variable would be retained in the duty formula, a higher 
burden could be expected for peripheral regions and distant territories. The impact could 
be partially or fully mitigated through a banding system or specific duties or other 
provisions for specific types of territories. 
As an illustration, the UK exempts flights departing from airports in the Scottish 
Highlands and Islands from Air Passenger Duty. In France the Solidarity tax on aircraft 
tickets is due by public air transport companies and assessed on the number of passengers 
boarded from France (i.e. Metropolitan France, French overseas departments, and French 
overseas collectivities of St-Barthelemy and St-Martin). On the other hand, for 
83 This cost would not only be financial but could also involve other factors, such as difficulties 
arising to travelling outside the EU, obtaining a passport, etc. Considering the tax amounts 
envisaged, such costs may end up being disproportional compared to the tax. 
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passengers to destinations within Metropolitan France, the DOM/TOM, another State 
member of the EU, or a State signatory to the EEA, a State signatory to the EEA, or 
Switzerland the same (reduced) rate applies. 
4.3.2. Criteria set out in the budget review 
(I) Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
There is a link to the Europe 2020 Strategy for a smart, sustainable and inclusive 
economy and to the re-launch of the internal market (20 I 0 Monti report) through better 
coordination of existing tax measures. 
The departure tax and the aviation duty would contribute to the functioning of the 
internal market by reducing current tax-induced distortions of competition between the 
aviation sector and other modes of transportation. It would thus indirectly promote 
greener means of transport such as the railway system for shorter distance travels. This 
would be in line with the above-mentioned White Paper on transport. 
Depending on its specific design, a flight duty could, in addition, serve various EU policy 
objectives. It could possibly provide incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions not 
covered by the ETS and favour the operators using the less polluting and more efficient 
air transport technologies. 
At the same time, as the Memorandum to the Commission accompanying the White 
Paper on transports states, "the paramount goal of European Transport Policy is to help 
establish a system that underpins economic progress, enhances competitiveness and 
offers high quality mobility services while using resources more efficiently". An aviation 
tax would have to take into account these important policy objectives of promoting 
cohesion and competitiveness. 
At the same time, a major priority of EU air transport policy is to achieve a more 
performing and sustainable air transport system through the Single European Sky. The 
Commission Communication on the A TM Master Plan indicates an objective to "provide 
ATM services to the airspace users at a cost of at least 50% less" by 202084. All efforts of 
the Single European Sky aim at increasing the cost efficiency of air navigation service 
provision and reducing the cost of flying. A new EU air transport tax would have to be 
set against the benefits from EU air transport policy, which it could be considered as 
partially funding. However, this assessment might differ if the revenue coming from an 
air transport tax were to be used to further support measures aimed at financing 
investments in improving the environmental impact of aviation such as use of sustainable 
alternative fuels or acceleration of fleet renewals. 
(2) Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
Most of the activity is international, and thus does not naturally belong to any one nation, 
making it a natural target for international taxation. It should also be recalled that 
operators structure their activities on a supranational basis and that the regulation of 
aviation activities is also supranational to a very large extent. The EU plays a key role in 
this context, notably with theSES initiatives and in the context ofEUROCONTROL. 
84 See COM(2008) 750. 
67 EN 
Unsuccessful attempts at introducing av1atwn taxes in various Member States and 
observed displacements of activities make it clear that the national level is not the 
optimal level for imposing such taxes. Due to the cross-border nature of aviation, a cross-
border instrument is needed on as broad a geographical scale as possible. The EU or 
broader European level appears suitable in this respect. 
An important feature of the aviation duty is that it would involve an equal treatment of all 
operators active in the 'EU Flight Information Region' (i.e. the region corresponding to 
all Member States' FIRs). Consequently, the risks of activities displacement would be 
considerably reduced. Similarly for a departure tax, the EU scale envisaged for the 
measure would limit displacement of flights to neighbouring countries. 
(3) Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
There is currently no harmonised base applicable to the entire EU. 
However, several departure taxes exist in Member States and could underpin the 
development of an EU-wide departure tax. 
Charging systems already available at EUROCONTROL could, in theory, constitute the 
basis on which to build an EU flight duty. 
( 4) Autonomous resource collection 
Several collection models could be envisaged for both variants: 
• 
• 
• 
85 
A decentralized model could rely on Member States administrations to compute and 
collect the tax from the operators and the transfer corresponding revenues to the EU 
budget. It would be more suitable for the departure tax than for a more complex, 
formula-based flight duty. This would be the most straightforward system and it 
could rely on the experience gained in some of the Member States (FR, UK, DE). But 
it would also be the least efficient system as there would be no economies of scale 
and the resource would not be autonomous. It would also entail higher costs for 
airlines having to deal with 27 tax administrations. 
A centralized model based on an independent EU collection, for instance through an 
EU agency, could compute and collect the tax from the operators. There would be 
substantial economies of scale. The collection would not have to rely on Member 
States administrations (even if some forms of collaborations could be involved) and it 
would not require complex arrangements with EUROCONTROL. 
A centralized model based on EUROCONTROL would have the advantage of using 
existing infrastructures and the extended know-how of an institution based in 
Brussels and closely linked to the EU. It would offer the possibility to extend the 
geographical coverage of the tax beyond the EU borders. This approach would seem 
particularly suitable for a formula-based flight duty, which presents many common 
features with existing charges imposed by EUROCONTROL. It would be the 
cheapest approach for administrations (no new administration needed85) and for 
The potential administrative burden posed by possible solutions would only encompass limited 
costs induced by the expansion of the existing recording, registration and data management 
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companies (the tax would be part of the single bill received for each flight). It should 
be underlined that the CRCO has established well operated and efficient system of 
resources collection and recovery of amounts due. All these activities have been 
achieved within limited overall collection costs of EUR 18.3 million in 2006 (as 
compared to EUR 18.2 million in 1997). In the same period unit costs reduced by 
38% and the rate of recovery increased from 98.8% to over 99.8%. However, as 
explained above, this approach would rely on overcoming substantial legal and 
institutional obstacles. 
Except in the first option, the tax revenue would not need to transit via the Member 
States budgets. 
( 5) Additional burden on specific sectors 
Provided that the operators do not fully reflect the aviation duty in their prices, the duty 
could have an impact on their profitability. A useful measure of profitability is the so-
called value of the flight (average profit per flight excluding the costs of ownership of an 
aircraft). As there is no commonly accepted standard for this value, which varies a lot 
over time and between routes, estimates must be treated with caution. The values vary 
from EUR 814 for a flight according to IATA86 (at 2006 prices) to EUR 1,113 for 
domestic flight, EUR 2,226 for Inter-European flight and EUR 13,357 for Inter-
continental flight87 according to UK Department of Transport. These values are based on 
airline profits and they do not include costs to society, for instance negative externalities 
related to pollution, noise or climate change impact. In economic terms, a more 
theoretically correct method of valuation would be based on passengers' willingness to 
pay and the elasticity of demand for air transport88. 
Another way to put a potential EU charge on air transport in perspective is to compare to 
the turnover of the sector. The total revenue generated by European air transport is 
currently around EUR 120 bn a year. If the aim is to raise revenue of EUR 15 bn a year 
in 2020, the tax would represent about EUR 8 bn today (see below). This would represent 
around 6-7% of the sector's revenue. While a high proportion of the aviation tax or duty 
could be expected to be passed on to consumers, this illustrates that the tax base is 
relatively narrow. 
The demand for aviation is considered, in general, not very price sensitive, which 
facilitates passing the tax burden to the consumers and reduces tax-induced distortions in 
behaviours. This is partly because, according to data on the socioeconomic distribution of 
air transport users, increased ticket prices would be borne predominantly by the wealthier 
segments of the population. An additional explanatory factor is that both GOP and 
86 
87 
88 
schemes such as EUROCONTROL's Route Charges System (RCS) managed by the Central Route 
Charging Office (CRCO). See Central Route Charging Office (CRCO), "Customer Guide to 
Charges, May 2008, version 3.4" as available on 
http://www.Eurocontrol.int/crco/gallery/content/public/docs/other/customerguide.pdf. 
!AT A Cost Benefit Task Force, 1999 
Study on Airport Slot Allocation by SD-Scicon for the UK Department of Transport, 1991 
"Standard Inputs for EUROCONTROL Cost Benefits Analysis", Value of Add. Flight, as 
available on 
http://www. Eurocontrol. inti ecosoc/ gallery/ content/pub lie/ documents/CBA %20examples/Standard 
%20Values%202007.pdf 
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disposable income are projected to continue to increase in real terms into the future89. On 
the other hand the price elasticity of traffic is neither uniform nor constant; it varies with 
the type of traveller and also with the prevailing fare level. The air travel price elasticity 
on short-haul routes are higher than on long-haul routes. This largely reflects the greater 
opportunity for inter-modal substitution on short haul routes (e.g. travellers can switch to 
rail or car in response to air travel price increases)90• 
In any event, the air transport business is likely to be affected through demand decrease. 
The precise impact of these reductions in demand on the airline industry is difficult to 
predict, but it is certain that for an industry with high fixed costs, even a small reduction 
in demand could have a significant impact on the profitability of air carriers91 • 
Consequently, airlines will not welcome the imposition of an additional levy. However, 
depending on the design of the tax and its link to existing national systems, some 
operators may welcome a proposal that could ensure a more level playing field of 
aviation taxes in the EU. Also, the tax may bear more heavily on some segments of the 
industry than others, thus entailing shifts in competitive positions (see above). 
At the same time, the impact of the tax should not be exaggerated. Let us just recall that 
the UK the Air Passenger Duty (departure tax) came into effect on I November 1994 and 
the UK still has airports - Heathrow Airport and Gatwick Airport (London) - in the list of 
the world's thirty busiest airports for passenger traffic92 • Also, any EU aviation tax would 
affect all operators active on the EU territory, including extra-Community ones. 
As regards the impacts on other economic sectors which rely on air transport, in 
particular the tourism industry93, they are the result of two effects: first, a net reduction in 
air travel demand and, second, destination switching. The main impact on tourism is 
likely to come from reduced air travel demand, also taking into account substitution with 
land transport. The impact on tourism through destination switching - in both variants -
would mainly concern non-EU travelers, as for EU travelers, international flights would 
be covered by the tax (although possibly at varying rates and with departure switches in 
case of a departure tax). On the other hand, acceptable tax differentiation between intra-
Community and international flights could help maintaining (and perhaps even 
reinforcing) the attractiveness of European tourist destinations (for European tourists). 
The effects depend on the substitutability of destinations. And price increases of tickets 
should be compared with the price of a travel package and not simply with the price of 
the ticket alone. 
R9 
91 
92 
93 
Commission Staff Working Document. Summary of the Impact Assessment: Inclusion of 
Aviation in the EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) { COM(2006) 818 
final} {SEC(2006) 1684} 
http:/ /ec.europa.eu/ environment/climat/pdf/aviation/sec _ 2006 _1685 _ en.pdf 
lATA Economic Briefing No 10, "Air Travel Demand" 
http://www. iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/1 02A92AE-494C-4265-8AAA-
D5 7960B9432F /0/air _travel_ demand_ summary.pdf 
SEC(2005) 1067, p.6 
based on finalized 2008 data and on number of passengers enplaned and deplaned with passengers 
in transit counted only once. 
The EU tourism industry generates more than 5% of the EU GDP, with about 1,8 million 
enterprises employing around 5,2% of the total labour force (approximately 9,7 million jobs). The 
Commission has set up an action plan to increase the competitiveness and capacity for sustainable 
growth of EU tourism: 'Europe, the world's No I tourist destination- a new political framework 
for tourism in Europe' COM(2010) 352 final. 
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In case of a flight duty which also includes freight transport, additional economic sectors 
would be affected, as the tax could marginally increase the cost price of products in 
theory resulting in higher output prices or less profitability for the producers. Again, one 
should compare the amount of the tax with the total value of the goods transported. In 
any event, the flight duty could have an impact on both imported and exported products. 
Locally produced goods could thus gain a limited advantage compared to imported ones. 
Overall, the potential reduction in the growth of the aviation sector and the negative 
impact on its profitability, as well as the impact on users of air transport, would have to 
be weighted against the contribution of the resource to the budgetary consolidation 
efforts in the EU, the impact of the duty on externalities, the increased demand for 
alternative modes of transportation, and destination switching in the tourism area. 
Particular attention could be paid to the specific impact of a passenger tax on travel via 
airports hubs and on the inbound tourism. Both issues are further examined in Annex 3. 
3.2. 6. Administrative burden for the EU administration 
Independent of the exact approach followed to levy an aviation tax, let us recall that there 
is no evidence of high administrative costs in countries applying a departure/passenger 
tax. The tax is basically collected via the carriers. And regarding existing charges 
collected by EUROCONTROL, the administrative cost is limited (see above). 
However, depending on the collection model chosen, the impact on the EU 
administration would vary. It could be limited in a decentralized model, moderate with a 
centralized collection managed directly by the Commission (or an EU agency), and very 
limited if it relied on EUROCONTROL (a marginal addition to the existing low 
collection costs of less than 0.3%). In any event, the collection cost could be covered by 
the tax revenue. 
4.4. Quantitative assessment of the own resource 
4. 4.1. Revenue estimates 
In general, it should be noted that aviation activity is highly cyclical (see Annex4) around 
a steady high growth path. It can be expected that this would be reflected in the revenue 
collected with any aviation sector tax. However, it should be recalled that as long as a 
GNI-based residual own resource exists, variations of revenues related to a new own 
resource would be borne by the Member States. 
(I ) Departure tax 
A preliminary estimate can be done using the passenger numbers departing from EU 
airports94• Towards the end of the year 2008, the economic crisis started to show its 
effects, but the volcanic ash shock only came later in 2010. 
Intra-EU transport: 515 million 
From EU to other Europe: 45 million 
94 Eurostat Statistics in Focus 91/2009, "Economic crisis stops air transport growth- Air transport in 
Europe in 2008 11 • 
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From EU to North Africa: 17 million 
From EU to North America: 30 mi11ion 
From EU to Central America & Caribbean: 5.5 million 
From EU to South America: 5.4 million 
From EU to Sub-Saharan Africa: 7 million 
From EU to Central Asia (ex-CIS) and Near & Middle East: 12 million 
From EU to South Asia: 4 million 
From EU to Far East: 13 million 
From EU to Australia: I million 
For tbe sake of calculation tbe first three categories (intra-EU, otber Europe, North 
Africa) are classified as short-haul, Central Asia and Near & Middle East as medium-
haul and the rest as long-haul. 
This generalization does not take account of Member States' situation: from Ireland, the 
East Coast of Canada is closer than Egypt. From Greece, Egypt is short-haul. 
Furthermore, demand impacts of a tax are also neglected. 
The German rates are used as an example: short-haul: EUR 8, medium-haul EUR 25 and 
long-haul: EUR 45. The resulting amount would be EUR 7,881.5 million. This estimate 
is consistent with previous Commission analyses95 . 
Anotber estimate, using only the distinction between intra EU and national flights, for 
which a tax ofEUR 20 would apply, and international flights, for which a tax ofEUR 40 
would apply, leads to an estimated revenue of EUR 15 bn (2009 Eurostat data, no 
reduction of demand). 
To put tbese figures into perspective, tbe Commission's impact assessment for the 
inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS estimated tbat by 2020 the impact on ticket prices for 
a return flight witbin the EU could be an increase of between EUR 1.8 and EUR 9, and 
for a return flight to New York an additional EUR 8 to EUR 40 depending on the market 
price for C02 allowances. The tax needed to generate EUR 15 billion as an own resource 
would therefore be higher than, and in addition to, the increase in ticket prices expected 
as a result of the ETS, a polluter-charge. 
Forecast average annual growth of 4.3% is foreseen for Europe by Airbus from 2009 to 
2028. Applying this growtb to this third scenario produces tbe following maximum 
revenues to 2023 (again witbout having applied any price elasticity to reduce demand). 
95 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2005)467 on "New Sources of Financing for 
Development: A Review of Options". Based on figures available at the time, the paper estimated 
that if a tax rate of EUR I 0 was applied on intra-Community flights and of EUR 30 on 
international flights, expected revenues would be about EUR 6 billion per year, taking into 
account demand reaction. 
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Year Estimated maximum revenue 
(Mio euros) 
2009 15,028.0 
2010 15,674.2 
2011 16,348.2 
2012 17,051.2 
2013 17,784.4 
2014 18,549.1 
2015 19,346.7 
2016 20,178.6 
2017 21,046.3 
2018 21,951.3 
2019 22,895.2 
2020 23,879.7 
2021 24,906.5 
2022 25,977.5 
2023 27,094.5 
(2) Flight duty 
A first rough estimate can be made with 2006 data published by the CRC096 relating to 
the distance billed (7.98 billion km), amount invoiced (EUR 5.73 billion), the number of 
the flights under FIR regime (9.6 million), the average IFR flight distance (815 km) and 
adjusted unit rates97 (EUR 44.86 as of December 2006). For a Unit Rate of Tax of EUR 
100, i.e. corresponding to EUR 1.0 per km for a 2 jet engine airliner, the estimated total 
aviation duty revenue would amount to EUR 12.8 billion. The corresponding average 
duty per flight would be EUR 1 ,331. 
It should be underlined that this first calculation is based on total flights in the Central 
Flow Management Unit (CFMU), so it includes all EUROCONTROL members, not just 
EU airspace. It also includes overflights, which would likely not be subject to an EU 
flight duty without major international repercussions. 
A second, probably more accurate, calculation would be based on 20 I 0 data from 
EUROCONTROL. This puts the number of flights at 8.1 million (including all-cargo and 
business aviation flights). Raising EUR 12.8 billion would then imply an average duty 
per flight of EUR 1,580. To make this calculation comparable to the departure tax 
revenue estimates, the range could be the same, i.e. 8-15bn. Again this calculation takes 
no account of elasticity effects. 
The amount collected for the aviation duty can be expected to be significantly higher in 
the post-2013 period than these figures computed for 2006 considering the fast growing 
96 
97 
Of the current 38 Member States ofEUROCONTROL, 34 States participate in the multilateral 
route charges system. "The Central Route Charges Office. A pan-European economic rolen as 
available on htto:/ /www.E urocontrol.int/crco/ gallery/ content/pub lie/ docs/other/introcrco.pdf 
"Adjusted unit rates applicable to December 2007 flights" as available on 
http:/ I www. Eurocontrol. int/ crco/ gallery/ content/pub lie/ docs/unit rates/adj unit rates 2007 .pdf 
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trend of aviation activity. (The previous table illustrate the fast expected growth of the 
passenger traffic over 2009-2023). 
It should be noted that this estimate is based on a charge covering all flights, including 
those that depart from- and land at an EU airport. Yet other estimates could have been 
obtained in the case of a flight duty imposed only on flights departing from the EU, this 
time taking into account the total flight distance (as estimated for instance with a banding 
system) rather than the distance flown only over the 'EU Flight Information 
Region'.4.4.2. Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
As a general remark, for both types of air transport taxes examined here, the burden of 
the tax will most likely fall on the customers of the air transport service. In case the 
customer is a final consumer (e.g. a tourist) he will also ultimately carry the burden of the 
tax. If the customer is not a final consumer, e.g a business traveler or a business using 
freight transport services, the ultimate burden may be the final consumer of goods or 
services produced by the business customer. This will depend on a number of factors, 
such as competition conditions in the relevant business sector. The ultimate taxpayers 
will be located all over the world, with the largest part being EU citizens and companies. 
The total burden for citizens and businesses of any particular Member State would thus 
be very difficult to estimate. 
At the same time, data on air passenger and flight departures for each Member States are 
readily available. Given that some Member States already have departure taxes in place, 
it is reasonable to conclude that they would regard the associated revenues as in some 
sense belonging to them, irrespective of whether the passengers or airlines concerned are 
from that Member State or elsewhere. 
(I) Departure tax 
Within the EU, London Heathrow remained the busiest airport in terms of passenger 
numbers (about 67 million in 2008), followed by Paris' Charles de Gaulle airport (about 
60 million), and then Frankfurt, Madrid's Barajas airport and Amsterdam's Schiphol 
airport (all three with between 53 million and 47 million passengers). They attract a lot of 
international flights (except for Madrid's Barajas airport). In terms of air passengers per 
inhabitant, in 2008 Cyprus, followed by Malta and Ireland show very high scores98. 
However, the exceptional situation of Cyprus, Malta and Ireland points to their isle 
status. 
The countries concerned might feel that with any aviation tax they disproportionally 
contribute to the EU budget. On the other hand, they make more use of natural resources 
which could motivate a higher contribution to the EU society. More importantly, the 
customers are most likely established all over the world, and so are the companies 
operating the flights99. This is another reason to dissociate the revenue from a particular 
country. 
98 
99 
Europe in figures- Eurostat yearbook 2010, p. 498 and 502. 
Think of a German businessman flying from London to Rome (and over part of Belgium and 
France) using a Swiss airline. Should the departure tax be allocated to the country of origin or 
destination of the flight, the country of origin of the passenger (or its company), the country where 
the airline is headquartered, etc? 
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(2) Flight duty 
In addition to passenger flights, the flight duty would also tax air freight transport. 
For air freight transport, German airports, followed by the UK, France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain attract most traffic in the EU 27 in 2009 in terms of 
tons100• The exceptional situation of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg might be 
due to the central EU location and presence of distribution hubs. Again, it is difficult to 
associate this highly cross-border activity with a specific country, be it the country of 
origin, destination or otherwise of the flight. 
Due to the characteristics of the duty (formula based on technical variables for which 
national allocation appears impossible) and the central collection system which is 
envisaged, the national origin of funds would be almost impossible to estimate. An 
aviation duty would not lend itself to net balances calculations. This may be seen as a 
positive feature in the context of the net balances debate. 
100 
http:/ I epp.eurostat.ec .europa.eu/tgrnl graph.do:j sessionid=9ea 797 4b30db 15a3 b3 bae5 fe4 21 fbd44e0 
bc6 f5 69eee.e34SbxiPb3 uSb40Lb34 Laxg Rb3eReO?tab-graph&p 1 ugin= 1 &language-en&pcodc=1t 
r00011&too1box=type). 
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ANNEXl 
OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF VAT TO PASSENGER TRANSPORT IN THE EU 
1. The current legal framework 
Transport services, like any other service supplied by a taxable person within the EU, are 
subject to VAT. Transport may be domestic (departing from and arriving in the same 
country) or international (departing from and arriving in different countries). International 
transport covers transport going from one Member State to another as well as transport 
going to (outward) or coming from (inward) outside the EU. 
Where VAT is applied, the supply of passenger transport is taxed pursuant to where the 
transport effectively takes place, proportionate to the distances covered (Article 48 of the 
VAT Directive) and may be subject to a reduced rate of minimum 5% by the Member 
States as provided for in point (5) of Annex III to the VAT Directive 2006/112/EC. 
The VAT Directive nevertheless leaves a scope for passenger transport to continue to be 
exempted through derogations accorded to Member States. It reflects the exemptions 
already in place in Member States before 1 January 1978 or accepted upon the accession 
of new Member States. Those exemptions are to be found in Articles 371 to 390 and, from 
1 January 20 II, including Articles 390a and 390b of the VAT Directive 2006/112/EC. 
The exemptions are not limited to air transport of passengers. 
In addition, exemptions related to international transport, allowing certain passenger 
transport providers to purchase some goods and services (e.g. the supply of goods for 
fuelling and provisioning) free of VAT, have been in force since the introduction of VAT 
for international sea and air transport (not for road and railway transport). 
This means that the VAT treatment of passenger transport combines different exemptions, 
depending on the kind of means of transport used to provide the transport and the place 
where the transport is deemed to take place: 
• Exemption of passenger transport provided by transport providers to their customers, 
subject to certain conditions (output exemption); 
• Exemption of some supplies to transport providers, subject to certain conditions (input 
exemption). 
2. Historical overview 
Under the definitive arrangements, passenger transport is according to Article 393(2) of 
the VAT Directive supposed to be taxed in the Member State of departure for that part of 
the journey taking place within the EU. In 1992, the Commission therefore proposed to 
tax passenger transport at the place of departure 101 , but the Council could not reach an 
agreement on the proposed modification. One of the main issues standing in the way of an 
agreement was the patchwork of exemptions actually in force in the different Member 
States. 
101 COM(92) 416-rev2 as amended by COM(94) 378 
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A study1 02 was carried out for the Commission in 1997 and confirmed the differences in 
treatment between Member States and also between the different means of transport. 
Given the absence of political will from Member States to change that situation, no new 
initiative was undertaken by the Commission in this field. 
In July 2000, the Commission stated its intention to put forward a number of new 
proposals and to review existing proposals in the VAT area 103 . The rules on the place of 
supply of services were identified as one of the potential future priorities. 
In its consultation paper104 the Commission again suggested to tax the supply of passenger 
transport services taking place in the EU, irrespective of the means of transport used, at 
the place of departure. For domestic transport, this rule would not change the situation 
while, for international transport, it would ensure that passenger transport services to a 
large extent could be taxed where they are actually consumed, without the complication of 
having to split up the price according to the distances covered in each Member State. 
Summarising the results of this public consultation 105 , the Commission however noted 
that although "some businesses supported this idea, there was also serious opposition 
mainly from airline companies fearing that the new rules could encourage Member State 
to abolish the current exemption", most found that "the real issue is that of the different 
rates and exemptions applied by Member States and the inequity in VAT treatment 
between air, sea and road/train transport". 
Against this background, it was decided not to propose to change the rules concerning the 
place of taxation of passenger transport 106• The Council agreed with this approach when 
adopting the new rules concerning the place of supply ofservices107• 
3. The current situation 
The VAT treatment of passenger transport differs from one Member State to the other108 • 
Domestic passenger transport is taxed in almost all Member States, whatever means of 
transport are used. Demnark, Ireland and Malta however exempt domestic passenger 
transport, except some transport by road. International passenger transport, on the other 
hand, is in most cases exempted by Member States. Whilst international sea and air 
transport services are exempt of VAT in the whole of the EU-27, VAT is paid, subject to 
varying conditions, on international passenger transport within the EU on inland 
waterways, rail and road transport in 9 Member States. 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
KPMG. 1997.A study of the VAT Regime and Competition in the Field of Passenger Transport 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/resources/documents/pass tran knmg final.pdf 
COM(2000) 348 Final, 7 July 2000 'A strategy to improve the operation of the VAT system 
within the context of the internal market', 
Commission Consultation Paper: VAT- The Place of Supply of Services to Non-Taxable Persons 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/resources/documents/vat place of supply en.pdf 
http:/ Icc .europa.eu/taxation customs/resources/ documents/ common/ consultations/taxirep vat p la 
ce of supply en.pdf 
See explanatory memorandum of proposal COM(2005) 334 final (point 2.2.). 
Directive 2008/8/EC. 
Description of current situation can be found under 
http:/ I ec.europa.euitaxation customs/resources/ documents/taxation/vat/how vat works/rates/vat 
rates en.pdf 
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Where international passenger transport is taxed, it is often difficult for Member States to 
effectively ensure the actual taxation when a transport starting and ending outside their 
territory is supplied by a transport provider not established in that Member State. 
Specific exemptions related to international transport are provided for in Articles 148 to 
150 of the VAT Directive. These exemptions which are applicable throughout the EU, 
apply to the input of certain businesses which provide international passenger transport by 
air or by sea, allowing them to purchase, free of VAT, vessels and aircraft as well as 
goods for the fuelling and the provisioning of these means of transport and services to 
meet their direct need or that of their cargo. The application of these exemptions varies 
across the EU, given that Member States may limit their scope and adopt the detailed rules 
for their implementation. 
These input exemptions are intrinsically reserved for international air and sea transport at 
the exclusion of other means of transport, like trains or busses. They provide a cash-flow 
advantage for certain parts of the transport sector, with businesses benefiting from 
exemption not having to pre-finance the VAT before being able to exercise their right of 
deduction. Given the importance of the amount involved, this advantage is far from 
negligible. 
It means that the current situation with a number of exemptions applied quite broadly in 
the sector of passenger transport raises the question of the neutrality of the applicable 
VAT treatment and its sustainability in a long term. 
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ANNEX2 
SURVEY OF AVIATION SECTOR TAXES IN THE EU MEMBER STATES 
Member State Tax basis, rate and other relevant information Estimated 
yearly revenue 
UK APD is structured around 4 distance bands, set at intervals £1.9 billion in 
Air Passenger Duty of 2,000 miles from London, each with a reduced rate for 2009/10113 
(APD) the lowest class of travel and standard rate for other than 
(originally introduced on the lowest class of travel. Transit and transfer passengers 
0111111994) are excluded109 . Current rates, which increased with effect 
fiom 1 November 2010, are as follows: 
Band A (:OZOOOm): £12/£24 
Band B (2001-4000m): £60/£120 
Band C (4001-6000m): £75/£150 
Band D ( ;,6001m): £85/£170 
The Treasury is planning to raise £3.8 billion in 2014-15 
fiom air travel, compared to £1.9 billion in 2008 1 10 
The UK Government considered amending its Air 
Passenger Duty to replace it with a per-plane tax, and 
conducted a public consultation in 2008 111 • The 
Government ultimately decided not to proceed with a per-
plane tax for a variety of reasons which were set out in its 
formal response to the consultation. However, new plans 
to replace the current Air Passenger Duty with a per-plane 
levy that would encourage airlines to operate fuller aircraft 
and consequently to cut carbon emissions seem to have 
been included in the coalition agreement 112• 
France The tax varies according to distance and class of travel EUR 300 
Solidarity Tax on air (economy= lower rate, business or first= higher rate): million 
tickets to fund 
international development Intra-European: 1 EUR/10 EUR 
(from 01/07/2006) Outside Europe: 4 EUR/40 EUR 
109 
110 
Ill 
112 
Ill 
It is assessed on the number of passengers boarded from 
France (including overseas Departments). The tax is levied 
on all public air transport companies. The passengers on 
connection are not included in the basis of the tax. 
Besides, France also levies a Civil Aviation Tax and an air 
nuisance tax ("taxe sur les nuisances sonores")114 • 
htrp:// customs.hmrc.gov. uk/ channelsPortal W ebApp/ channelsPortaiW ebApp. portal?_ nfpb=1ruc& _ 
pageLabel=opageExcise _ ShowContent&id~HMCE _ CL _ 000505&propertyType~document 
http:/ 1W\V\V. telegraph. co. uk' finance/ tina ncctopics/budgct· 7 84 72 7 3.T ost -of-air- tra vc 1-sct -to-1i sc-
becausc-ofhidden-aviation-tax-bombshcll.html 
The consultation document can be found here: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20 10040701 0852/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/consult aviation310108.pdf and the summary of responses can be found here: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/htto://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/dlpbr08 aviationduty 395.pdf 
http:/iwww. busi nessgreen. corrv bg i news/ 1 8065 70, us-prepares-fight -uks-ereen-a vi ation -tax-pI an 
The UK government envisages bringing the APD revenue to £3.8 by 2015, possibly using a flight 
duty instead of the passenger duty. 
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Germany With effect from I January 2011, the tax will vary Target is to 
Environmental Ticket Tax according to distance 1 15 : raise EUR I 
(from 01/01/2011) billion 
Short-haul: 8 EUR 
Medium-haul: 25 EUR 
Long-haul: 45 EUR 
Germanwings and Ryanair already announced their 
intention to move some of their flights to neighbouring 
countries to avoid the tax 116 . 
Ireland Originally the tax varied according to distance as EUR 125 
Air Travel Tax follows 117 : million forecast 
(from 30/03/2009) by Government 
All flights less than 300km from Dublin: 2 EUR in 2010. 
All other flights: I 0 EUR 
However, the Irish Government recently announced that 
with effect from I March 20 II this will be replaced with a 
single flat rate of3 EUR 118• 
Austria Implementation date has yet to be decided ". The tax will Not known 
Flight departure "Eco- be in two distance bands: 
tax" 
(announced Nov 201 0) Short-haul: 8 EUR 
Long-haul: 40 EUR 
Denmark The tax, which formerly added DKK 150 to the price of a EUR 70 million 
Ticket tax return trip on a domestic route, was reduced by 50% on 1 
(Introduced in 1998, January 2006 and completely eliminated from 2007. 
repealed in 2007) 
The tax was repealed mainly due to the shift of passengers 
to the Swedish airports Malmo and Goteborg120• 
114 The Civil Aviation Tax is assessed on the number of passengers boarded and the tons of freight 
and mail loaded from France. http://www.aviation-civile.gouv.fr/html/prospacelbudget!taxe _ ac _ang.htm 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn 4134/DE/Wirtschaft und Verwaltung/Steuern/20 1 
00906-Luftverkehrsabgabe.html 
http://www.airliners.de/verkehr/netzwerkplanunglgermanwings-weicht-nach-maastricht-
aus/22753. More than half the Ryanair flights serving Berlin will vanish in the new timetable. In 
October, the airline cut its services to the Frankfurt area. It said it would now trim services to the 
Dusseldorf area by 20 per cent. The cuts to 34 routes connecting to Germany would mean 3 
million fewer passengers carried, the airline said. 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/tax/excise/leaflets/air-travel-tax.html 
The reduction will be reviewed at the end of 2011. The Irish government has also recently 
announced plans to introduce an incentive scheme with the Dublin Airport Authority to encourage 
traffic at Dublin, Shannon and Cork airports in 2011. The Grow Incentive Scheme will mean the 
airports will waive all airport charges for passenger traffic once an overall threshold of 23,5 
million passengers is reached during 2011. 
(http://www.etnw.co.za!NewsDetails.aspx?newsid=43122) 
http://online.ibfd.org/kbase/ 
Ryanair and Sterling each have said that "they were reluctant to add flights to Denmark because of 
the tax". http://atwonline.cornlintemational-aviation-regulation/news/denmark-eliminates-
passenger-tax-11 08 
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Netherlands It was levied on departing passenger. Transfer passengers EUR300 
Flight tax were exempt from the levy. The tax was imposed on the million 
(introduced in July 2008 company that runs the airport. 
and withdrawn in July 
2009) The rate was: 
EUR 11.25 for EU Member States and up to 2500 krn; 
EUR 45 for long-haul flights. 
The economy and the recession have been cited as the 
reasons behind the abolition of the tax121 . A small noise 
nuisance tax on civil aviation still seems to be in place 122 . 
Malta Not known EUR 5.7 
Passenger Service million (2008) 
Charge 123 
(Introduced in 1997 and 
abolished in 2008) 
Sweden 
Belgium 
121 
122 
123 
The Swedish government attempted to get a Departure Tax 
through parliament in 2006. The proposal was withdrawn 
following a change of parliamentary majority and 
considerable pressure from the aviation/tourism sector. 
Belgium decided not to proceed with the suggestion to 
levy an Air Travel Tax in January 2009. 
SEO Economic Research carried out a survey that reported that the flight tax was responsible for a 
decline of 2% on the number of visitors who have passed through Dutch airports, year on year. 
The survey went on to conclude that the flight tax, if it carried on, would be to the detriment of the 
Dutch economy to the tune of about EUR 1.3 bn. See 
http://www.seo.nl/nl/publicaties/rapporten/2009/2009-09.html. Many travellers chose to board 
their flights in nearby countries with Dusseldorf and Brussels being popular. Amsterdam airport 
said that 1.3 million passengers (-18%) were lost. See 
http:/ /www.airportwatch.org. uk/news/ detail.php?art _id=l444 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen info/info docs/tax invent 
ory/list minor taxes en.pdf. 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/taxinv/ getcontents.do ?mode=nonnal &k w 1 =checked& k w2=-
&kw3=-&year=20 I O&coll= MT +-+ Airoort+tax+%28 Passenger+Service+Charge%29) 
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ANNEX3 
PASSENGER TAX- IMPACTS ON COMPETITIVENESS 
There are essentially two main impacts on the competitiveness of the European aviation 
sector vis-a-vis non-EU industry arising from an EU passenger tax- on intercontinental 
markets in which EU hubs compete with non-EU hubs, and on inbound tourism. 
The first impact arises due to the increase in the cost of travelling via airport hubs in the 
EU relative to travelling via alternative hubs outside the EU. This issue was addressed in 
the Commission's impact assessment concerning the inclusion of aviation in the EU 
ETS 124, based on estimates produced by MV A Consultancy. Based on an estimate that 
approximately 1% of all passengers departing from EU airports were travelling from one 
non-EU airport to another and transferring at the EU airport, the impact assessment 
concluded that at an allowance price of €30, the number of departing passengers at EU 
hub airports would decrease by 0.07% at most. 
However, a study on the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS carried out in 2008 on 
behalf of the Association of European Airlines 125 stated that 8% of passenger traffic 
arriving at EU airports from non-EU origins is connecting to non-EU destinations. If an 
EU passenger tax were to be levied on these passengers in respect of their flights 
departing EU airports, then such passengers would be more likely to choose alternative 
routings via hubs in non-EU countries, e.g. Switzerland or the Middle East. The extent to 
which they would do so would of course depend on the level of the tax and the suitability 
of alternative flight schedules. The AEA study did not seek to quantify this effect. 
The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) addressed the issue of connecting passengers in 
its response to the 2008 consultation on changes to UK aviation duty126, and again in a 
specific study in November 2008 on Connecting Passengers at UK Airports127• This did 
not contain figures for the numbers of passengers connecting between non-EU origins 
and destinations, but showed (a) that the proportion of connecting passengers at London 
airports was higher than that assumed by MV A Consultancy, and (b) that the proportion 
of passengers at Heathrow connecting between two long haul flights in 2007 was 6.2% 
(the proportion ofnon-EU to non-EU connectors will be higher than this, given that short 
haul destinations from London include non-EU points). While Heathrow is by no means 
representative of EU airports generally, this would seem to indicate that the 1% 
assumption made in the Commission impact assessment may be an underestimate. 
In terms of the economic impact of hubs, the CAA study did not seek to quantify the 
costs and benefits associated with connecting traffic, but rather to identify where these 
arise and their likely level of significance relative to each other. It cited previous studies 
that had attempted to quantify costs and benefits, as follows: 
"Connecting passengers, by supporting a wider network and higher frequency of services 
than could be provided by direct passengers alone, contribute to the 'connectivity' of an 
124 
125 
126 
127 
SEC(2006)1684, 20.12.2006, Annex 9 
Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS: Cases for Carbon Leakage, Ernst & Young/York Aviation, 
October 2008, available at http://files.aea.be/Downloads/EY FULL TEXT OCT08.pdf 
http://www.caa.eo.uk/docs/5/20080424CAAResponse0nAviationDutyFinal.pdf 
http://www.caa.eo.uk/docs/5/Connecting Passengers at UK Airoorts.pdf 
82 EN 
airport or airport system. lATA has recently attempted to quantifY128 the benefits of 
connectivity to GDP growth and labour productivity. Its statistical analysis estimates 
that the 25% increase in connectivity experienced by the EU accession countries between 
2001 and 2004 has boosted their long-run GDP by 2.75%, and that, in general, a 10% 
increase in connectivity relative to GDP will boost labour productivity levels by 0.07%," 
"Inevitably, the difficulty of isolating aviation's effects from all the others acting on a 
country's economy create a degree of uncertainty around such results. More concrete 
evidence may be the value which businesses in particular place on the range and 
frequency of air services, indicated by their willingness to pay high premium and flexible 
ticket prices to use those services. It is also supported by various surveys of businesses, 
such as the lATA study on network benefits and the London First report. A short review 
of these and other studies, such as those by Oxford Economic Forecasting or York 
Aviation, into the trade and productivity benefits of air services can be found in the 
Department for Transport's response to the provisional findings of the Comgetition 
Commission in its market investigation into the airport services provided by BAA 29 " 
The second impact on competitiveness arises from the impact on inbound tourism. A 
passenger tax increases the cost of visiting the EU, so that overseas residents who have a 
choice of destination will be more likely to choose an alternative non-EU destination. 
The AEA study referred to above also addressed this aspect and stated that around 25% 
of passenger traffic at EU airports is generated by non-EU residents travelling into the 
EU for leisure. 
Several of the existing passenger taxes at national level (e.g UK, Germany) seek to 
minimise the risk of adverse impacts on their airport hubs by exempting transfer and 
transit passengers from the scope of the tax. This would avoid the first impact identified 
above, but would not address the impact on inbound tourism. 
Indeed, it is worth noting here that it was because of the exemption for transfer and 
transit traffic that the UK's proposal in 2008 to move to a per-plane tax gave rise to 
concerns that such a tax would be more detrimental to the competitiveness of the UK's 
aviation sector (and hence the wider UK economy) than the existing passenger tax. The 
arguments on this point are summarised in the UK Government's summary of responses 
document. However, the summary does not contain any quantifications of the impacts. 
128 
129 
lATA Economic briefing 3: Airline Network Benefits and Economic briefing 8: Aviation 
Economic Benefits available from www.iata.org/economics, which attempted to estimate the 
relationship between connectivity of a country and growth in both long run GDP and labour 
productivity. 
http://www.dft.gov.uklpgr/aviationlaimorts/ccinvestigation.pdf- pages 35-38. 
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ANNEX4 
AVIATION ACTIVITY IS HIGHLY CYCLICAL 
The following charts, based on IA T A data, demonstrate the cyclical nature of air 
transport demand and profitability, and also show that the cycles of air transport demand 
are more extreme than those of the economy generally. 
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5. NEW VALUE ADDED TAX RESOURCE 
5.1. Political context 
5.1.1. VAT in theEU 
The development of a common VAT system has been one of the cornerstones of the 
Internal Market and an important aspect of the development of an own resources system. 
The essential piece of VAT legislation in the Union since I January 2007 has been 
Directive 20061!!2/EC. That 'VAT Directive' is effectively a recast of the Sixth VAT 
Directive of 1977 as amended over the years. The recast brings together various 
provisions in a single piece of legislation. Directive 2006/112/EC in tum was amended 
several times in the last few years 130• 
VAT represents a major source of revenue for national budgets and in many Member 
States it is the most important revenue. Since the economic and financial crisis, several 
Member States have recently strongly increased VAT rates or are considering it, either as 
a reaction to the crisis or in the context of a longer-term shift towards indirect rather than 
direct taxation. A majority of Member States have now a standard rate at or above 20%. 
In the past, Member States have failed to agree on a move towards a definitive, simpler 
and more harmonised system operating across the EU in the same way as within a single 
Member State. Even less far-reaching proposals tabled by the Commission in order to try 
to improve the current VAT system were either not adopted or often watered down. 
The search for a compromise on which an agreement by unanimity can be reached often 
required the insertion of further options or derogations into VAT law, affecting the 
uniformity of the VAT system within the EU. As a result, the VAT system remains 
complicated and burdensome in particular for cross-border supplies. 
This complexity and the burden of compliance obligations are the main elements 
considered harmful to the single market and to the competitiveness of EU businesses. 
Those shortcomings also hinder the collection of the VAT and, on average, due in part to 
fraud, about 12% of the theoretical VAT revenue is uncollected, with several Member 
States above 20%. 
With the publication of the Green Paper on the future of VAT, the Commission has 
launched a debate with all the stakeholders including Member States on the evaluation of 
the current EU VAT system and the possible ways forward 131 • 
The Green Paper stresses that "after some 40 years, the time has come to have a critical 
look at the VAT system with a view to strengthening its coherence with the single market, 
its capacity as a revenue raiser by improving its economic efficiency and robustness, and 
its contribution to other policies whilst reducing the cost of compliance and of collection. 
In this way, reforming the VAT system can play a crucial role supporting the delivery of 
130 
131 
A consolidated version without legally binding value was published in January 2010 in the EU 
Official Journal: http://eurlex.europa.eu/Result.do?T I =V3&T2=2006&T3= 112&RechType=REC 
H _ consolidated&Submit=Search 
See COM(2010)695 and SEC(2010)1455 of 1.12.2010. The consultation was completed on 31 
May2011. 
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the Europe 2020 strategy and a return to growth through its potential to reinvigorate the 
single market and underpin smart budget consolidation in the Member States. Any such 
improvements require a comprehensive VAT system that can adapt to changes in the 
economic and technological environment and is solid enough to resist attacks of fraud of 
the kind experienced in recent years." 
5.1.2. VATasanownresource 
There is a long history of propositions related to the VAT as an own resource since the 
introduction of a VAT -based own resource in the own resource Decision of 21 April 
1970. The VAT -based own resource was the main source of revenue for the EU budget 
in the 1980s and at the start of the 1990s, providing between 48% of own resource 
revenues in 1980 and 70% in 1990. 
The share of VAT -based financing has been reduced in each new own resources Decision 
since the introduction of a GNI-based own resource in 1988, mainly to accommodate 
poorer Member States concerned about the regressivity of the VAT-based own resource. 
A system of a "modulated EU VAT" as an own resource has been promoted by the 
European Parliament as early as 1994. It was proposed to impose different rates on 
different categories of goods in order to mitigate the regressive effect of the tax. The 
1994 Langes Report stated that "a proportion of a largely harmonised VAT, imposed on 
the basis of tax declarations and clearly denoted on each individual invoice as E U 
taxation would at present be the most convincing form of own revenue". 
The European Parliament, as well as the Commission defended the idea of a new 
resource based on VAT during subsequent revisions of the own resources Decisions. 
However, the specific structure of rates (modulated or not) and the details regarding the 
implementation of such a tax have not been re-examined in much detail. 
In the discussion for the financial framework 2007-2013 the Commission stressed that a 
new resource based on VAT constituted one of three main options for reform. 
Commission work undertaken in 2004 suggested that the technical preparation required 
for the implementation of such a resource would not be particularly complex132• 
However, no concrete proposals were tabled. 
More recently, in the context of the Budget Review preparation, the MEP Lamassoure 
(EPP, FR) resolution mentioned the idea of a resource based on VAT on top of the list of 
possible options for an alternative own resource133 • A number of MEPs, NGOs and 
academics took positions in favour of a new resource based on VAT during the Budget 
Review consultation 134• Prominent MEPs defended the same idea in a joint report 
published in April 2011 135• 
132 
Ill 
134 
See "Financing the European Union. Commission report on the operation of the own resources 
system", COM(2004)505, Vol. II, section 2.3.1. 
EP resolution of 29/03/2007 on the future of the European Union's own resources, 
P6 _ T A(2007)0098. 
MEPs H. Triipel (Greens-EFA, DE) and G. Onesta (Greens-EFA, FR) indicated that "Greens want 
to combine payments based on member states' Gross National Income (GNI) with a slice out of 
one or more of the most promising candidate levies or taxes, such as a share of national VAT". 
MEP D. Daianu (ALOE, RO) stated that "so far only VAT responds to sufficiency and stability 
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The issue of visibility of the EU budget financing and the possible link to EU 
citizens/taxpayers has been a central motivation for past proposals. However, it is worth 
mentioning that there is often no legal requirement to issue an invoice for supplies to 
non-taxable persons. There is thus no guarantee that retailers would mention an "EU 
VAT" on the receipts. 
Discussions also highlighted that adding a new VAT resource in a context where a 
majority of Member States have already a standard rate at or above 20% and are often 
reluctant to further harmonisation, could lead to considerable opposition. On the other 
hand, such approach might give a new push towards more harmonisation of VAT which 
would be beneficial for the smooth functioning of the Internal Market and could reduce 
compliance costs for business. 
5.2. Outline of the proposal 
5.2.1. identifYing variants 
The starting point of this analysis is set out in the technical annex attached to the Budget 
Review communication. It states that "a combined VAT rate could consist of the national 
and the EU rate. The Member States could determine the national rates as today. An EU 
rate could be defined separately in the framework of the own resource Decision and/or 
its implementation rules. The Member States would collect the EU VAT and transfer the 
proceeds to the EU budget. The EU VAT payments could be clearly denoted on each 
individual invoice, next to the national VATpayment"136 
This resource would thus be markedly different from the ex1stmg VAT -based own 
resource which is in practice a contribution from the Member States largely based on 
statistical calculations. It would create a direct link between EU and national VAT 
policies and the EU budget. 
As a starting point, three main variants are envisaged in this analysis: 
• 
135 
136 
137 
The modulated VAT (1 '' version) would allow for different EU rates to be applied 
to different categories of goods and services in line with the existing differences in 
the Member States. For instance the EU rate could be zero for zero-rated goods. In 
other words, this variant would imply an acceptance of the fact that the VAT rate 
charged on the same goods and services in the EU would be different as a result of 
the differences in the VAT rates structure existing in the Member States, and also but 
to a lesser extent, differences in exemptions/option to tax due to some options and 
derogations left in the VAT Directive 137• As will be shown below, this variant would 
be faced with serious legal limitations. 
criteria". See also the contributions of the Advisory Council on International Affairs (NL), the 
South Finland EU office, the Union of European Federalists Group Europe, the Quaker Council 
and 50 European university professors (mainly from IT). 
"Europe for growth: for a radical change in financing the EU'', report prepared by J. Haug, A. 
Lamassoure and G. Verhofstadt with the collaboration of D. Gros and P. De Grauwe, G. Ricrad-
Nihoul and E. Rubio coordinated by C. Perrin, Notre Europe, April2011. 
See SEC(20 I 0)7000 of 19 October 2010. 
Council Directive 20061112/EC. 
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• The single-rated VAT applicable to all goods and services would not be affected by 
the national differences in VAT rates. One possibility would be to apply this single 
EU rate to all goods and services, not allowing a special treatment for reduced- or 
zero-rated goods 138 . Therefore, the EU rate could be set at a lower level. However, 
differences in exemptions could still have an impact if transactions exempted/taxed 
on option at national level were also exempted/taxed at EU level. Another approach 
would consist in applying the single rate to a subset of goods and services, for 
instance those that are subject to standard rates in all the Member States. This would 
be a smallest common denominator or "core" VAT approach. Two main approaches 
have been assessed in terms of administrative and compliance costs to implement the 
single-rated EU VAT: a parallel VAT system to that of the Member States and a 
revenue transfer mechanism. 
• The modulated VAT (2"d version) applied in the same way across the EU with a 
specific rates structure. The rates would also not be affected by the national options 
or derogations concerning the rates structure. Differences in exemptions would also 
have an impact. 
Other variants have been mentioned in the public debate but do not seem suitable as 
potential own resources: 
• The VAT on gambling appears particularly impractical. Gambling is generally 
exempted from VAT for technical reasons i.e. because of the problem of the 
identification of the taxable amount. That is why other taxes are often applied to this 
sector. This variant has in fact little to do with the idea of a new VAT resource, since 
it would apply to a single -very limited- sector (compared to VAT which has a very 
general scope). 
• The VAT on imported goods would face insurmountable legal or practical 
difficulties, as explained in Box 6 below. 
Box 6: EU VAT ON IMPORTED GOODS? 
1st option: Adding a new VAT resource on top of the existing VAT on imports 
A specific VAT resource only applied on imported goods would infringe the 
international commitments of the EU Member States under the WTO and would 
therefore be illegal. Article III of the GATT provides that "the products of the territory of 
any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not 
be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in 
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products." 
In addition, it would have to be refunded to taxable persons carrying out taxed 
transactions in order to avoid cascading effects and respect the basic principle of 
neutrality. The new VAT resource would therefore actually be paid by fmal consumers 
(private individuals or businesses with no right of deduction such as small businesses) 
entering the EU with goods or purchasing goods dispatched from third countries. Such a 
138 Notwithstanding the rules applicable to exports outside the EU. 
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system would thus provide a limited source of revenue (see below 2"d option). Moreover, 
it could be open to avoidance schemes (importation by an intermediary). 
2"d option: Taking a share of the (existing) VAT on imports 
To avoid the legal issue raised above, the new VAT resource would represent a portion 
of the net national VAT receipts collected in the Member State of importation. 
Firstly, the VAT resource would have a very narrow base. In most cases, the VAT on the 
final consumption of manufactured goods for end users coming form third countries is 
charged at a latter stage after the importation. Moreover, Member States exempt from 
VAT the importation of small consignments, the importation of goods of which the 
supply within their territory would be exempt and of goods entering the EU in luggage of 
travellers below certain thresholds. 'Zero-rated' goods are also taxed at such a rate on 
importation. 
Secondly, although it would be neutral for all importers, it means that the new VAT 
resource would actually be borne by the Member States of importation on the basis of the 
value of taxed importations carried out by final consumers. It would entail an unequal 
treatment between Member States. Those having the closest ties with third countries, 
such as having a land border with a third country or an airport used by international 
carriers, or particular consumption patterns with relatively more consumers ordering 
goods from third countries, would afpear to contribute more to the EU budget than other 
Member States with a similar GNI13 • 
3'd option: importation as a new calculation base for a VA Town resource 
As an alternative, to broaden the tax base, it could also be foreseen that the Member State 
of importation would transfer a slice of the gross VAT receipts collected i.e. including 
the VAT actually refunded to taxable persons. 
The new VAT resource would thus merely constitute a new method of calculation of the 
VAT -based own resources, again without any visibility or link for EU citizens. The 
contribution of Member States to the EU budget would be calculated according to the 
total value of national VAT collected on importation of goods into their territory. 
However, unlike the current method, because of the inclusion of the VAT actually 
refunded to taxable persons, it would be based on purely theoretical fiscal revenues. 
Such a method would moreover once more entail an unequal treatment between Member 
States. The Member States having the closest ties with third countries, such as having a 
land border with a third country or, in particular, an international major seaport, or an 
airport used by international carriers, would likely contribute more to the EU budget than 
other Member States with a similar GNI. For example, considering the import values of 
2009 (Eurostat), the Netherlands could be the 3'd major contributor the EU budget. 
As a matter of fact, the Member States would contribute on the basis on the import values 
of the goods taxed when entering the EU through their territory including those 
139 The so-called "Rotterdam effect" has been the source of many discussions related to customs 
duties. 
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consumed elsewhere, in other Member States. The VAT exemption when the goods 
imported are then dispatched to a taxable person in another Member State could very 
partly mitigate this shortcoming. However, such an exemption is actually optional for 
importers and in the Member States having a strong policy of simplification of the VAT 
formalities on importation (e.g. via the VAT declaration and deduction at the same time 
on the VAT return), such a procedure is likely to be less used. Therefore, such a method 
would also have a negative impact on the simplification of formalities undertaken by the 
Member States. 
For all these options, the issue of controls would also be an important issue, which is 
described further in section 2.4. 
5.2.2. Tax base 
In general, the taxable base of transactions subject to VAT is harmonized in the EU. This 
means that for a taxable transaction the amount used to determine VAT is the same 
everywhere. 
However, a specific transaction is not necessarily treated in the same way in all the 
Member States. The main differences between the Member States are as follows: 
• Most Member States apply a system of exemption for very small firms. Firms below 
a certain threshold are not required to levy VAT on their sale of goods and services 
and consequently cannot deduct input-VAT on their purchases. This threshold varies 
a lot between the Member States; 
• Some Member States continue taxing operations that others exempt and vice-versa 
(Art. 137, part A and B of annex X, VAT Directive); 
• In the computation of the VAT amount that can be deducted on goods and services 
used by businesses both for taxed transactions or non-taxed transactions, Member 
States may apply different methods and in particular choose to take certain subsidies 
into account. This has an impact on the amount of VAT paid by those 'partial final 
consumers :o; 
• In the same way, some Member States differently limit or exclude the deduction of 
VAT on some operations undertaken by operators that would normally benefit from a 
full deduction. This would typically be the case for the purchase of cars, or hotel and 
restaurants expenses; 
The extent of adjustments required for calculating the VAT-based contributions140 
suggests that only three Member States, Finland, Malta and the UK, make a significant 
use of possibilities of exemptions or special treatments that are offered by the current EU 
legislation. Furthermore, differences in the economic structure between Member States 
would have far greater impacts on the share of the new VAT resource revenue per 
Member State than remaining differences in Member States' VAT systems141 • Important 
factors can explain these differences: consumption, investment and savings patterns; 
extra revenues due to tourism, etc. 
140 
141 
See Annex I. 
See Annex III. 
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However, more importantly, from a legal point of view, it is not conceivable, under the 
principle of equal treatment, that a new own resource would impose different burdens on 
taxpayers i.e. the final consumers, with comparable consumption patterns in different 
Member States (see below). Dealing with the differences in the scope of exemptions for 
those supplies that are exempted in some Member States and not in others (e.g. as a result 
of an option in Article 13 7 and as a result of Annex X), a harmonisation of these 
differences would therefore be necessary but might be difficult to achieve. 
5.2.3. Tax rate(s) 
Some Member States apply a "zero rate" for some products, for instance food, children's 
clothing and footwear, newspapers, etc. In this case, there is actually a VAT exemption 
with deduction of the tax paid at the preceding stage. Specific schemes may also be 
foreseen for farmers ("flat rates") and "super-reduced", "reduced" or "parking" rates can 
be applied in some circumstances. The majority of taxable goods and services are taxed 
using a higher, "standard" rate. 
In theory, one could envisage that in a modulated VAT system the level of contribution 
of final consumers to the EU budget would be determined by the national VAT system -
and the VAT rates structure in particular (I'' variant). This would mean, for instance, that 
a Danish citizen would pay the new VAT resource at a standard rate on food. A reduced 
modulated VAT rate would apply in many other Member States and a modulated VAT 
zero-rate would apply in the UK or Ireland. This would have the great advantage of 
respecting national preferences on the rate structure and reproducing them for the VAT 
resource. 
However, there is a major objection to this theoretical approach, namely the legal 
obligation, resulting from the treaties, of an equal treatment of EU citizens (see box 8). If 
a modulation were to be applied, it would need to be applied equally in all the Member 
States to avoid imposing different burdens on final consumers with comparable 
consumption patterns in different Member States. This issue could be at least partially 
solved if the list of goods included in the different VAT rate categories was completely 
harmonised at EU level and applicable without any option for the Member States. A 
standard rate combined with a compulsory list for goods and services, for which a 
reduced rate would apply, would cater for this. It would imply that zero rates would have 
to be abolished. However, differences between Member States in the level of the standard 
and reduced rates may continue to exist. 
A single rated VAT system would not encounter the same problem: all goods and 
services would be taxed at the same VAT rate. From a political point of view, the EU 
would have to take the responsibility of charging VAT on goods zero rated at national 
level (food, children clothing, medicines etc.). Alternatively, the EU could itself decide if 
and on which range of goods and services to apply a reduced or a zero rate (2"d version of 
the modulated VAT). 
BOX 7: HOW TO COPE WITH THE ZERQ-RATED GOODS ISSUE? 
In theory, there are five possible approaches to cope with the existence of zero-rated 
goods in some Member States: 
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1. Requiring that the system of zero-rated goods be abolished prior to the 
implementation of a new VAT resource. The advantage would be to ensure a higher 
degree of convergence of national VAT systems and a better efficiency of the VAT 
system, which the Commission has been striving for decades. However, this could prove 
extremely difficult politically as applying only the EU rate to these zero-rated goods. 
That would entail that in some Member States, whole economic sectors move de facto to 
taxation, albeit under a reduced rate, with likely a proportional increase in prices; 
2. Zero-rated goods would not be subject to the new VAT resource in the Member 
States where this system exists. Equivalent taxpayers would not be treated equally across 
the EU regarding the new VAT resource: EU taxpayers would have to pay the EU rate on 
all purchases of goods including first necessity goods whereas other taxpayers living in a 
handful of Member States would be released for some of those goods. This would 
contravene the Rrinciple of equal treatment. Besides, the financial advantage for those 
Member States 42 with zero-rated goods could be substantial, thus leading to concerns 
regarding fairness; 
3. Zero-rated goods would not be subject to the new VAT resource in all the 
Member States. Any good benefiting from the zero-rate in one Member State would give 
rise to an equivalent treatment in all the Member States. The "most favoured treatment" 
would thus apply everywhere to avoid any problem of horizontal equity. This approach 
would involve higher administrative costs since 2 different set of tax rates may need to be 
applied in every Member State. It would also reduce the overall revenues for a given 
common EU rate. Furthermore, it conflicts with the general accepted idea that broad 
based taxes are more efficient. Such a reduction of the tax base would have to be 
compensated with a higher VAT rate. 
4. Taxing the zero-rated goods at the standard (single) new resource rate (2nd 
variant). This would imply that, de facto, entire sectors ofthe economy of some Member 
States that were previously released from taxation would be taxed with likely a direct 
increase in prices. Political resistance to this would likely be significant. 
5. Taxing the zero-rated goods at a reduced rate across the EU with the other goods 
and services already subject to reduced rates (e.g. 0.5%, 2nd version of the modulated 
VAT resource). Impacts on prices would be limited. Political resistance from certain 
Member States may be less significant. Businesses selling "zero-rated" goods are already 
registered (to deduct input VAT and for other taxed operations they might carry out). The 
additional administrative burden such a way forward would imply for businesses would 
be therefore rather limited. However, businesses would have to apply two different rates 
structures. 
5.2.4 Implementation 
Given that the scope and the rules of deduction of national VAT and the new VAT 
resource would have to be different, the variants under consideration would require that 
the taxable persons identify in their accounts and VAT returns for each supply and each 
purchase each tax separately in order to complete parallel declarations determining their 
142 The zero-rated supplies represent a significant share in the total taxable base for four countries, 
namely Ireland, Cyprus (until3l Dec. 2010), Malta and the United-Kingdom. 
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net position for each VAT. The new VAT resource rate and the amount paid could be 
shown on each individual invoice next to the national VAT payment. Offsetting 
deductible national VAT against the new VAT resource and vice-versa would not be 
possible since the tax administrations would transfer to the EU budget the net VAT 
resource collected. As the tax administrations, the taxable persons would therefore have 
to actually deal with a double VAT system. 
It would likely raise a series of legal and practical problems in terms of collection. The 
collection of VAT is today primarily the competence of the Member States. The 
complete legal framework of that collection would need to be reviewed since it would 
have to ensure the collection of the national VAT and the new VAT resource. An original 
and complete legal framework covering the rules on the scope and exemptions of the new 
VAT resource, the deductions, the obligations of taxable persons and the role of the 
national tax authorities, etc. would need to be created to ensure the proper collection and 
control of the new VAT resource and equal conditions and taxation throughout the 
Union. 
Furthermore, a priority between the national VAT and the new VAT resource would 
need to be established to settle conflicting situation, e.g. partial payments. The EU 
system of deduction could again not be based on national legislations (like the modulated 
VAT option) as this raises the issue of equal treatment among tax payers. For instance, 
some taxpayers would be able to deduct VAT on their purchase of cars or on hotel bills 
while other would have no or a limited right of deduction. 
As an alternative to this parallel system of VAT, a solution with similar results in terms 
of revenue but with limited impact on businesses and less impact on national tax 
administrations could be envisaged. It would require the latter to regularly transfer a 
share, corresponding to a specific rate, of the VAT receipts collected and stemming for 
transactions subject to the new VAT resource. 
To address the requirement of the 'visibility' of such a contribution for EU citizens, 
requiring a statement on invoices and receipts given to customers that a part of the VAT 
paid is to be transferred to the EU budget could be considered. This would require 
amending the VAT Directive as regards the content of invoices but could be achievable 
due to its limited impact in terms of compliance costs on business. 
Unlike the existing VAT -based own resource, the revenue stream would not be capped 
and would not be the result of adjustments to obtain a purely theoretical VAT base. It 
would result from the actual VAT paid by all the European final consumers and then 
collected by the national tax authorities. 
The question of the controls by the Member States and the supervisory responsibilities of 
the Commission as well as the question of the financial responsibility Member States 
may have to face in case of forgone new VAT resources revenues need to be addressed. 
Where the collection to be the responsibility of the Member States, like it is currently the 
case with the Traditional Own Resources (mainly import duties), a framework of 
supervisory compliance control directly of indirectly carried out by the Commission 
would be required, given the latter's responsibility for the execution of the EU budget. 
This means that a control system would be required that is at least equivalent to the 
current system for TOR and that would also include system-based audits. Moreover, 
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where individual transactions to be the core of a new VAT resource system, the 
(financial) responsibility of member States for the non collection of new VAT resource 
foregone in case of inappropriate management and administrative errors could be 
implied, as is currently the case in TOR. 
5.3. Qualitative assessment of the own resource 
5.3.1. Preliminary questions 
( 1) International experience with two-tiers VAT systems 
Experience with multi-tiers sales taxes regimes is common in federal States, e.g. the US. 
VAT can also be found in combination with sales taxation in Canada. There is no known 
experience of VAT systems applied by two tiers of government. 
• No experience can be drawn from the Brazilian government' draft proposal to, inter 
alia, merge three federal contributions into a "federal VAT" while reforming the VAT 
collected by the states. No documentation is immediately available on the effects of 
such a proposal which so far has not been adopted. Brazil has currently a tax limited 
to manufactured products (IPI) levied at a federal level on every stage of the 
producing process and on import transactions and a tax on the sales of goods and 
selected services at all stages of the production and distribution process (ICMS) 
levied at the state level143 . 
• In Canada, the harmonized sales tax (HST) replacing the federal goods and services 
tax ( GST) and provincial sales tax in certain provinces is administered by the federal 
government. The provinces receive their share from the federal government on the 
basis of consumption figures and a distribution formula. Quebec collects its own 
VAT and the federal GST and remits the latter net of the cost of collection to the 
federal government. Experience may be drawn from that system but the overall trend 
in Canada has been to consolidate the tax with a redistribution mechanism employed 
to reallocate receipts on the basis of political agreement. 
(2) Lessons from economic theory 
No economic literature on the implementation of such a system seems immediately 
available. The "single-rated VAT" and the "modulated VAT" resource would however 
likely have impacts on prices and thus on consumption patterns. Experience may be 
drawn from studies conducted in Member States having, as a reaction to the economic 
crisis, recently increased their standard rate e.g. Germany (3 points), UK (2.5 pts), 
Estonia (2 pts), Greece (4 pts), Spain (2 pts), Latvia (3 pts), Lithuania (3 pts), Hungary (5 
pts), Romania (5 pts). No references are available at that stage. 
If the tax was set once more at a higher level by adding the new VAT resource, evading it 
would become more attractive and black economy might increase. Collection costs 
would therefore rise and the efficiency of the tax would be affected. However, the fact 
that lower fraud levels can be observed in some of the highest VAT rates countries, e.g. 
DK, suggests that cultural and governance issues and an efficient administration of the 
143 http://www.civiceducation.org/wp-
content/uploadsl20 1 0/11/lessons _ICMS _islamabad_ 30 _ OCT.ppt#313,1 ,Slide 
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tax allow a VAT system based on high standard rates play a more relevant role than the 
level of the tax itself. 
(3) Legal issues 
As explained in 2, in absence of harmonisation of the tax base and the tax rate structure, 
an important legal question would be raised regarding the principle of equal treatment 
(see Box 8) 144. A question therefore arises as to how further VAT harmonisation could be 
achieved under unanimity rule. 
The VAT Directive is based on Article 113 of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union which requires that the Council adopts provisions for the harmonisation 
of the legislation concerning turnover taxes to the extent of such harmonisation is 
necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning on the internal market and to 
avoid distortion of competition. 
Changes to the VAT Directive that could be envisaged (rate 
approximation/harmonisation and harmonisation of exemptions notably) for an efficient 
and fair application of a new VAT resource could be made under this provision. 
The new VAT resource itself would have a separate legal base in the own resource 
decision. 
BOX 8: A KEY LEGAL PRINCIPLE- EQUAL TREATMENT OF EU CITIZENS 
The general principle of equality is a fundaniental principle of Union law and applies to 
the institutions of the Union in the same way as it does to Member States (see for 
example Case C 304/01 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I 7655). That principle 
requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different 
situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively 
·ustified. 
A modulated VAT resource based on national legislations would mean that the rate of the 
VAT charged on the same goods and services purchased in the EU would depend on the 
VAT rates structures of the Member States where the supply takes place, and on the 
exemptions applied therein (because of options and derogations in the VAT Directive). 
The level of contribution of EU final consumers to the EU budget would thus be 
primarily determined by the national VAT of their residence (and its VAT rates 
structures in particular). 
In practice, a Danish resident would pay the VAT resource at a standard rate when 
purchasing food. A reduced modulated VAT rate would be paid by citizens living in 
other Member States applying a reduced rate on such goods. Moreover, no VAT ('zero-
rate') would be paid in the UK or Ireland for example. 
Therefore, fmal consumers, with strictly similar consumption patterns, purchasing the 
same goods or services, which would therefore be in a similar situation, could bear a 
144 Alternatively, a separate system of exceptions and exemptions would need to be developed for the 
EU VAT, in parallel to the existing system. 
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different burden of tax collected for the EU Budget only because of their Member State 
of residence and the options and derogations it makes use of. 
The fact that national rates of VAT and their impact on the amount of tax paid by 
individuals differ is the result of the territorial nature of taxation. Within the scope of 
each national system, the principle of equality is observed. However, if it is desired to 
impose a tax at the level of the Union, the principle of equality must be observed at that 
scale. There is no apparent objective justification for differentiation based on the place of 
the supply in the EU or on the place of residence of the final consumer in the EU. 
Consequently, a tax to be paid by all EU final consumers could not, without offending 
against the principle of equality, vary in its impact according to the different tax 
structures of the Member States. 
( 4) Harmonization and other reforms needed 
A harmonised VAT base could be necessary to comply with the principle of equal 
treatment if a new VAT resource system was developed with the same base and thus with 
no particular rules on the exemptions and right of deduction. This would require: 
• 
• 
• 
the abolishment of the options of the VAT Directive which allow Member States to 
exempt certain transactions which should normally be taxed and vice versa; 
a further harmonisation of the special schemes for small businesses, which are 
exempt from VAT under a certain threshold (different from one Member State to 
another) and other flat-rate schemes although, since those regimes depend on the 
specific situation of the supplier, it might be less necessary; 
a harmonisation of the rules of deduction of input VAT, in particular on goods and 
services for mixed use (business/private purposes and taxed/exempted transactions) 
to allow the equal treatment of the businesses not having a full right of deduction; 
This form of VAT resource would also mean in practice that zero-rated goods and 
services (i.e. exempted with credit) would be taxed. 
If that were to be the case, it would be a major challenge from a political point of view. 
Discussions with member States have in recent years been concentrated on areas in 
which more flexibility could be provided to them (labour-intensive services, restaurant 
services). 
A new VAT resource could however be envisaged without such a far reaching 
harmonization, but it would at least require a set of specific rules on scope, deduction and 
exemptions for the VAT resource to avoid unequal treatment of EU citizens. As a result, 
some goods would be exempted from the national VAT and not from the new VAT 
resource and vice versa (due to the options to tax and the rules chosen) and the zero or 
reduced rated goods and services could still be taxed). 
Given the likely reluctance of some Member States to apply a new VAT resource on such 
goods and services and to accept the high degree of harmonisation required for the 
functioning of a broad based VAT similar to national systems, it could also be envisaged 
to narrow the base of the new VAT resource to those transactions which are taxed under 
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a standard rate in every Member States. Supplies of goods or services subject to a 
reduced or zero rate or exempted at national level on the basis of an option would thus be 
exempted from the new VAT resource. 
Besides reducing the new VAT resource base (by circa 55%), the main negative 
consequence would be that all taxable persons, but in particular those established in the 
Member States making less use of optional exemptions and reduced or zero rates, would 
need to apply two different sets of rules as regards the scope of the EU and national 
VAT. 
They would have to check whether the transactions subject to national VAT do not 
benefit from an exemption from the new VAT resource due to a particular option or 
derogation used by one or several Member States. The current VAT system already 
strongly fustigated for its complexity would be even more burdensome. However, such a 
complexity may be partly tackled through a system of revenue transfer (see above section 
5.2.4). 
Such a narrow base would closely link EU polices for VAT with EU budget policies. The 
new VAT resource revenue would automatically be increased when the national VAT 
bases are broadened and the scope of zero or reduced rates diminished by the Member 
States making use of the same options or derogations or by new European VAT rules 
imposing such moves. 
If the idea of a VAT own resource were to be pursued, it would undoubtedly have an 
impact on the broader debate on the future of VAT launched by the Green Paper, in 
particular in the area of the compliance costs and administrative burdens. The future 
VAT system would have to be designed taking into account the aspect of the new VAT 
resource. It would need to be examined whether its implementation would not require the 
need for EU law in areas today primarily left to the competence of national authorities 
(collection, control, sanctions). 
5.3.2. Criteria set out in the budget review 
(I) Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
Rules on VAT are an integral part of the acquis. Since the 1970s, the development of 
VAT has been linked to the development of a VAT -based resource to finance the EU 
budget and the Single Market objectives. 
Although a new VAT resource would be different from the VAT -based resource, it 
should not be forgotten that the VAT -based resource was constructed due to the 
persistent disagreement of the Member States to achieve a full harmonization of the VAT 
system and to transfer a given (uncorrected) percentage of their national VAT to the EU 
budget. 
Besides, the importance of the VAT -based resource in EU financing has decreased over 
time. It amounts to 10.9% of the total revenue 145 in the budget 2011 against 50.7% in 
1979. Moreover, a clear dissatisfaction with the existing resource has been expressed in 
145 And 12.7% of total national 'contributions'. 
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the context of the Budget Review consultation, with a large majority of Member States 
expressing a preference for its elimination. 
Consequently, the strong link to the acquis should not conceal the fact that the ambition 
to develop a genuine new VAT resource has not delivered over the past 40 years. And it 
is difficult to see, from a technical point of view, the emergence of compelling new 
arguments in relation to the acquis that could justify a new attempt at developing this 
particular option. However, the political context in which this reflection takes place is 
also exceptional. In the face of a severe financial and economic crisis accompanied and 
followed by important consolidation efforts, having a new look at a key revenue source 
for both the Member States and the Union is fully justified. Considering the existing 
important issues related to VAT at both level, new approaches could be seriously 
considered. 
Changing the VAT Directive in view of harmonizing the VAT base for the 
implementation of the new VAT resource would allow the reduction of administrative 
burdens and distortion of competition in the current VAT system and help achieving EU 
policy priorities related to the functioning of the internal market. 
Alternatively, in absence of a fully harmonised system, developing, for instance, a single-
rated VAT resource could be seen as an emblematic example of an efficient and simple 
broad-based VAT next to the national VAT systems. It may constitute an incentive for 
Member States to broaden national VAT bases and reduce the scope of zero rates, as 
goods or services exempted or subject to a zero-rate at national level would be taxed at 
EU level. Should Member States follow the EU approach of a broad based single rate the 
administrative burden for business could be reduced. Such a move would also serve the 
common need for balancing national budgets and a fiscal consolidation. 
However, a new VAT resource added as an extra layer to the current VAT system, 
without full harmonisation, could represent a major additional complexity for business as 
about 35 million taxpayers, including the smallest retailers, would in effect have to deal 
with a double VAT system. Thus, there are clear trade-offs between what could be 
envisaged in the short-term and the potential longer-term impact of the system, provided 
Member States adjust their system to that developed at EU level. 
(2) Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
Like the VAT, the new VAT resource would cover the whole single market. Cross-
border transactions are at present in principle taxed in the Member State of destination. 
Like in the current VAT system, it would be difficult for the Member States to levy the 
new VAT resource on cross-border supplies (at present exempted by the supplier, subject 
to reverse charge or taxed whilst being carried out by non established businesses) without 
the assistance of the Member States of origin via the administrative cooperation. 
Moreover, the EU could legitimately play a bigger and more active role in coordinating 
the administrative cooperation between Member States thereby better targeting non-
compliant businesses and reducing the current administrative burdens on cross-border 
activities for compliant businesses trading within the single market 
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(3) Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
The VAT legislation is part of the acquis and it applies to the entire Union. Nevertheless, 
the VAT directive allows for a number of differences between Member States in the 
application ofVAT (see above). 
• As shown in Annex I the implementation of VAT is almost the same in all the 
Member States. In 2006, for 18 Member States out of25, adjustments ("corrections" 
and "compensations") needed to obtain a harmonised (statistical) VAT basis 
amounted to less than 3% of the uncapped final basis. 
• Only three Member States displayed significant deviations, namely Finland (9.6%), 
Malta (10.1%) and the UK (13.2%). These countries make a large use of possibilities 
of exemptions or special treatments that are offered by the current EU legislation. 
• The special scheme for farmers ("flat rate" system) only applies in a limited number 
of Member States and with limited financial consequences (0.2% of the total taxable 
base for the EU-25). 
These differences explain why the VAT -based contribution is a rate of call applied to a 
statistically harmonised basis rather than the actual tax basis. 
As indicated above, changing the VAT Directive in view of harmonizing the VAT base 
for the implementation of the new VAT resource (modulated or single rated VAT) would 
certainly allow the reduction of distortion of competition in the current VAT system and 
help achieving EU policy priorities related to the functioning of the single market. But it 
would also prove extremely challenging. And, in practice, this could constitute a major 
difficulty in setting up a new VAT resource. However, with a specific set of rules on the 
tax base, the resource could be applied independently of the national VAT 
exemptions/taxation based on options and derogations available to Member States so that 
a full harmonisation process would not be systematically required for implementing the 
single-rated or modulated (2nd version) VAT. Such an approach would nonetheless 
entail additional administrative burdens for businesses (see below) unless the system of 
revenue transfer was chosen. 
(4) Autonomous resource collection 
Direct collection and control of the new VAT resource by an EU administration does not 
look feasible because in that case the EU would need dedicated central and local services 
and staff similar to national tax administrations including control services. 
However, the EU administration competences would be limited to the new VAT resource 
and national tax administrations are often organised according to types of taxpayers 
(large businesses, SMEs, households etc.) and not according to the types of tax. 
Moreover, taxable persons would have to deal for their VAT obligations with two 
different tax administrations. 
On the other hand, leaving the competence entirely to the national administrations of a 
new VAT resource which would appear separately in the accounts of the taxpayers might 
raise some concerns about the motivation of the national tax officials for auditing the 
correct application of the resource. Experiences in the area of administrative cooperation, 
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whereby a tax administration has to perform some tasks for the benefit of other Member 
States, demonstrate this is a legitimate concern. 
In any event, the new VAT resource revenues collected would be immediately 
attributable to specific Member States. 
(5) Additional burden on specific sectors 
The impact of such a new VAT resource would be widely spread throughout the whole 
EU economy without a specific impact on a particular business sector. 
Regarding more specifically businesses selling 'zero-rated' goods, they are in principle 
VAT registered (to deduct input VAT and for other taxed operations they might carry 
out). Given also the low rate (e.g. 1% or less) they would have to charge, the impacts the 
EU VAT (single and modulated 2nd version) would create in terms of additional VAT 
obligations or of prices, would be relatively limited. 
However, with a new VAT resource conceived as a parallel system to that of the Member 
States, about 35 million taxpayers would have to charge 2 types of VAT, ensure 
deduction of input VAT separately (national from national and EU from EU) and have 
therefore two sets of accounts for determining their net position. 
The reduction of administrative burden related to VAT is one of the priority areas under 
the Better Regulation Agenda. VAT accounts for almost 60% of the total burden 
measured for the 13 priority areas. 
It is undeniable, but at this stage not quantifiable, that with the three variants envisaged 
thus far, a new VAT resource would result in a substantial increase of administrative 
burdens for all EU businesses. 
( 6) Administrative burden for the EU administration 
Assuming that the direct tax collection for the EU level and the reimbursement of input 
VAT will be administered by national tax authorities, the EU would have to perform 
similar tasks than those performed for controlling the collection and calculation of 
existing own resources. 
Considering the extent of national VAT systems and the wide implications of building up 
a new VAT resource, it can be expected that such tasks would require significantly more 
human resources than those that are currently used for the determination of own 
resources. 
5.4. Quantitative assessment of the own resource 
5.4.1. Revenue estimates 
Table I shows revenue estimates for one variant, namely a single-rated VAT resource 
applied to a harmonised basis. The total revenue for 2009 amounts to 0.40% of GNI for 
the EU-27. The VAT burden in some Member States would clearly be higher than the 
average. This is the case in particular for LU, MT and CY. On the other hand, some 
countries would benefit from lower VAT charges, for instance LV, SK and RO. 
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Table 1: 
rate: 1% 
Revenues collected by Member States with a single rate VAT (2009), EU 
Total in million euros Total in % of GNI 
BE 1.419 0,40% 
BG 163 0,44% 
cz 601 0,40% 
DK 904 0,37% 
DE I OA81 0,40% 
EE 68 0,42% 
EI 682 0,43% 
EL 1.104 0,46% 
ES 3.783 0,34% 
FR 8.276 0,41% 
IT 5.513 0,35% 
CY 141 0,82% 
LV 59 0,22% 
LT 116 0,33% 
LU 194 0,61% 
HU 378 0,36% 
MT 41 0,71% 
NL 2.268 0,39% 
AT 1.234 0,43% 
PL 1.429 0,37% 
PT 828 0,51% 
RO 432 0,29% 
Sl 172 0,44% 
SK 207 0,29% 
FI 773 0,40% 
SE 1.307 0,38% 
UK 7.917 0,43% 
EU-27 50,489 0,40% 
Sources: DG BUDG calculations based on CIRCA database 
Note: estimates based on the uncapped final basis used for the VAT-based own resource. 
As there is a strong correlation between VAT bases and GNI, it can be expected that a 
new VAT resource could bring stable and sufficient revenue for a budget evolving 
broadly in line with GNI. 
5. 4. 2. Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
The national origin of the resource would be fully known by the Member States. 
Although the Member States' payments to the EU budget would evolve broadly with the 
evolution of their GNI, important differences would be observed between Member 
States. In the past, regressivity concerns have been used to suggest that poorer countries 
may bear an unfair share of the budget burden in a VAT -based financing system. This 
explains in part the progressive shift of EU financing to a GNI-based resource, which is 
generally seen as fairer than a resource based on VAT. 
However, the issue of regressivity seems not to be so clear-cut, as illustrated in Annex 
IV. The slight negative relationship between potential VAT revenues, expressed in% of 
GNI, and the GNI per capita of the Member States, seems not to be statistically 
significant and in some cases could be partly due to factors such as tourism or cross-
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border shopping boosting consumption (and VAT revenues). However, these effects are 
difficult to disentangle from structural differences in consumption or savings patterns. 
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ANNEX 1 
STATE OF HARMONIZATION OF VAT IN THE EU 
Table I displays the extent of adjustments ("corrections" and "compensations") which are 
undertaken in order to obtain an equivalent basis of calculation for the VAT -based 
contributions - which would correspond to equivalent rules and practices in all the 
Member States. 
• Corrections are adjustments related to the revenue obtained from VAT (and they are 
converted into base equivalent to allow for comparisons). The main types of 
corrections relate to small companies or to farmers. 
• Compensations are adjustments related to the tax base. They mainly highlight the 
impact of annex X of the VAT directive. 
It highlights that the implementation of VAT is almost the same in all the Member States. 
• 1n 2006, for I 8 Member States out of 25, the total corrections and compensations 
amounted to less than 3% of the uncapped final basis. 
• Only three Member States displayed significant deviations, namely Finland (9.6%), 
Malta (10.1%) and the UK (13.2%). 1n these cases, the upwards adjustments reflect 
that these countries make a large use of possibilities of exemptions or special 
treatments that are offered by the current EU legislation. 
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Table: Corrections and compensations in the calculation of the "uncapped final basis" (EU-25, 2006) 
Corrections Compensations Corrections + 
Comoensations 
Total in national Equivalent In% of final Total in EUR In °/o of final Final basis2 Total 
currency in base and EUR1 basis2 basis2 
BE -46.653.904 -282.412.038 -0,2% -2.976.460.666 -2,2% 133.192.917.346 -2,4% 
cz 46.900.000 14.131.891 0,0% 167.450.930 0,3% 65.536.33 7.498 0,3% 
OK 1.270.400.000 681.269.196 0,7% 1.795.118.894 2,0% 91.166.344.881 2,7% 
DE -203.291.840 -1.409.458.516 -0,1% 2.262.868.785 0,2% 1.018.029.026.640 0,1% 
EE 0 0 0,0% 54.770.968 0,8% 7.166.088.860 0,8% 
IE 16.009.859 103.294.745 0,1% 318.432.339 0,4% 86.949.081.628 0,5% 
EL -39.424.630 -275.596.495 -0,3% 1.596.642.243 15% 106.794.124.790 1,2% 
ES 3.162.037.443 30.214.494.026 5,0% 1.198.551.959 0,2% 608.754.865.710 5,2% 
FR -569.061.935 -3.828.586.370 -0,4% -7.701.133.546 -0,9% 881.984.345.148 -1,3% 
IT -1.658.982.396 -11.086.045.708 -1,8% -26.435.105.703 -4,4% 600.321.039.698 -6,3% 
CY 440.006 6.671.715 0,1% 97.982.917 0,8% 12.138.377.306 0,9% 
LV 598.120 5.173.246 0,1% 319.976.813 3,8% 8.354.344.050 3,9% 
LT 70.242.272 128.506.254 1,1% -43.249.473 -0,4% 11.317.917.681 0,8% 
LU -1.099.441 -9.342.397 -0,1% 269.932.228 1,7% 15.641.322.452 1,7% 
HU 12.428.775.864 260.604.722 0,7% 136.419.839 0,4% 38.810.086.385 1,0% 
MT 0 0 0,0% 339.081.523 10,1% 3.373.554.757 10,1% 
NL 108.868.647 700.525.365 0,3% 1.023.881.000 0,4% 258.580.513.360 0,7% 
AT -19.709.874 -114.552.328 -0,1% -3.754.304.860 -3,3% 114.311.463.274 -3,4% 
PL 54.478.728 92.096.771 0,1% -1.201.971.132 -0,8% 143.189.216.054 -0,8% 
PT 117.129.540 7 51.799.049 0,8% 438.251.600 0,5% 89.892.819.967 1,3% 
SI -4.643.704.872 -121.797.519 -0,7% -357.060.731 -2,2% 16.554.564.685 -2,9% 
SK 0 0 0,0% 246.631.883 1,3% 18.325.105.059 1,3% 
Fl 1.535.153.494 7.727.308.618 10,6% -733.858.320 -1,0% 73.048.368.840 9,6% 
SE -4.099.969.000 -2.062.423.322 -1,5% 1.412.610.110 1,1% 133.346.946.759 -0,5% 
UK 11.962.927.221 129.137.845.374 13,6% -3.448.526.471 -0,4% 949.383.515.417 13,2% 
Sum for EU-25 __ 
--
19.492.~63.303 150.633.506.280 _2,7% 
--
___ -34.973.0§6.87_2-
__ -0,6'Yt_• - 5.486.162.288.245 2,1% 
Source: Data from VAT statements in CIRCA database (2008) and calculations DG Budget. 
Notes: 1 Obtained by dividing the corrections by the weighted average rate (WAR). 2 Before capping bK 
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ANNEX2 
STRUCTURE OF VAT RATES IN THE MEMBER STATES 
Table 2 presents the shares of the different VAT rates in% of the whole VAT taxable base. 
It shows that 68.6% of the taxable base was taxed using standard rates in 2006 (EU-27). 
• Important differences could be observed between the Member States. In Denmark, a rate 
of 25% applied to 99.3% of the taxable base. In other countries, such as France or 
Luxembourg, relatively complex multi-rates structures could be observed. The special 
scheme for farmers ("flat rate" system) only applied in a limited number of Member States 
and with limited financial consequences (0.2% of the total taxable base for the EU-27). 
Zero-rated supplies represented a significant share in the total taxable base for four 
countries, namely Ireland (9.2% of the total taxable base), Cyprus (16.0%), Malta (22.2%) 
and the United-Kingdom (20.4%). 
Table: Share of the different VAT rates in% of the whole VAT taxable base (EU-27, 2006) 
Member State Zero 1 Miscellaneous3 Reduced2 
BE 0,7 0,0 30,7 
BG 0,0 0,0 1,6 
cz 0,0 0,0 33,8 
OK 0,7 0,0 0,0 
DE 0,0 0,1 17,6 
EE 0,0 0,0 6,4 
El 9,2 0,1 49,3 
EL 0,0 1,1 44,7 
ES 0,0 0,2 57,7 
FR 0,0 0,0 31,3 
IT 0,0 0,0 42,9 
CY 16,0 0,9 17,8 
LV 0,0 0,5 19,0 
LT 0,0 0,0 15,0 
LU 0,0 0,1 25,8 
HU 0,0 1,8 27,1 
MT 22,2 0,0 8,8 
NL 0,0 0,0 25,8 
AT 0,0 0,9 27,8 
PL 0,8 2,8 38,0 
PT 0,0 0,2 40,2 
RO 0,0 0,0 4,4 
Sl 0,0 2,6 32,3 
SK 0,0 0,0 3,0 
Fl 1,3 0,0 21,7 
SE 2,4 0,0 19,0 
UK 20,4 0,0 3,4 
Total EU-27 4,0 0,2 26,8 
Source: DG BUDG calculations based on CIRCA database 
Notes: 1 Zero rate refers to VAT exemption with refund of the tax paid at the preceding stage 
2 Sum of the shares of super-reduced, reduced and parking rates bases 
3 Mainly ''flat rate" for farmers 
4 The standard rate includes the 20% and the 25% rates. 
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ANNEX3 
VAT IN THE ECONOMY 
Table 3 highlights that there are structural differences between Member States that would 
have far greater impacts on the share of VAT revenue per Member State than existing 
differences in Member States' VAT systems. The fully harmonized VAT bases expressed in 
percentage of GNI vary significantly between the Member States. 
Table 3: 
BE 
BG 
cz 
OK 
DE 
EE 
El 
EL 
ES 
FR 
IT 
CY 
LV 
LT 
LU 
HU 
MT 
NL 
AT 
PL 
PT 
RO 
51 
SK 
Fl 
SE 
UK 
EU-27 
Size ofVAT bases in the Member States, EU-27, 2003-2009 (uncapped final 
base as a % of GNI) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
39,1 40,8 41,9 42,0 41,9 40,9 39,8 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 59,1 57,6 43,6 
n.a. 60,9 57,1 61,2 49,8 47,4 40,3 
38,4 38,6 39,7 41,3 42,4 40,5 37,4 
44,3 42,8 42,8 43,5 41,5 41,4 40,2 
n.a. 48,9 53,7 57,6 58,9 51,8 41,7 
52,8 54,5 56,7 57,3 58,4 57,0 43,4 
53,9 53,7 51,7 54,1 56,0 53,6 45,7 
57,1 59,1 61,4 63,6 61,4 50,8 34,5 
45,9 47,2 47,8 48,7 48,0 46,4 41,1 
43,2 38,5 39,1 41,1 43,3 39,4 35,2 
n.a. 77,7 83,7 87,4 92,4 102,2 82,3 
n.a. 40,7 45,6 52,3 52,5 45,5 22,2 
n.a. 41,3 43,5 47,9 51,3 53,4 32,9 
73,4 68,3 47,3 61,2 62,2 68,1 61,4 
n.a. 43,1 42,6 46,5 45,6 46,7 36,3 
n.a. 73,0 80,4 78,7 73,6 75,7 71,5 
46,6 46,0 48,4 47,2 48,0 48,9 38,7 
41,6 44,4 45,6 45,5 44,8 45,0 43,0 
n.a. 50,1 51,0 54,6 57,2 54,9 36,7 
57,7 58,5 62,7 61,7 61,6 62,9 51,0 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 41 '1 45,4 28,6 
n.a. 51,9 55,9 54,5 52,6 52,7 44,5 
n.a. 41,0 45,1 42,6 40,6 38,1 28,7 
43,4 42,3 43,2 43,7 42,2 42,9 40,5 
41,7 42,1 42,9 42,2 42,2 43,2 37,8 
49,3 50,2 49,1 49,5 49,9 48,9 43,5 
44,2 46,1 46,6 47,5 47,7 45,8 39,6 
Note: 1 the uncapped final basis is calculated using net VAT revenues of the Member States. Net revenues=gross 
revenues-reimbursements. In some case, like in LU in recent years, reimbursements can lead to substantial year-
on-year variations of net revenues. 
Source: DG BUDG calculations based on CIRCA database 
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ANNEX4 
REGRESSIVITY 
Graph 2 below shows that with full VAT base harmonization there would be a slightly 
negative - but not statistically significant - relationship between the potential revenues 
from the hypothetical new VAT resource, expressed in% of GNI, and the GNI per capita 
of the Member States. The fact that all countries above the 1.20 % level, which to a 
significant extent drive the slight negative slope, are characterised by a substantial 
tourism sector, suggests that expenditure by non-residents might partly explain the high 
level of this ratio; if this were confirmed, it would arguably circumscribe further the 
relevance of the regressivity argument. However, these effects are difficult to disentangle 
from structural differences in consumption or savings patterns. 
In the past, the regressivity argument has been used to suggest that poorer countries may 
bear an unfair share of the budget burden in a VAT -based financing system. This 
explains in part the progressive shift of EU financing to a GNI-based resource, which is 
generally seen as fairer and simpler than a resource based on VAT. 
Graph: VAT revenues (in% ofGNI) and GNI per capita, EU-25, 2005 
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6. EU ENERGY TAX 
6.1. Political context 
6.1.1. Energy taxation in the EU 
Traditionally, energy taxes have been levied for several reasons, in particular to raise 
revenue, but also to influence the behaviour of economic agents towards a more efficient 
use of energy and cleaner energy sources. 
In order to ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market several key aspects of 
energy taxation are already governed at EU level under Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 
27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy 
products and electricity146 (hereafter also referred to as "the Energy Taxation Directive" 
or "the ETD"). 
The ETD lays down harmonised rules for the application of excise duty to energy 
products and electricity. In general, it makes energy products used as motor fuel or 
heating fuel as well as electricity consumed in similar situations subject to taxation. 
Other uses of energy products and electricity (e.g. energy products used as raw material 
in certain production processes) are out of scope of the ETD. The Directive also defines 
what exceptions are allowed and under which conditions. Mandatory exemptions apply 
in particular to energy products and electricity used to produce electricity. Optional 
exemptions apply in particular in favour of energy-intensive business. The ETD also sets 
minimum levels of taxation for energy products used as motor or heating fuel and for 
electricity. Above the minima Member States are free to set their national rates as they 
see fit. 
Since the adoption of the ETD, the underlying policy framework has changed radically. 
More efficient and cleaner energy consumption has become a key factor for long-term 
sustainability of our economies. The EU has now very clear policy objectives in the areas 
of energy and climate change and has committed itself to achieve ambitious targets by 
2020 under the Climate Change Package. The creation of a EU Emission Trading 
Scheme is a key instrument in this direction. It is therefore necessary to align the ETD to 
this new policy framework. This is the purpose of its ongoing revision, which should lead 
to the adoption of a formal Commission proposal to amend the ETD during the first 
semester of 20 II. A revised ETD revision shall provide an internal market framework for 
energy taxation that enables Member States to use energy taxation more effectively for 
environmental purposes and promotes energy saving. It should also allow for revenue 
generation in a way that does not distort competition between energy sources and energy 
consumers, improving as such the functioning of the internal market. 
The objectives of the ETD revision can be further specified in the following way: 
(!) 
'" 
Ensure consistent treatment of energy sources in the ETD by taxing them on the 
basis of their C02 emissions and energy content, in order to provide a real level 
playing field for different energy consumers. 
OJ L 283,31.10.2003, p. 51. 
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(2) Provide an adapted taxation framework for renewable energies. The ETD should 
reflect the positive characteristics of renewable energies in the general structure 
of the tax system. 
(3) Provide a framework for the use of C02 taxation to complement the carbon price 
signal established by the ETS. The new structure should provide a framework for 
Member States to apply C02 taxation to all areas where the EU ETS does not 
apply including in particular areas currently excluded from the scope of the ETD. 
At the same time overlaps between both instruments should be avoided to ensure 
consistency and avoid losses in cost-efficiency. 
6.1. 2. Energy taxation and own resources 
Although the Energy Taxation Directive was not prepared for the purpose of introducing 
new own resources, it nevertheless creates suitable conditions by harmonising tax bases 
and establishing minimum rates. 
In 2004, the Commission suggested that an EU levy be imposed on motor fuel used for 
road transport147 • Motor fuel used for road transport includes leaded and unleaded petrol, 
diesel, LPG and natural gas as well as biofuels used for transport. This EU levy would be 
a share of the excise duties currently imposed on motor fuel. 
The main issue for discussion identified by the Commission in 2004 was the level of 
taxation in the context of defining an own resource as well as the concrete operation of 
the system, including the practical arrangements for the possibility of displaying the EU 
levy on receipts and invoices. The Commission concluded that "EU rates below half of 
the minimum rates would be enough to finance half of the current EU budget". 
The Commission also mentioned that for at least one subcategory of motor fuel for road 
transport there is a strong case for complete harmonisation also ofthe excise duties at EU 
level. Diesel used for professional transport is a tax base with a significant degree of 
mobility mainly due to the possibility of hauliers and coach operators engaged in 
international activities to take advantage of the very significant differences in national 
excise duties on diesel by filling up in Member States where prices are lower (see 
below). Hence, it stated, "a single EU-wide rate on diesel used for professional transport, 
as already proposed in the Commission proposal for a Council directive to introduce 
special tax arrangements for diesel fuel used for commercial purposes148 , would avoid 
distortions in the internal market". 
Since 2004, not much progress has been achieved towards the harmonization of excise 
duties on diesel used for professional transport149• But, as indicated above, the rapidly 
evolving political context and the ongoing work on the in-depth revision of the Directive 
provide a new framework for discussion of an EU Energy Levy. The envisaged modified 
system of energy taxation, which would include a C02 tax plus an energy tax, could 
open new opportunities and entail additional issues for setting up a new own resource. 
147 
148 
149 
COM(2004)505 Vol. I and II, 14.07.2004. 
COM(2002) 410 final of24 July 2002. 
The Commission tabled proposals in 2007 [COM(2007)52 of 13 March 2007]. The forthcoming 
proposal to review the ETD will integrate its main thrust and replace the proposal. 
110 EN 
6.2. Outline of the proposal 
6.2.1. Identifying variants 
It is important to stress that the draft proposal for the revised ETD provides for an 
explicit distinction between energy taxation specifically linked to C02 emissions 
attributable to the consumption of the products concerned (C02-related taxation) and 
energy taxation based on the energy content per GJ of the products concerned (energy-
related taxation). An EU Energy Levy could focus on either of- or both these elements. 
Any work on C02-related taxation needs to take into account not only the ongoing work 
to revise the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD), but also recent developments in the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). In a context where important efforts are made to 
ensure a maximum of coherence between C02 taxation of non-ETS sectors and the 
burden imposed to sectors covered by the ETS, an own resource proposal cannot focus 
just on one of these dimensions only. 
Three main variants of the EU Energy Levy are examined below. In order to avoid any 
confusion between these rather different options, very distinct names are used: 
EU Energy Levy. This variant would consist in applying a single EU rate to the 
quantities of energy products released for consumption in each Member State. In 
order to reduce the operating cost of the levy, the final calculation of the own 
resource could be determined centrally, possibly on an annual basis, based on the 
total quantity of products released for consumption. [Alternatively, in line with the 
revised ETD, an EU rate could be applied to the quantities of energy products 
released for consumption in each Member State, based on the energy content of the 
products.] 
EU C02 Levy. This variant would consist of attributing to the EU budget (part of) 
the revenue from applying the minimum rate of C02-related taxation defined in the 
ETD. In addition, (part of) the proceeds from auctioning emissions allowances under 
the ETS could be added. (An own resources solely based on the future C02 
component of the ETD would lead to an unjustified exemption of all installations 
subject to ETS.) The link between the EU C02 Levy and the use of (a part of) the 
auctioning revenues under the ETS is discussed in Box 9 below. In addition, a 
chapter deals specifically with the auctioning revenue under the ETS. 
• C02-based contribution. A single rate could be applied to the overall C02 
emissions of a Member State, including those covered by the EU ETS and those not 
covered by the EU ETS. The calculation of the own resource could be determined 
centrally, based on the total quantity of C02 emissions. The corresponding 
contribution would be transferred by each Member State from their national budgets, 
without this being linked directly to any specific source of revenue on Member State 
level. This would therefore be comparable to today's GNI-based contributions. As an 
aggregate measure, it would not be designed as a tax, unlike the two other variants. 
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BOX 9: ADVANTAGES OF A CONSISTENT APPROACH FOR THE EU C02 LEVY AND THE ETS 
An own resource based on C02 would achieve maximum consistency if it covered all 
C02 emissions. 
This means that an EU C02 Levy should preferably be considered as a candidate own 
resource in combination with an own resource based on the proceeds from auctioning 
emission allowances in ETS sectors. And, conversely, if an own resource based on 
auctioning revenue under the ETS was considered, it would be consistent to complement 
it with an own resource from revenue from C02 taxation that, according to the 
forthcoming proposal revising the ETD, would apply to all non-ETS sectors. 
Combining both elements would be more equitable than an own resource based on 
revenue from auctioning emission allowances only, as the own resource collected in each 
Member States would not depend on the importance of its ETS sector but cover all C02 
emissions. Whether or not the total revenue or only part of the revenue of both elements 
would become an own resource would depend, inter alia, on the total level of expected 
revenue and the share of overall own resources it is deemed to cover. 
The draft ETD proposal provides for an exemption from C02 taxation for energy 
consumption in the sectors covered by the EU ETS sectors. As such, it perfectly aligns 
the scope of the C02 taxation to the EU ETS. Hence, energy consumers will always be 
subject to only one system (EU ETS or C02 taxation) and will never be subject to both 
systems at the same time. 
6.2.2. Tax basis 
A key issue for the EU Energy Levy is the scope of the levy. The 2004 Commission 
proposals, which is also reflected in the Staff Working Document accompanying the 
Budget Review communication, placed the focus on "the main motor fuels used for road 
transport, namely leaded and unleaded petrol and diesel". Such an approach reflected the 
importance of these products in revenue terms, and the complexity of a number of 
provisions related to other products. However, several alternatives can be envisaged. 
Annex 1 presents the pros and cons of including in the scope of an EU Energy Levy other 
motor fuels used for road transport and including energy products used as motor fuel for 
other purposes than road transport, heating fuels and electricity. 
Taking into account the disadvantages of the variants extending the energy levy to all 
motor fuels or to all energy products, restricting the scope of the energy levy to petrol 
and diesel used for road transport would be the simplest approach. 
But one should not overlook the fact that an energy levy based on motor fuels used for 
road transport has a number of important drawbacks as well. A number of important 
evolutions are ongoing that can be expected to accelerate in the medium term, such as the 
enhanced used of biofuels and the emergence of electric cars. Currently, Member States 
may provide for tax reductions or exemptions for biofuels and a systematic beneficial 
treatment to biofuels will be proposed in the forthcoming revision of the ETD. Even 
though it would be recommendable to reflect such beneficial treatment in the own 
112 EN 
resources calculation, this would further complicate the calculations and require the 
definition of an EU tax policy for biofuels (for which pros and cons are very much 
debated). The emergence of electric cars would over time erode revenue from an own 
resource on fuels used for road transport. Adapting the ETD to this evolution would be 
relatively easy (as electricity is already within the scope of the ETD), but it might be 
more complex to align the own resources legal framework to this evolution. 
Regarding the EU C02 Levy, the consistent application of a harmonised tax on C02 on 
energy products of EUR 20/Tc02, would constitute an argument in favour of a wide base 
for the resource. Ideally, all C02 emitted through combustion should be included in the 
scope of the tax (like for ETS). And, as indicated above, the EU C02 Levy should also 
be based on the transfer of (part of) of the emission auctioning revenue under the EU 
ETS to avoid that only specific parts of the economy contribute. 
Regarding the C02-based contribution, a system inspired by the current calculation of 
the VAT -based and the GNI-based own resource could be set up. It would involve 
proposals of the Commission based on publicly available data and Member States 
estimates where relevant. The exact scope of the resource, i.e. the exact definition of the 
total emissions to take into account for the purpose of the own resource calculation, 
would need to be determined. 
6.2.3. Tax rate(s) 
In general, a practical feature to address would be how to align the EU Energy or C02 
Levy to the different minima listed in Annex of the ETD. 
• Regarding the EU Energy Levy, as the different minima are based on complex 
considerations (ex. different treatment of gas oil used as a motor fuel or for heating 
purposes) it could be difficult, for instance, to apply a unique tax rate per amount of 
energy content. Any variation could on the other hand render it more difficult for the 
consumer to identity clearly the EU share in the overall taxation. However, the 
revised ETD could bring about a considerable simplification of the structure of rates, 
distinguishing according to the use of the energy product, which could attenuate this 
concern. 
• Regarding the EU C02 Levy, the revised ETD envisages one m1mmum rate 
applicable to all products categories. This rate that could be attributed to the EU 
budget and would be highly visible. 
For both variants, as well as for the C02-based contributions, the rate to be applied 
would depend primarily on a revenue objective. As an illustration, in the spirit of the 
2004 Commission proposals, the rate imposed could correspond to one half of the 
minimum rate applicable: 
• For the EU Energy Levy, this would mean a rate evolving in steps to reach 4.8 €/GJ 
on the I st of January 2018 for motor fuels used, mainly, for road transport (Table A 
of the Annex to the proposed revised ETD). As a possibility, the tax could also cover 
other energy products, using a rate of 0.075 €/GJ (Tables B to D). 
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• For the EU C02 Levy, half of the minimum C02 tax rate would correspond to 
€1 0/T c02 for all energy products (except electricity, which is a secondary energy 
product the generation of which is covered by the ETS). This could for instance be 
aligned with the transfer of half of the revenue of auctioning under the ETS. Sharing 
the revenues with the Member States administrations would reduce risks of tax 
avoidance and facilitate mechanisms of administrative cooperation (and, possibly, 
enhance collection of the levy by the Member States on behalf of the EU). 
6.2.4 Implementation 
The EU Energy Levy and the C02-based contribution could be based on already existing 
EU acquis and might therefore be easier to implement but the former would negatively 
impact on the forthcoming proposal to revise ETD. They would require computations at 
the Member State or at EU level based on statistics on energy consumption and C02 
emission, respectively. The EU C02 Levy would require a modification of the ETD as 
projected in the forthcoming proposal for revision. 
The EU Energy Levy would consist in applying a single EU rate to the quant1ttes 
released for consumption in each Member State over a certain period, e.g. one year (or to 
the energy content component after a revised ETD would be applicable). 
• 
• 
• 
Excise duty becomes chargeable at the time of release for consumption of the 
products. It is this point in time that should be taken into account for the purpose of 
calculating the amount of own resources. The reason is that the rules for the levying 
and collection of duty are not harmonised. This would also imply that a duty which 
has become due but has not been paid would also be taken into account for own 
resources purposes (unless corrections are allowed for this). 
This approach would be simple to administer for the taxpayers as well as for the 
administrations as existing procedures for release for consumption would not be 
affected and the final calculation of the own resources share would only have to be 
determined centrally, on an annual basis, based on the total quantity of products 
released for consumption. 
It should be noted that, alternatively, the EU Energy Levy could be directly paid to 
the EU by the companies releasing the products, which would involve higher 
operating costs and a (further) revision of the ETD (see below). 
The EU C02 Levy would build on the intended modification of the ETD providing for a 
dual rate structure (C02-related and energy related taxation), based on a Commission 
proposal (foreseen in April/May). 
• 
• 
Companies releasing energy products for consumption would be obliged to separately 
declare the tax resulting from the application of the EU rate of C02-related taxation, 
of the remaining national part of C02-related taxation and of the energy-related part 
of taxation. 
Such an approach would slightly increase the administrative burden for these 
companies since an additional EU rate would be added in their calculation of the 
C02-related and energy-related taxation. It would also result in an increased burden 
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for Member States' administrations in terms of control and may somewhat complicate 
the control of the correct application of the own resource by the Commission150• 
• This variant would reflect the current structure of EU climate policy instruments with 
the main distinction between ETS and non-ETS sectors (with the intention to apply 
C02 taxation to the latter). However, the climate policy approach is only fixed until 
2020; since the time perspective for the new own resource is longer, flexibility would 
be needed to adapt the structure of own resources to changes in the EU's climate 
policy later. 
6.3. Qualitative assessment of the own resource 
6.3.1. Preliminary questions 
(I) Lessons from economic theory 
Currently, the rates applied for most energy products differ a great deal from one 
Member State to another. As an illustration, for diesel, 2 countries do not comply with 
minimum rates because of transitional periods granted in order to take into account their 
specific situation. 16 countries apply a rate between EUR 300 and EUR 400 excise tax 
per !000 litres. The other II countries tax at a level in excess of EUR 400 per !000 litres, 
the highest in the UK with EUR 679 (situation in January 2011, see Annex II) 151 • 
Differences between Member States are an important element when it comes to the 
economic assessment of a new own resource. The economic impact will very much 
depend on its impact on the absolute level of (energy or C02 taxation) and the effective 
degree of harmonization of the tax rates in the EU. 
The impact will ultimately depend on how Member States will restructure their tax rates 
following the introduction of the new own resource. 
• 
150 
151 
If, for instance, they applied the EU (Energy or C02) Levy on top of existing rates 
and used the additional revenue from lower GNI-based contributions to lower charges 
on labour, positive environmental and economic effects (in terms of GDP and 
employment) could be expected. This scenario is comparable to one of the options 
examined in the Impact Assessment of the revision of the ETD (option 4 -
introduction of a C02 tax on top of the rates applied by MS). This option shows 
positive economic impacts (for the EU-27: increase in GDP of 0.27% and of 
employment of 0.39% by 2030) if the additional revenue is used to reduce employers' 
social security contributions. Economic impacts are less pronounced if additional 
As an alternative, the part of the own resource based on C02-related taxation could be calculated 
by the Member States on the basis of the quantities of energy products released for consumption 
(as in EU Energy Levy), taking into account their respective C02 emission factors as laid down in 
EU legislation (See Commission Decision 2007 /589) and applying the minimum rate of COl-
related taxation to these quantities. 
Information per Member State can be found on the Commission website: 
http:/ lee. europa.eu/taxation_ customs/taxation/ excise_ duties/ energy _products/rates/index_ en.htm 
http:/ /ec.europa.eu/taxation_ customs/resources/ documents/taxation/ excise_ duties/energy _products 
/rates/excise_ duties-part _ii_ energy _products_ en. pdf 
http:/ /ec.europa.eu/taxation _customs/resources/ documents/taxation/ excise_ duties/ energy _products 
/rates/excise_ duties_ energy _products_ en. pdf 
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revenue is used for fiscal consolidation or lump-sum payments to households to 
compensate for higher taxation. 
• Additional positive effects could derive from an approximation of taxation levels in 
the EU. This could for instance arise if some Member States with relatively low tax 
rates considered the EU levy as a top up on national rates, while higher tax Member 
States reduced their national rate to make room for the EU levy. 
• If the Member States decided to simply restructure their tax rates (dividing up current 
rates into a national and an EU share), no direct economic impacts would be expected 
as the consumer prices would not be affected and reduced income from energy or 
C02 taxation would be compensated by the reduction in the GNI contribution. 
However, an indirect effect could be observed due to a change in the gross 
contributions from the Member States (or their taxpayers) to the budget. 
(2) Legal issues 
The application of an EU Energy Levy, which consists in the allocation of a part of the 
revenue to the EU budget, would not as such require any changes to the ETD or to the 
horizontal excise provision (Directive 2008/118/EC). Although the ETD contains a 
number of optional exemptions and tax reductions, this should however not require any 
corrections if one bases the calculation of the energy levy on the quantities released for 
consumption including the quantities benefiting from an exemption or tax reduction in 
order to ensure an equal application across the EU. 
The EU C02 Levy presupposes the adoption of a revised ETD by the Council and the EP 
providing for an explicit distinction between C02-related taxation and energy-related 
taxation. Although, the Commission could propose an entry into application of the 
revised ETD on 111/2013, it is difficult to predict the effective date of entry into 
application due to the complexity of the proposal, its political sensitivity and the need to 
reach unanimity in the Council. 
The C02-based contribution could be realised via the own resource decision and its 
implementing provisions. 
6.3.2. Criteria set out in the budget review 
(I) Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
The EU Energy Levy could be based on the current scope of the ETD. The allocation of a 
part of tax receipts to the EU budget would not in itself further the policy objectives 
pursued by the ETD (better functioning of the internal market; reduce distortion of 
competition between energy consumers and suppliers; support environmental policy and 
energy efficiency). However, as explained above, under some assumptions, a positive 
impact could be obtained if the introduction of the EU Energy Levy led to an increase of 
the total energy taxation (i.e. with appropriate recycling of the revenue) or a more 
harmonized structure of rates among the Member States. 
The EU C02 Levy and the C02-based contribution are more clearly linked to the EU 
climate policy and could, in the medium term, be considered to support EU policies, for 
instance if more stringent emission reduction objectives - such as a 30% reduction of 
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GHG emissions by 2020- were translated into higher rates for the resource. In the longer 
term (mainly beyond 2030), the EU objective to decarbonise the economy would, 
however, start to conflict with the revenue raising needs in case one of these two options 
were chosen (a reduction by 80- 95% of emissions is envisaged by 2050). 
The EU C02 Levy and the C02-based contribution (including a revenue-sharing 
mechanism for emissions auctioning) have the advantage that they cover all C02 
emissions and level out differences between Member States related to different shares of 
products in the final energy consumption (e.g. in the EU Energy Levy - if based on 
quantities consumed like in the current ETD - a higher diesel share as compared to petrol 
would lead to lower own resources payments due to lower consumption in 1/1 OOKm). 
They would also provide a strong incentive for Member States to take measures to reduce 
overall C02 emissions. 
(2) Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
The EU Energy Levy would be cross-border in nature, in particular regarding products 
for which important cross-border shopping can be observed. This is in particular the case 
for motor fuel used for road transport. The huge capacity of big trucks allows them to 
cover distances of between 1.500 and 3.000 kilometres on a single tank. Hauliers 
involved in international activities or situated in or near the border of low-taxing 
countries refuel in low-tax countries in order to benefit from a significant competitive 
advantage. 
The allocation of a part of the proceeds of energy taxation to the EU would not by itself 
lead to lower rate differentials between Member States and, hence, to reduced tank 
tourism. Whether or not such effects would occur would depend on how Member States 
react, in particular whether or not they apply the EU levy on top of existing rates or not. 
The EU C02 Levy and the C02-based contribution would be cross-border in nature 
because they would cover C02 emissions. 
(3) Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
The development of an own resource would be facilitated by the existence of a 
harmonised base applicable on the entire EU. 
The EU Energy Levy could cover all energy products used as motor fuel in the scope of 
the ETD and, by extension, also energy products used as heating fuel. The ETD provides 
for an EU-wide framework for the taxation of motor and heating fuels. National 
variations exist (e.g. some Member States apply reduced rates for commercial diesel). 
These would however not affect the EU Energy Levy as it is applied to the total quantity 
released for consumption during a year. 
Provided a revised ETD including a distinction between a energy and a C02 component 
was adopted, it would also make the development of the EU C02 Levy straightforward. 
A C02-based contribution could be set up based on currently available and agreed data. 
117 EN 
( 4) Autonomous resource collection 
Two approaches can be envisaged for the collection of both the EU Energy Levy and the 
EUC02 Levy: 
• The annual computation of the levy based on the (energy or C02 content) of the 
quantity of product released for consumption. In this case, the levy would be 
somewhat similar to the current VAT -based contributions since it would constitute a 
revenue transfer by the Member States on the basis of one tax. However, there would 
be no need for corrections and compensation as for the VAT contributions since 
everything would be calculated on the basis of quantities of products released for 
final consumption (independent of the national tax regime) and in any case it would 
not be valid for the C02 levy where no exemptions are foreseen. 
• The autonomous collection of the tax by the EU. In this case, a part, say 50% of the 
tax rate currently envisaged in the revised ETD, could be paid by the companies to 
the EU. There are about 6.000 companies in the EU releasing petrol and diesel for 
consumption. If extended to other energy products, this number increases to about 
56.000. The administrative burden on these businesses would be (marginally) 
increased if they would have to calculate and pay the EU part of the excise duty 
separately. It would also be burdensome for the EU administration to collect the levy 
directly from these companies. Forms of administrative cooperation with the Member 
States administration would have to be explored to minimize the operating cost of the 
levy. In this case, although the levy would not transit via Member States accounts, 
the amount levied in each Member State would be easy to compute. 
The C02-based contribution constitutes a direct payment by Member States to the EU 
from their national budgets (as the GNI own resource). It therefore by definition does not 
entail any direct collection of revenue by the EU from taxpayers. 
( 5) Additional burden on specific sectors 
The EU Energy Levy, the EU C02 Levy and the C02-based contribution would 
primarily constitute a transfer of revenue from the Member States to the EU budget. They 
would not, by themselves, imply a change in the tax burden for the energy sector or any 
sector covered by the ETD. 
The ultimate impact on specific sectors would entirely depend on how Member States 
would adjust their tax rates following the introduction of the own resource (see section 
3.1.1 ). The impact of an EU Energy or C02 Levy on the energy industry would require 
particular attention due to the evolution of the energy sector. 
In its recent energy strategy 2020 the Commission has announced a need for EUR 1 
trillion until 2020 to replace obsolete capacity, modernise and adapt infrastructures and 
cater for increasing and changing demand for low carbon energy152• Most of these 
investments will have to be paid by the energy consumers through higher prices. The 
expected price increase of energy will be in addition reinforced by an increased share of 
renewables with higher production costs and rising prices for fossil fuels. 
152 See COM (2010) 639. 
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Already now petroleum products are substantially taxed in most Member States -
especially products used as propellant, and with the recent crisis, several Member States 
have decided to further increase this taxation (VAT in particular). 
Given the current budgetary situation in most Member States it cannot be expected that 
they all will reduce the national taxation of energy to make room for an EU Energy Levy 
but of course at the same time the abolition of the VAT -based Own Resource opens up 
budgetary possibilities to redesign the tax system for instance in other areas. In the 
Commission's view reductions of labour costs and charges would achieve the best 
macroeconomic result. The possible impact on the competitiveness on parts of the EU 
industry which depends i.a. on competitive energy prices is being addressed by 
appropriate rules in the forthcoming revision of the Energy Tax Directive. Table I gives 
a first indication of the impact on energy prices if around EU 14 billion were to be found 
through an additional energy tax with a heavier tax placed on solid fuels and petroleum 
products. 
Even though the price increase would be limited to 0.5% to 2%, it would inevitably 
impact the necessary transformation of the energy sector into a nearly carbon free 
industry. The impact of the introduction of a substantive EU Energy Levy on the 
competitiveness of the European industry should therefore be analysed in more detail if 
this option is considered further. Especially as major competitors (USA, China, India) are 
apparently not willing to transform their industries in a comparable time span, the 
potential loss of competiveness of European industry must be taken seriously into 
account. 
Table 4: Summary estimate of the maximum impact of an EU Energy Levy on energy 
prices (in the extreme assumption of a full top-up of the EU component) 
Current Prices Levy (€/ktoe) 154 Price Levy Sector (EU27)153 Increase (b€)'" concerned 
0.9 b€ Industry 
Solid fuels 0.02 
0.2 b€ Households & Services 
Petroleum Products 1.25-1,4 €/litre 0.02 !.9% 8.0b€ Industry & 
transoort 
52.2I €/MWh !.6% !.7 b€ Households & Natural Gas 0.01 Services 
39.46 €/MWh 2.2% 0.9 b€ Industry 
Electricity 167 €/MWh 0.01 0.5% 2.5 b€ All 
103 €/MWh 0.8% 
Total 14.1 b€ 
Source: DG ENER 
153 EU27 Average price for gasoil and unleaded 95, on the 20/12/2010; EU27 Average Households or 
Industry price for the second semester of 2008 
!54 
155 
0.01€/ktoe represents 0.86€/MWh for gas and electricity; 0.02€/ktoe represents ±0.025€/litre. 
Based on 2008 Eurostat final energy consumption data. 
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(6) Administrative burden for the EU administration 
The administrative burden for the EU would be very limited in the case of a centralised 
annual computation of the own resource, the approach envisaged for the EU Energy Levy 
and the C02-based contributions. 
If the tax is collected directly from the taxpayers by the EU, as is envisaged for the EU 
C02 Levy, the EU administration will have to deal with up to 56,000 taxpayers. This 
could entail a substantial cost. However, the possibilities to cooperate with national 
administrations (which would continue collecting levies as well), should not be 
underestimated. 
6.4. Quantitative assessment of the own resource 
6.4.1. Revenue estimates 
(I) EU Energy Levy 
Table 2 below shows that existing receipts from excise duty on diesel and petrol are 
higher than the total amount of EU own resources for 2009. They amount to about 1.39% 
of GNI (see column 5) whereas total own resources amounted to about I% of GNI. An 
EU Energy Levy could thus potentially cover a large part of EU revenue needs. The table 
also shows the estimated proceeds of the application of a uniform EU Energy Levy on 
petrol and diesel used as road motor fuel of EUR 50/1000 I. Total proceeds would 
amount to EUR 17.5 billion (column 13) representin~ about 0.15% of the EU GNI 
(column 15) and about 15.1% of the 2009 own resources 56• 
This estimate was based on total revenue as communicated by Member States to the 
Commission157• The following should however be observed: 
• 
• 
156 
157 
The calculation is based on revenue and not on quantities released for consumption 
(which could be the basis for the calculation of an own resource). A number of 
Member States report revenue from excise duty in petrol and diesel globally (IT, AT, 
SK, PL). For these Member States, it was assumed that the share of petrol and diesel 
in these Member States is equal to the weighted average percentage share of the tax 
revenue of these two products separately in EU-27 based on the respective share in 
all other Member States. 
The revenue from excise on diesel also includes revenue from diesel used for other 
purposes than motor fuel for road transport (in particular heating fuel). However, 
rates on heating fuel are generally very low, compared to the rates for motor fuel for 
road transport. Hence, the impact on the overall results would anyhow be limited. 
This would represent between 9.1% (DE) and 18.3% (CY) of the current excise duty revenues 
from taxation ofpetro1 and diesel in the Member States (column 14). The higher the current rates, 
the lower the relative loss of revenue and vice versa. 
Based on information by Member States regularly furnished to DG TAXUD and published in 
compiled format: 
http:/ /ec.europa.ew'taxation _customs/taxation/ excise_ duties/ energy __products/rates/index_ en.htm 
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Further estimates can be made of the effect of extending the energy levy to include, 
respectively, all other motor fuels and all energy products and electricity: 
• Adding all other motor fuels used for road transport, i.e. LPG and methane, would 
generate another 417 million euro (or 2.3% of a total of 17.93 billion euro) assuming 
the application of a rate ofEUR 50 per Kg LPG (the whole revenue comes from LPG 
as the use of methane as motor fuel is marginal). 
• Adding energy products used as motor fuel other than for road transport, energy 
products used as heating fuel and electricity would require making assumptions on 
the EU rate for every singly product and use, as well as taking into account 
exemptions and tax reductions. Assuming that the own resource contribution from 
these other sources should be relatively at the same level as the levy on motor fuels 
for road transport (II% of total revenue), the additional amount of own resource 
would be around EUR 3.9 billion or 17.8% of a total of EUR 21.83 billion). 
(2) EU C02 Levy 
The impact assessment on the effects of the revision of the ETD estimated the revenue 
from an additional carbon tax ofEUR 22 per tc02 applied by all the 27 Member States on 
top of the existing national rates at EUR 61.8 billion in 2020. This revenue would come 
in addition to the proceeds from auctioning emission allowances under the EU ETS. 
Hence, it is clear that only a share of the revenue from C02-related taxation under the 
revised ETD would have to constitute an own resource. Moreover, the estimate does not 
take into account that the receipts will be diminished through special measures being 
applicable to sectors exposed to carbon leakage (similar to ETS). 
Using EUR 10 per tc02 the total estimated revenue could amount to EUR 28 billion for 
the EU-27. As indicated above, this back of the envelope estimate does not account for a 
number of factors. 
C02 tax revenue 10 euro per !em 
(min. Euro) 
BE 817 
BG 192 
cz 500 
DK 285 
DE 4,667 
EE 74 
EL 537 
ES 2,424 
FR 3,910 
IE 341 
IT 3,710 
CY 34 
LV 109 
LT !53 
LU 109 
HU 480 
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MT 10 
NL 1,078 
AT 528 
PL 1,512 
PT 463 
RO 895 
SI 160 
SK 224 
FI 264 
SE 487 
UK 4,004 
total 27,965 
(3) C02-based contribution 
The rate of the own resource should be fixed at a level generating the revenue expected. 
Taking into the quantity of emissions and the current and foreseeable price of carbon, a 
range of EUR 15 to 40 bn could reasonably be envisaged. 
6.4. 2. Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
Except in the case of direct revenue collection by the EU administration (envisaged 
mainly for the EU C02 Levy but also feasible for an EU Energy Levy), Member States 
would know the origin of the own resource. Even with a centralized collection 
mechanism, Member States would be able to make estimate of the national origin of the 
resource. 
In all variants, there would also be an impact on the relative share of each Member States 
in total own resources. Member States having relatively higher energy/motor fuel 
consumption and/or C02 emissions would pay more than today and Member States 
having relatively low C02 emissions would pay less (as the relative share in the 
balancing GNI own resource remains equal). 
Figure I below shows a negative correlation between the potential revenue related to EU 
excise duties on fuel used for road transport and GDP per capita. The amount of money 
accruing from an EU energy tax would be lower as a percentage of GDP in richer 
Member States than in poorer Member States. However, the contributions in absolute 
amounts (EUR per capita) would be significantly higher for the richer Member States. 
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Figure 1: EU excise duties and GDP per capita (2008) 
6:' 3,0% 
Q 
~ 2,5% 
0 
0 c 2,0% 
~ 
.!: 
-
.; 1,5% 
~ 
·o 1,0% 
:l 
;;l 
~ 0,5% 
~----~-~- ----~~--
----- ~ ~--- -- ·------• 'Y-.;;:o:oos9Iil<xf+o,o33 
r~rc::.:~::.:=-· ·~~c~~2-': (!J{i~8--.--
O,Oo/o +---------~~~~--T-~~--~~~~----~~-----4 
0,000 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 
GDP per capita (EUR) 
Source: DG Budget on the basis of Primes Model and DG ECFIN Spring 2008 Forecasts 
It is also interesting to note that groupings of countries can be observed in Figure 1. 
These correspond to the new Member States (upper left), the cohesion phasing-out 
countries (middle) and the traditional net contributors (lower right). It should be recalled 
again that the resource (at least the EU C02 Levy) could be levied on individual 
taxpayers treated in a similar way throughout the EU-27. 
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Table 5: Revenue estimates for the EU Energy levy 
om excise duty on petrol and dillalln 2009 I 
Gro .. Annual revenue (million Euro) Tax rata (per 1 000 par 1000 Eatlmated conBumptlon (million lltras and kg) 
National litre a) 
Income LPG and LPG and LPG and 
_I (GNI) Petrol Diesel methane Total Ma%ofGNI Petrol Diesel methane• Patrol Diesel Total methane 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(2)+(3)+(-4) (5)=(-4)1(1) (6) (7) (8) (9)::(2)1(6) {10)=(3)1(7) (11)=(4)1(8) (12)=(9)+(10)+(1 1) 
1,12% 614 335 125 1.6IT 8.349 38 10.064 
2,85% 350 307 174 843 1.886 395 3.125 
226~ r----t 72 r---1.345 --fa I-- 2,29% 48 406 155 2.454 4.337 72 6.663 OK 2.536 1,12% 557 380 489 2.105 3.540 37 5.662 
DE 2.430.940 17.826 16.933 129 34.889 1.44% 655 470 180 27.236 35.996 718 63.952 
EE 13.53 153 148 0 301 2,23% 398 37 125 384 401 2 786 
EL' 226.644 2.08 1.137 5 3.222 1,42 
" 
302 12 5.072 3.765 41 8.878 
g._ 1.029.541 2.703 9.384 1 12.089 1,17% 425 331 57 6.365 28.352 16 34.733 
1.922.84 7.008 16.41 11 23.429 1,22% 607 428 106 11.551 38.305 101 49.958 
132.601 1.075 1.115 0 2.190 1.65% 509 409 125 2.113 2.725 0 4.839 
...... "~~ 
"""" 
............. 
'" . ... '"" 1.30% 564 423 228 15.424 24.165 2.272 41 861 
l1Lt=!s~l-- --~f----239 -~1-------foo 1.58% 299 245 125 517 444 0 962 2,01% 379 33 127 418 725 19 1.162 
27.010 200 256 46 502 1,86% 434 330 304 460 777 152 1.389 
26.765 239 615 0 854 3,19% 462 302 102 517 2.035 2 2.554 
88.291 810 1.145 5 1.961 2,22% 451 375 177 1.796 3.058 30 4.884 
5.451 43 46 1 89 1,64% 459 352 125 94 130 6 230 
6.518 4.026 3.158 33 7.219 1,30% 701 424 154 5.749 7.453 217 13.419 
1.459 1.424 1.673 241 3.338 1.23% 442 347 261 3.221 4.821 924 6.966 
299.518 2.312 2.716 271 5.300 1,77% 488 336 192 4.735 8.037 1.413 14.185 
162.331 942 1.472 5 2.418 1,49% 583 364 109 1.615 4.039 45 5.699 
3.652 888 1.191 33 1.913 1,68% 336 284 128 2.051 4.195 259 6.505 
4.704 375 643 1 1.019 2.94% 462 433 125 811 1.466 • 2.302 
SK' I 62.575 414 486 0 900 1,44% 515 481 259 805 1.011 1.815 
I!'' + 171.363 1.435 929 174 2.537 1,46% 627 364 125 2.286 2.551 1.393 6.232 3.921 1,32% 568 44 164 4.132 3.502 84 7.716 
I' Note. The data lor tax revenue for NL IS for 2008, the data for the annual tax revenues for IT, AT. SK, PL are based on est1mallons. petrol data lor EL InCludes both leaded and 1 -"-~ .. ' 
• Note the tax rates apPlied are for LPG as the me than consumpbon as a motor fuel is rather low 
• Note, the tax ~~enues from diesel ~;:om prise the revenue both from heating and motor fuel 
Total EU Own Resour~;:es 2009· 
Revenue from EU energy le 
116.096,04 million Euro 
17927.17 million Euro 
Revenue from all energy products and electricity 2009 198.824.47 million Euro 
Share of the total tax revenues from petrol diesel. LPG and natural gas in the 62,1% 
15,4% 
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EU energy levy= 50fJ1000 lltr" (million Euro) 
....,...-- M a •t. of total 
Petrol Diesel LPG and Total revenue Ma%ofGNI methane 
(13)=50"(9)11000 (14)=50"(10)11000 (IS)=W(tt)l (16)'<(13)+{14)-t(15) 1000 (17}={16)/(4) (18)={111}1(1) 
B4 417 
42 94 
123 217 
-!!- 34.!j.. 11,6% 0,27% 
"" 1.36< 3ot= 13.0~ -19 20 0 0,2 
254 188 2 444 13.8% 0,2 
318 1.418 1 1 
578 1.915 5 2. 0,18~ 106 136 0 242 11,0% 
771 1.208 114 2.093 10,8% 0,14% 
28 22 0 48 18,3% 0,29% 
21 36 1 58 14,5% 0,29% 
23 39 8 89 13,8% 0,26 
28 102 0 128 15.0% 0.46 
90 153 2 244 12.5% 0,28 
5 • 0 11 12,6% 287 373 11 871 9,3% 
161 241 46 448 13.4%L 0,1"10(J 
237 402 71 709 13.4% 0,24,. 
81 202 2 265 11,8% 0.16~ 
103 210 13 325 17,0 
41 74 0 115 11.3 
40 51 0 91 10,1% 0,15~ 
114 128 70 312 12,3% 0,18~ 
207 175 4 386 9,8% 0,13% 
2.469 9,5% 0.16% 
7.927 11.0% 0,153% 
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ANNEX 1 
DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE EU ENERGY LEVY 
1. Advantages and disadvantages of including other motor fuels, i.e. adding LPG 
and natural gas (methane), as kerosene is generally not used as motor fuel in 
road transport 
Advantages 
It would seem logical to include all motor fuels for road transport in the basis of an own 
resource as this level out differences in consumptions patterns between Member States. 
Disadvantages 
Revenue-wise petrol and diesel are the most relevant taxes for Member States today. 
Additional revenue from adding other motor fuels would be very small. 
Adding other motor fuels would make the (slightly) system more complex for Member States, 
with the need to report separately releases of consumption of products whose use as motor 
fuel is marginal. 
The ETD currently allows Member States to apply a beneficial treatment for LPG and 
methane. These products are therefore mainly consumed in Member States making use of this 
option. However, the draft proposal revising the ETD gradually removes this option and 
proposes to systematically treat these products as any other motor fuel (taxation based on 
C02 emissions and energy content). Hence, it can be expected that their use as motor fuel will 
further reduce. 
2. Advantages and disadvantages of including energy products used as motor fuel 
for other purposes than road transport, heating fuels and electricity 
Advantages 
It would be more consistent to include all energy consumption m the own resources 
calculation. 
No need to distinguish releases for consumption for different uses (e.g. diesel for road 
transport; diesel for heating; diesel for commercial/industrial uses), provided that the same 
own resources rate would apply to all uses (which is not obvious as rates for diesel for road 
transport are generally much higher than for other uses). 
EU transport policy aims at reducing today's almost total dependence of road transport on 
petrol and diesel. In the longer term, if successful, this transport policy would therefore 
undermine the tax base of the own resource solely based on fuel for road transport, which 
might trigger the need for an increase in rates or a broadening of the tax base. 
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Disadvantages 
The ETD allows many more exemptions for heating fuels than for motor fuels for road 
transport. For all these cases correction mechanisms would have to be agreed upon. 
Furthermore, obligatory exemptions exist for aviation fuels (kerosene) and sea navigation and 
it would therefore be illogical to include them into the tax base for an own resource. On the 
other hand, limiting the own resource to petrol and diesel, has the advantage that the tax base 
would be strongly harmonised and few corrections would be needed as petrol and unmarked 
gasoil (road diesel) has to be taxed in almost all cases (few exceptions include e.g. 
agriculture). 
Fuel use in transport has a significant cross-border dimension given today's pattern of traffic 
flows. For heating use such a cross-border dimension is much less obvious. 
As far as the economic impact of an energy-based own resource is concerned, including 
heating fuels is difficult as increasing costs for domestic heating has a regressive 
distributional impact. This is not the case for motor fuels ( cf. the Impact Assessment of the 
ETD revision for details). Given the distribution of competencies the EU would have to leave 
it to Member States to address undesired social consequences of a potential surcharge on 
heating costs via their social systems. 
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ANNEX2 
NATIONAL TAX RATES ON PETROL AND DIESEL (JANUARY 2011) 
Tax rate petrol Tax rate gasoil 
Member State Minimum 359 €/10001 Minimum 330€/10001 
BE 613 392 
BG 363 314 
cz 528 448 
DK 576 392 
DE 669 470 
EE 422 392 
EL 670 412 
ES 424 331 
FR 606 428 
IE 576 465 
IT 564 423 
CY 359 330 
LV 379 329 
LT 434 302 
LU 464 392 
HU 438 355 
MT 469 382 
NL 718 423 
AT 482 425 
PL 421 327 
PT 585 364 
RO 359 302 
SI 478 420 
SK 550 386 
FI 627 364 
SE 539 492 
UK 679 679 
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7. EU CORPORATE INCOME TAX (EUCIT) 
7.1. Political context 
7.1.1. Corporate income taxation in the EU 
The Corporate Income Tax is traditionally one of the most important taxes, although it yields 
only 9.2% of total tax and social security contributions 158, much less than VAT or personal 
income tax. The main reasons for its importance include the fact that it has a direct effect on 
corporations and therefore on general competitiveness, and the so-called backstop function it 
carries out in tax systems, i.e. to prevent income from being capitalised in corporations to 
avoid personal income tax. 
From 2000 to 2009 (last value available), national CIT revenues have oscillated, on average, 
between 2.8% and 3.7 % of GNI (see table in annex). This range of variation is not 
uncommon given that the revenue from this tax is highly dependent from the business cycle. 
Therefore, it is to be expected that 20 I 0 revenue data, when they become available, will fall 
even 2.8%, given the impact of the current economic and financial crisis. 
The cross-country variation in revenue is even stronger: in 2009, it ranged between 0. 7% in 
Germany to 7.8% in Luxembourg. This wide spread of results reflects many factors besides 
differences in tax rates: allowances and rules on cost deductibility play an important role, as 
well as other structural or institutional factors, such as the corporatisation rate, the presence of 
developed financial centers, or the existence of attractive tax and regulatory regimes for 
multinationals. 
The technical complexity of the CIT and the possibility it offers for tailoring tax regimes to 
achieve specific policy objectives result in very different national CIT frameworks, creating 
complex interactions between national systems. Any reform of the CIT therefore has 
widespread implications, not only for the national corporate tax itself, but also with regard to 
other national systems and, within a country, will inevitably affect other tax regimes such as 
the personal income tax. Ultimately, it will also have an impact on investment, employment 
and growth. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that corporate taxation is a very sensitive policy area. Some 
Member States are, as a matter of principle, against any legislative proposals in this area (e.g. 
UK). Furthermore, Ireland made the approval of the Lisbon Treaty depend on safeguards 
protecting its rights to determine its corporate tax system 159• Owing to the need for unanimity, 
it took, for instance, almost 30 years of discussions160 to produce the first European directives 
on business taxation, the 1990 Parent/Subsidiary and Merger Directives 161 . Another stepping 
stone was the agreement at the end of 2004, following 7 years of negotiations, on a 
comprehensive tax package including a code of conduct on business taxation. 
158 
159 
16il 
161 
2008 value. Source: Taxation Trends in the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010. 
The Ireland ~'Guarantee' is a Decision of the Heads of State or Government of all Member States which 
was annexed to the Conclusions of the European Council of 18119 June 2009. 
The Neumark report (1962) proposed the harmonisation of business taxation in the Community. 
These Directives (90/435/EEC and 90/434/EEC respectively) were the result of proposals that had been 
on the Council table since 1969 (see OJ C 39, 22.3.1969). 
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Despite important achievements, much remains to be done to improve the EU regulatory 
environment in the area of corporate taxation. The existence of 27 separate national tax 
systems with different provisions determining taxable profits and different tax rates puts EU 
multinational enterprises at a disadvantage compared to companies operating in only one 
Member State or in large countries such as the US. EU companies face many obstacles to 
their cross-border activities and may suffer from double taxation and over taxation as a result 
of the current lack of coordination among the various corporation tax systems in the EU. The 
current system imposes significantly higher compliance costs both on companies operating 
across borders in the EU and on national tax administrations 162. 
To tackle these problems the Commission prepared, inter alia, a legislative proposal bearing 
on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which suggests introducing a 
harmonized tax base across countries that could be used by companies in the EU on a 
voluntary basis while allowing the Member States to apply their individual corporate tax 
rates. During the last years of preparing the CCCTB proposal the Commission always 
emphasised that it would not touch the sovereignty of Member States to set corporate tax 
rates. The prospects for adoption by the Council of the CCCTB could be materially damaged 
if the Commission were to propose a EUCIT making use of the CCCTB. The CCCTB is 
explained in more details in Box 10 below. 
7.1.2. EU Corporate Income Tax (EUCIT) 
Past Commission analyses show that differences in the nominal tax rates on profits (statutory 
rates, surcharges and local taxes) are an important factor in explaining diverging effective tax 
burdens among the Member States - and the related effects on the allocation of productive 
capital in the internal market163 . Therefore, some observers concluded that setting a minimum 
tax rate and a harmonised tax base, i.e. creating an EU corporate income tax (EUCIT), could 
bring important economic benefits for the EU164 • Moreover, EUCIT could generate 
considerable revenues. However, as shown below, setting up a EUCIT would also face a host 
of conceptual, practical and political problems. 
In any event, the analysis of the pros and cons of EUCIT would depend on the specificities of 
the system put in place and, in particular, the scope ofthe tax and the degree of harmonisation 
achieved. It is evident that variants of an EUCIT with a deeper impact on the national tax 
systems will be more negatively considered than variants which build upon existing national 
corporate tax systems. 
Finally, it is useful to keep in mind the views expressed by a number of stakeholders: 
• 
162 
163 
164 
Member States' governments and Parliaments are generally opposed to legislative 
proposal in the direct tax area due mainly to the perceived loss of sovereignty. 
See European Commission (2004), "European Tax Survey", Commission Staff Working Paper, 
SEC(2004)1128. 
See European Commission (2001), "Company taxation in the internal market'', Commission staff 
working paper, COM(200 I )582. 
The Commission has steadfastly refrained from proposing tax rate harmonisation for corporate taxation, 
giving preference to alternative approaches (CCCTB), which would consistently tackle several 
corporate tax obstacles and tax-induced inefficiencies in the Internal Market, such as double taxation, 
the lack of cross-border loss consolidation, tax-related obstacles to business restructuring and 
significant compliance costs associated with international activity . . 
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• 
• 
• 
Business and industry are generally opposed to any obligatory harmonisation on tax bases 
and rates (e.g. the CCCTB is supported under the condition that the companies can decide 
to opt in to the CCCTB or not). The main reasons are the loss of flexibility and tax 
competition advantages- tax planning opportunities and specific tax incentives offered by 
Member State for sectors, e.g. tonnage tax regimes, or activities, e.g. R&D tax incentives. 
The European Parliament, which is traditionally supportive for greater tax harmonization 
has consistently supported the CCCTB 165 In addition, the Lamassoure report of 29 March 
2007 recalled that taxes on corporate profits were taken into consideration for the purpose 
fd I . 166 o eve opmg a new own resource . 
The European Commission mentioned a resource based on corporate taxation as a 
possible longer-term option in its last report on EU financing 167. 
Overall, a EUCIT proposal is likely to encounter considerable opposition due to marked 
national differences and diverging preferences in the area of corporate taxation. This is well 
illustrated by the difficult progress towards a CCCTB. This explains why the Commission 
considered in 2004 that "a fiscal resource based on corporate income is to be seen as a much 
longer-term option" than an option based on VAT or energy consumption. 
7.2. Outline of the proposal 
7.2.1. Identifying variants 
The analysis of the EUCIT would depend on the specificities of the system put in place. As 
already indicated by the Commission in 2004, decisions would need to be taken on "the 
definition of a possible EU (consolidated) tax base; the implications for the current network of 
bilateral tax treaties linking EU Member States with other countries; the implications for 
national rules regarding personal income taxation; the rate of the tax and the allocation of the 
base or the revenue between the Member States; the responsibilities regarding the collection 
of the tax and related legal and administrative issues" 168 • 
There is only one meaningful approach for a EUCIT. It would consist of three main features: 
• 
165 
166 
167 
168 
a common corporate tax base (EUCIT base) that would be compulsory for all companies 
in the EU. In absence of an EUCIT base, the tax imposed on similar operations performed 
in different Member States would vary. This would contravene the equal treatment 
principle and introduce distortions in the Internal Market; 
See for instance the letter of the Socialist Group to Mr. Barroso demanding a CCCTB (harmonisation of 
the base) and the resolution'Written declaration pursuant to Rule 123 of 8 ECON coordinators 
demanding a CCCTB with harrnonised rates. See the Rules of Procedure 
on corporation tax rates in the EU' 010112010 from 13.12.2010 (Uri: 
http://www .europar1.europa .eu/sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP I !NO NSG ML + W D ECL +P7-DCL-20 1 0-
0101 +O+DOC+PDF+ VO//EN&language=EN) 
European Parliament resolution of 29 March 2007 on the future of the European Union's own resources 
(2006/2205(1Nl)), § 39. 
See COM(2004)505, 14.07.2004. 
See "Financing the European Union. Commission report on the operation of the own resources system", 
COM(2004)505, Volume II, p. 59. 
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• a harmonised EUCIT rate. This would allow equal treatment of companies across the EU 
and this minimum EU rate would in practice constitute a floor in total corporate rates in 
the EU. 
• additional national CIT rates that would vary across Member States. Member States would 
be left free to adjust their rates, taking into account the implications of the EUCIT and 
other relevant features of their national tax system. 
An EUCIT system would therefore entail adjustments to the tax base and possibly to the 
national rate of corporate income tax. This could have important implications for the tax 
treatment of dividends at national level. National tax treatment of dividends is tightly linked 
with the corporate rate and the tax base, forming a coherent, logical whole. For instance, 
countries with a high CIT rate often tend to introduce imputation systems to avoid double 
taxation at the level of the shareholders, while countries with flat tax systems typically adopt 
wider tax bases, lower rates and exempt dividend income from taxation at the level of the 
shareholders. The introduction of an EUCIT may therefore require substantial changes in the 
tax systems of Member States. 
Although this approach looks similar to the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax base 
(CCCTB) proposal (see Box 10), it is actually very different in a number of critical areas. In 
particular, it would go significantly beyond the scope of the CCCTB exercise, and would 
directly contradict a number of recent statements from the Commission that the work on the 
CCCTB is restricted to defining only the base leaving the levying of tax entirely to Member 
States. 
BoxlO: WHATISTHECCCTB? 
The European Commission believes that the only systematic way to address the underlying 
tax obstacles for companies operating in more than one Member State is to provide them with 
a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities. 
This policy was established in 2001 [COM(2001)582] and refined in subsequent 
communications [COM(2003)726 and COM(2007)223]. The European Commission proposed 
a common system for calculating the tax base of businesses operating in the EU on 16 March 
2011 [COM(2011)121]. The CCCTB is designed to encourage cross-border commercial 
activity within the Internal Market and allow companies to operate within a single framework. 
The proposal presents a number of significant advantages in terms of tax compliance: 
• Companies will apply a single set of common rules and deal with only one tax 
administration ('one-stop-shop'); 
• Profits and losses generated in different Member States will be offset automatically as a 
result of consolidation; 
• There will be no need to price transactions at 'arm's length' within the group because the 
sharing of the tax base between two or more Member States will be done through a 
formula; 
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• Costs and uncertainties linked to lawsuits brought before the ECJ will be reduced, as the 
CCCTB will be specifically complying with the Treaty. 
From a technical viewpoint, the main elements of a CCCTB are as follows: 
I. Double taxation 
Double taxation (and double non-taxation) will no longer be a risk within the consolidated 
group, since all intra -group transactions will be eliminated. The 'tax base' (i.e. the individual 
tax results of each group member) would be defined as follows: (i) all revenues are taxable 
except if expressly listed as exempt; (ii) fixed assets are depreciable for tax purposes subject 
to certain exceptions. Depreciable assets are distinguished between those subject to 
depreciation individually and those placed in a pool. Losses may be carried forward 
indefinitely. No loss carry-back is allowed. 
2. Consolidation 
A 2-part test - based on control (>50% of voting rights) and either ownership (>75% of 
capital) or rights to profits (> 75% of rights giving entitlement to profit) - determines the 
entitlement to participation in the group. 
3. Anti-Abuse 
A General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) is supplemented by measures designed to curb abusive 
practices of a cross-border nature: (i) Limitations apply to the deductibility of interest paid to 
associated enterprises in a low-tax third country which does not exchange information with 
the Member State of the payer; specific rules define the concept of a 'low-tax third country'; 
(ii) Controlled Foreign Companies (CFCs) legislation requires that the CFC, resident in a low-
tax third country, is controlled at 50% of its voting rights, owned at 50% of its capital and 
gives 50% profit entitlement to the taxpayer. In addition, 30% of CFC income should be 
tainted. 
4. Formulary Apportionment (FA) 
The FA comprises 3 equally-weighted factors (i.e. assets, payroll and sales): (i) Labour is 
computed based on both payroll and the number of employees (each item counts for half); (ii) 
Assets consist of all fixed tangible assets, meaning that intangibles and financial assets are 
excluded from the FA; Sales are taken into account to increase the taxing entitlement of the 
MS of destination. 
Formulary Apportionment would not apply to the revenue from the EUCIT to be used as an 
own resource for the EU budget - that would flow in its entirety to the EU. The 
apportionment would only be needed to divide between Member States the revenue from any 
national CIT applied to the EUCIT base "on top" of the EUCIT. An issue that would have to 
be examined in more detail is whether and how to allow carry-forward of losses incurred 
under national CIT prior to the entry into force of the EUCIT. 
5. Administration 
The 'one-stop-shop' practice will allow groups with a taxable presence in more than one MS 
to deal with a single tax authority across the EU (i.e. principal tax authority (PTA)), being that 
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of the EU parent of the group termed 'principal taxpayer'. A consolidated tax return will be 
filed with that authority. 
The Directive contains procedural rules on various matters: (i) How taxpayers should submit 
their notice to opt into the CCCTB and subsequently their annual tax returns; (ii) A ruling 
mechanism, coupled with an interpretation panel and a scheme for the exchange of 
information, will be operated by the competent authority (CA) in each group member;Audits 
will be initiated and coordinated by the PTA; In terms of dispute settlement, disputes between 
Member States will be referred to Arbitration whilst those between taxpayers and Member 
States will be dealt with by an Administrative Appeals Body at a 1 '' instance and, at a 2nd 
instance, will have to be brought before the national courts of the principal taxpayer. 
The main alternative to such a system would be attributing a fixed share of the national 
company tax revenues to the EU budget (without harmonising the tax base), that is, a revenue-
sharing mechanism. Such a system would lead to considerable differences in Member States 
contributions to the EU budget, reflecting the existing differences in national CIT systems. 
Furthermore, any national tax policy decision (on base and rates) would directly influence the 
EU budget revenues. There would be an inbuilt incentive to reduce the rate/base in a Member 
State (while increasing the taxation of distributed profits in the hands of shareholders via the 
personal income tax) and, thereby, reducing the financial contribution of this Member State to 
the EU budget. 
7.2.2. Tax base 
The core features of a EUCIT tax base would be: 
• An obligatory application of the common tax base (no option as proposed for the 
CCCTB) for all companies resident in the EU and EU permanent establishments of 
non EU resident companies. 
• Agreement on the deductibility of other national taxes ('Gewerbesteuer', Stamp duty, 
property taxes) from the EUCIT base; 
• Obligation of all transparent entities in the company tax area to be underlying 
corporate tax (Single entrepreneurs and partnerships) at the common rule; 
Agreement on the taxation of third country revenues as part of the EUCIT. Complex legal 
issues derive from the fact that tax relief for cross-border transactions is provided for in bi-
lateral double taxation conventions between Member States and third countries. In these 
conventions, the national taxes falling in the scope for tax relief are mentioned and it is 
generally understood that a tax replacing a listed national tax is either included in the scope of 
the convention by interpretation, or a formal amendment of the double taxation conventions 
has to be implemented by a protocol. It is unclear whether a EUCIT would falling within the 
scope of the bilateral double taxation conventions and hence tax relief from double taxation in 
third countries would be available. Third countries might argue that an EU-wide tax is not a 
national tax as stipulated in the tax conventions. 
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7.2.3. Tax rate 
Member States would be free to set their preferred tax rates on top of the EU rate ("split-
system"). The level of the tax rate would need to be determined taking into account the 
revenue objective and the other relevant variables. 
7. 2.4 Implementation 
The Member States would be charged with collecting the EUCIT on behalf of the EU. This 
would probably raise a series of legal and practical problems. The collection of CIT is today 
the competence of the Member States; hence, the complete legal framework of tax collection 
would need to be reviewed and adapted. 
The breadth of the topic does not allow describing the different alternatives for collections 
systems for a EUCIT tax. Any 'own' European system' could be criticised for not making use 
of the systems already in place in the Member States. It could be considered a waste of 
resources to establish a separate system to raise and collect an EUCIT, in parallel to national 
systems taxing exactly the same taxpayers. On the other hand, making use of national 
collection system would be more efficient and effective, but the question is whether a 
sufficient level of harmonisation could be ensured. Relevant elements to be agreed would 
include the legal nature of collection (a national tax collected on behalf on the EU budget or 
an EU levy would be collected as a national collection agent), the relationship with national 
procedures and sanctions (e.g. can the avoidance or evasion of a tax be sanctioned by national 
provisions implemented for tackling avoidance or evasion of national levies and taxes?), the 
collection period (calendar year or divergent tax years), a possible collection fee or additional 
revenues from late payments, the application of mutual agreement rules and procedures when 
companies are transferring registered office or place of effective management and control to 
another Member State. 
7.3. Qualitative assessment ofthe own resource 
7.3.1. Preliminary questions 
(I) International experience with multi-tier corporate taxation 
The Community has a multitude of corporation tax systems with different levels of 
complexity: on one side flat tax countries, on the other high-tax countries like France or 
Germany with different taxes applied on the 'same profit base' like CIT and Trade Income Tax 
(Gewerbesteuer) or 'Taxe professionelle' and specific/unique features like interest or patent 
boxes and interest limitations. 
As such, it is nearly impossible to describe a general experience of Member States with multi-
tier corporate taxation. In addition, such a reporting on the experience of the Member States 
with such taxation would also have to take into account whether there is an imputation of the 
CIT or local tax paid or whether there is no crediting of taxes at other levels and whether the 
combined system for corporate taxation and shareholder taxation is built upon a classical 
system or an imputation systems or a mixed approach (half-classical systems like 
'Halbeinkiinfteverfahren'). Without any clear picture of the planned elements of an EUCIT it 
is not possible to provide a general valid description of the experience of Member States and 
the economic assessment of multi-tier corporate taxation systems in the Union. 
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Concerning third countries, there are two prominent examples with multi-tier corporate tax 
systems- the US and Switzerland. 
• For the US, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the application of the multi-tier tax US 
system for the EU. The main tax is the 35% Federal Corporate Income Tax and the States 
charge between 0% and 4% as State tax. For this relatively small State CIT there is a 
range of issues, such as tax planning schemes in place and anti-abuse measures enacted by 
fiscal authorities, cases of over-taxation and double taxation due to non-harmonised tax 
bases, sectors with state-cross-border activities like mail order business exempted from 
state CIT, complicated formula apportionment solutions for cross-border tax bases169. In 
addition, the US tax system with worldwide income taxation and application of the credit 
system for providing tax relief in international operations combined with the detailed 
common law approach for regulations is per-se difficult to administer. 
The EU approach would aim at a significantly lower level of complexity. One significant 
difference is that in an EUCIT, the sharing of revenue between the central and the State 
level would be reversed: the EU portion of the revenue would be much smaller than the 
Member State portion, unlike the US case where the federal level receives the lion's share 
of the revenue; in effect the national CIT would act as a surcharge on the EUCIT, with the 
surcharge being much larger than the common EU tax rate. 
• In Switzerland, the lack of harmonised tax schemes in the cantons and a strong 
competition between cantons for foreign direct investment, in combination with a 
divergent economic structure in the cantons, have resulted in 'high tax' jurisdictions like 
Ziirich and 'tax haven' cantons like Zug. The EU is involved in a tax dispute with 
Switzerland due to these differences in cantonal taxation. Compared to the EU, there is 
also a certain level of flexibility in the Swiss political and tax system, which allows 
adjusting more rapidly to economic or political developments. It can be doubted whether 
the Swiss experience can be used in full for a EUCIT. There is a certain divergence in the 
Swiss cantonal taxation rules and the Swiss Federal tax, which does not fit in with the 
harmonised tax base approach for the EUCIT at Member State level, as well as for the 
EUCIT revenues. 
(2) Lessons from economic theory 
There is a growing economic literature on the CCCTB and other tax reform proposals, which 
might be relevant for the EUCIT170• The literature on the CCCTB is relevant because it 
postulates defining a common EU corporate tax base, a precondition for the EUCIT. 
However, the results studies carried out so far cannot be extended sic et simpliciter to the 
EUCIT case because they assume adoption of a common base only for multinationals, 
whereas the EUCIT would necessarily have to apply to all businesses in the EU to be a fair 
system. 
169 
170 
An insight on the US and Canadian formula-apportionment systems can be found in Martens Weiner, J. 
(2005), DG Taxation and Customs Union, Taxation paper n°8. 
A considerable amount of research has been developed in the last years to analyse both the technical 
options for a common tax base and its economic effects. See Aglindez-Garcfa, A. (2006), DG Taxation 
and Customs Union, Taxation paper n°9, for a review ofthe literature. 
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Analyses of an obligatory EU CCCTB show slightly negative effects on European GDP and 
employment, and neutral impacts on welfare171 • These results, based on the simulations 
performed using a computable general equilibrium model172, cannot however be extended 
mechanically to the EUCIT for various reasons. 
The economic effects of an EUCIT would depend critically on the final level of corporate 
taxation. In theory, Member States could keep their current level of taxation constant by 
recycling the lower contributions they paid to the EU fully into lower corporate income tax 
rates. Alternatively, they might use the savings from the lower contributions to the EU to cut 
other taxes or to finance expenditures, which would result in an increase in the effective CIT 
rate. Given that the CIT is the most distortionary of the main types of taxes, any increase in 
the marginal CIT tax rate would have a substantial negative impact on GDP and employment. 
However, in a longer term perspective, tax competition between Member States due to a 
greater comparability of effective tax rates based on the harmonised EUCIT -base might create 
some pressure towards lower rates. 
From a political economy viewpoint, it has been argued that a EUCIT would give 
corporations a strong incentive to lobby for limitations to EU spending, as any expenditure 
reduction would result in immediate and significant cuts to the CIT rate. Opposition to the 
Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, might intensify as the business community may 
resent being taxed to support agriculture 173 • 
(3) Legal issues 
Some legal issues are similar to the CCCTB: 
• Hierarchy of rights and obligations derived from general agreements (like investment 
protection agreements) and double taxation conventions between EU Member States and 
third countries concluded before and after the entering into force of the CCCTB Directive 
with conflicting rules and provisions of an EUCIT Directive. 
• Transitional problems (tax holidays or tax breaks granted to companies before the entering 
into force of the EUCIT Directive). 
• The question of obligatory conversion of transparent entities in the company profit/trade 
income sector of the EU into corporate tax payers (possible under national constitutional 
rules?). 
Others are very specific to a EUCIT proposal: 
• 
171 
172 
173 
There is the question of diverging delivery modes of public services in different Member 
States by private companies or the public sector (e.g. electricity and water supply, public 
transport, health and social services, service provided by companies owned by towns and 
See tables 7 and 8 in the Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the 'Proposal for a Council 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), Brussels 14.1.2011. 
Like any economic model, the CGE ignores certain economic mechanisms, include specifications 
which are not undisputed and cannot take away the uncertainty about the strength of certain behavioural 
effects of tax policies. For these reasons, numerical outcomes should be taken with proper care, and 
interpreted in the light of the modelling assumptions. 
See Cattoir, Ph. (2009), "Options for an EU financing reform", Notre Europe. 
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villages like Metro, busses). Any attempt to adjust the size and approaches for the public 
sector economic activities in the Member States to ensure an equal financial contribution 
to the EU budget, would be technically complex and politically difficult to implement. As 
an example, one could mention that in some Member States lucrative public utilities are 
owned by towns or cities and the financial surpluses from these activities are used to 
compensate financial losses in other areas like cultural or social service or the example of 
the medical sector with services provided for by self-employed doctors compared to 
services provided free of charge by a public national health service. Any attempt to 
compensate for such different approaches by introducing a 'fictitious trade income profits' 
element in the EUCIT from these activities in some Member States would open up 
difficult discussions and disputes. 
7. 3. 2. Criteria set out in the budget review 
(1) Link to the acquis and the objectives of the EU 
The adoption of an EUCIT would improve the functioning of the internal market. But the 
question is whether at the current level of economic and political interaction in the EU such a 
far ranging measure (obligatory tax base harmonisation and harmonised EUCIT rate) for 
mandatory harmonisation of the tax base could be proposed without interfering with the 
functioning of other elements of national tax systems (mainly dividend taxation). In theory an 
EUCIT would be beneficial, while in practice proposing it would probably make any progress 
in company taxation more difficult. 
Besides, if the tax applied only to multinational enterprises (MNEs), there would be level-
playing field concerns as companies would pay different taxes on the same territory 
depending on whether they are MNEs or not. This is why EUCIT should apply to all 
companies, the vast majority of which are SMEs active only in one Member State with no 
cross-border transactions (80% of all SMEs). The switch to a compulsory CCTB would create 
considerable administrative costs for those companies. Therefore, one could argue that the 
measure would be disproportionate in view of the objectives pursued. 
(2) Cross-border aspect and internal market coverage 
There are a number of advantages resulting from the introduction of a EUCIT: 
• The compulsory harmonisation of tax base rules would solve a number of tax-induced 
distortions and bring other advantages, such as a reduction of mismatches from the 
application of non-harmonised tax systems in the case of cross-border hybrid financing or 
hybrid entities. 
• It could facilitate cross-border activities for all the MNEs and the SMEs active in more 
than one Member State. It could also make it easier, for the more than 80% of all SMEs 
not yet involved in cross-border business, to venture in other Member States than their 
State of origin as the same tax base rules would apply. 
Although these advantages are included in the CCCTB proposal, the EUCIT would go further 
in the scope and ambition of the proposal. 
• The main advantage of a EUCIT against an optional CCCTB would be that the sharing of 
the tax base between MS and consequently all provisions related to apportionment of the 
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CCCTB would be obsolete. However, this requires that no additional national corporate 
taxation exists anymore. 
The impact assessment results show that the compulsory application of (a pre-consolidation 
base-broadening) CCCTB to both multinational and domestic groups would be associated 
with a contraction in GDP in the range of 0.3 percentage points a reduction in employment 
around 0.05-0.08%. The same background study provides additional simulations for a 
CCCTB coupled with rate harmonisation (at the unweighted EU average, or 24.2%). Such 
reform would prove neutral for employment, and neutral or only slightly positive for welfare 
(0.1%) and GDP (0.2%), but would negatively affect corporate tax revenues (-0.5-0.6%). The 
effects on the macroeconomic variables are worse in case the harmonised rate is fixed at a 
higher level so as to grant ex-ante budget neutrality of the reform. 
However, it should be noted that the model is calibrated to reflect the design of the CCCTB, 
particularly its application to firms belonging to a group (i.e. fulfilling the 75% ownership 
threshold). Hence, the reported figures might not correctly reflect the potential effect of the 
EUCIT. 
(3) Base harmonisation and application throughout the Union 
There is currently not a harmonised base for corporate taxation in the EU. As indicated above, 
Member States differ widely in a number of respects. Achieving the necessary degree of 
harmonisation on a EU-wide scale would appear extremely difficult to achieve for the 
foreseeable future. 
The very nature of a EUCIT would require the coverage of the EU as a whole. Exceptions at 
national level in the context of an EU-wide taxation system would not appear feasible, prima 
facie. First, they could lead to unequal treatment of similar taxpayers based on their 
nationality and/or location, which would contravene with the equal treatment principle. 
Second, they would induce distortions of competition. However, harmonised horizontal 
measures for start -up companies or air and water transport, for which separate taxation rules 
are foreseen in OECD model convention, exceptions could be imagined. But, as with all tax 
breaks, from the viewpoint of transparency and accountability, it is often more appropriate to 
show direct subsidies or financial support openly in the budget than to install in one tax years 
a tax break for which it is difficult to calculate the amount of financial support and to identify 
the beneficiaries. 
( 4) Autonomous resource collection 
With millions of EUCIT taxpayers and annual tax declaration, it would be impossible to 
establish EU fiscal authorities structures in the EU for the purpose of a direct collection. 
Indeed, direct collection of the EUCIT by an EU administration would involve dedicated EU 
central and local tax services and staff similar to national tax administrations including control 
services. Taxable persons would have to deal for their CIT obligations with two different tax 
administrations. The legal issues, too, appear very delicate. 
On the other hand, leaving the competence entirely to the national administrations of an 
EUCIT which would appear separately in the accounts of the taxpayers might raise serious 
concerns about the motivation of the national tax officials for auditing the correct application 
of the EUCIT. Experiences in the area of administrative cooperation, whereby a tax 
administration has to perform some tasks for the benefit for other Member States, demonstrate 
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this is a legitimate concern. A mechanism, comparable to the one existing for customs duties, 
whereby a percentage is kept by the national tax administration for the collection cost might 
be required to overcome this problem. 
In any event, the EUCIT revenues collected would be immediately attributable to specific 
Member States. 
(5) Additional burden on specific sectors 
As stated above, the results of the CCCTB applied to multinational and domestic groups of 
firms usually predict a reduction of employment (short term or static analysis). In particular, 
simulations from the lA report show a marginal reduction in employment (0.05-0.08%; see 
section 3.2.2. above). 
Concerning the impacts on specific sectors the most expensive would be the transformation of 
transparent companies in DE, LU and AT into corporate tax payers. With about 2 millions 
Single entrepreneur and 375.000 Personengesellschaften in Germany (data 2004 - source 
Wikipedia) the cost of transformation of all transparent entities into corporate tax payers 
could amount to EUR 118 billions174• The tax deductibility of these EUR 118 billion would be 
a huge transitional cost for Germany. 
In addition, with a harmonised EUCIT rate there could be increased incentives for profit 
shifting and delocalisation from an intensified tax competition with third countries, e.g. 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Channel Islands. If the project led to general increase of 
the average EU tax level on company profits, it would put the EU at a disadvantage as an 
investment place compared to third countries. This could lead to the transfer of registered 
office or head quarters, or mobile tax bases such as investment decisions for group finance 
companies or holding companies. 
( 6) Administrative burden for the EU administration 
As explained above, tax collection by the Commission services is not an option (millions of 
tax payers and annual declarations). 
If the EUCIT was collected by national authorities within the national tax assessments as a 
separate line and the whole EUCIT revenue of a Member State at the end of a budget year/tax 
year would be transferred to the EU Budget, the work could probably be managed and 
controlled by I 0 officials. But many major taxpaying companies in the EU do not settle their 
tax affairs for several years so either the transfer of the amount raised would be delayed by 
several years or the EUCIT would have to take precedence over the national tax - i.e. be 
collected on account etc. Ultimately, the administrative burden for the EU administration 
could be substantial, even if the national administrations play a central role. 
174 Assuming the typical cost of a tax deferred conversion of a single entrepreneur or a 
Personengesellschaft in a GmbH (corporate tax payer) at EUR 50,000 for the adviser fees, registration 
and notary cost and internal cost like training, software changes, letter heads, etc. 
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7.4. Quantitative assessment of the own resource 
7.4.1. Revenue estimates 
With 'Corporate Income Tax revenues representing between 2% and 3% of the GDP in the 
EU, the revenues from a EUCIT could easily reach billions per years. A baseline calculation 
could be done on the basis of national or Eurostat data depending on the CIT base and rate 
applied, and the decision whether the EUCIT rate would top up national rates or be a part of 
the national domestic rates charged. 
The !A on the CCCTB does not provide relevant data on this point, because it was prepared 
under the assumption that only internationally active groups would participate in the CCCTB, 
whereas an EUCIT would necessarily have to apply to all corporations. However, it is clear 
that an EUCIT would have more than sufficient potential to raise the required level of tax 
revenue. In 2008, corporate income tax in the EU raised 342.1 billion euro. Given that the 
average statutory CIT rate currently amounts to around 23%, a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation suggests that, assuming a comparable size of the tax base 175 , an EUCIT rate ofless 
than 2% should be largely sufficient to consistently raise EUR 15 billion in revenue, even 
though CIT revenues are one of the most fluctuating tax revenue sources in the economic 
cycle. 
As long as a residual own resources will exist, namely the GNI-based contributions, any 
fluctuation of the EUCIT (or any other own resource) can be automatically compensated by a 
fluctuation in this residual resource. The variability in revenue would however have the 
disadvantage of obliging the Member to transfer sharply fluctuating amounts in terms of the 
GNI resource, complicating financial planning. 
7.4. 2. Fair application and impact on correction mechanisms 
From the analysis carried out for the CCCTB !A based on the Amadeus and ORB IS databases 
it is possible to get some insights on the current distribution of corporate tax bases across the 
EU. When industrial groups are considered, the largest bases are to be found in Germany 
(18.3% of total EU base) and in the UK (16.3%), with Finland, France and the Netherlands 
accounting each for less than I 0% of the aggregate base. In the case of financial groups, more 
than one-third of the base is concentrated in the UK, with Germany following at 13.6%. 
Simulations for the distributional effects of CCCTB on the base show that the formula with 
employee costs, assets and sales by destination equally weighted leads to an increase in the 
tax bases (for industrial and financial groups combined) mostly in the MS in Central and 
Eastern Europe, as well as in Germany, Spain, France, Greece and Italy (see CCCTB lA). 
175 The CCCTB tax base definition is comparatively wide, so the tax base for an EUClT is likely to be 
somewhat wider than the weighted average of the current national tax bases; on the other hand, the 
EUC!T would presumably allow cross-border loss compensation, which only few national systems 
allow today. There is also the issue of the inclusion of some partnerships in an EUCIT to safeguard 
comparabitility. Overall, the net effect seems likely to be a comparable or slightly wider EUC!T tax 
base. 
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Annex 1: 
CORPORATE TAX REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME, 1995-2009 
CIT as % of GNI 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AT 2.2 3.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.7 1.9 
BE 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.3 2.5 
BG 2.8 4.0 3.0 2.8 2.6 1.9 2.3 4.7 3.3 2.7 
CY 6.6 6.6 6.2 4.4 3.9 4.8 5.7 7.2 7.5 6.6 
cz 3.6 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.0 4.7 5.1 5.4 4.4 3.9 
DE 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.1 0.7 
DK 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.9 4.3 3.8 3.2 2.4 
EE 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.9 
EL 4.1 3.3 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.3 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 
ES 3.2 2.9 3.3 3.2 3.5 4.0 4.3 4.9 3.0 2.4 
FI 5.9 4.2 4.2 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.9 3.5 2.0 
FR 2.8 3.0 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.7 1.3 
HU 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.2 
IE 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.5 4.1 3.3 3.0 
IT 2.5 3.3 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.9 3.3 3.1 2.5 
LT 0.7 0.5 0.6 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.8 2.7 2.8 1.8 
LU 8.0 8.2 9.7 9.4 6.5 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.7 7.8 
LV 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 1.5 
MT 3.0 3.2 3.8 4.5 4.2 4.7 5.2 6.3 7.0 7.2 
NL 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 2.2 
PL 2.4 1.9 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.8 2.4 
PT 3.8 3.4 3.4 2.8 2.9 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.8 3.0 
RO 3.0 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 2.7 
SE 3.8 2.6 2.0 2.2 2.9 3.6 3.6 3.7 2.8 3.0 
SI 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.8 3.0 3.3 2.6 1.9 
SK 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.2 2.5 
UK 3.6 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.9 3.4 3.5 2.8 
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ANNEx: OTHER POTENTIAL CANDIDATES NOT RETAINED 
1. An overview of potential candidates 
The previous chapters of Part III presented possible variants for each of the six financial 
means put forward in the Budget Review communication. The result is a substantial list of 
potential candidates, which also includes potential candidates that the working group 
considered unsuitable for legal or other technical reasons. Box 11 presents an overview of the 
analysis done so far. Information on potential candidates not retained can be found in the 
respective chapters. 
This annex briefly mentions others potential candidates, which do not fall within the scope of 
one of these six financial means but which have sometimes been mentioned. It explains why 
the working group did not retain them for further analysis. 
Box 11: Six candidates as new own resource- and their variants 
Financial sector taxation 
Financial Transaction Tax (narrow-based FTT, broad-based FTT) 
Currency Transaction Levy: not examined in details for legal reasons 
Financial Activities Tax (addition method, rent-taxing FAT and risk-taxing FAT) 
Revenue from auctioning under ETS 
Revenue-sharing mechanism (simple revenue sharing, auction-based revenue sharing) 
Centralised revenue collection 
Taxation ofthe aviation sector 
Passenger/departure tax 
Flight duty 
Kerosene taxation: considered unsuitable as candidate for legal reasons 
VAT on tickets: considered unsuitable for technical reasons 
EUVAT 
Modulated EU VAT (1st version): considered unsuitable for legal reasons 
Modulated EU VAT (2nd version) 
Single-rated EU VAT 
VAT on gambling: considered unsuitable for technical reasons 
VAT on imported goods and services: considered unsuitable for technical reasons 
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EU Energy Tax 
EUC02 Levy 
EU Energy Levy 
C02-based contribution 
EU Corporate Income Tax 
2. A resource based on seignorage 
It has sometimes been suggested that the total monetary income or the seigniorage of the 
Eurosystem (European Central Bank and National Central Banks (NCBs) of the Euro-area) 
could be transferred to the EU Budget. 
• The monetary income (or the more narrowly defined seigniorage) would not be distributed 
to the NCBs who are currently the subscribers of the ECB capital and who normally 
transfer it (partly) to their national government or shareholders. 
• Countries outside the Eurozone would contribute to this new own resource through a 
contribution based on their share in GNI. As an alternative, the share of the Eurozone 
seignorage/monetary income in the GNI of Euro-members would be calculated. The non-
Euro-members would have to contribute an equal share of their GNI, but in order to 
determine the national contributions within this group of countries, the same distribution 
key as the ECB capital key would be applied (equal weight of GNI and population). 
This proposal has not been retained for the following reasons: 
• Legal and institutional difficulties: The "Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank" would have to be changed. The statute provides, in its 
article 32.5, for the distribution of the ESCB's monetary income to its shareholders, which 
are the NCBs. This statute is laid down in a protocol to the treaties. A change concerning 
the allocation cannot be done with the simplified amending procedure laid down in the 
statute itself but would require a change of the protocol with "quasi treaty-status". 
• The necessary change to the "Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank" could prove extremely difficult. The proposal could also be seen 
as an attempt to reduce the independence of the European Central Bank. Although in 
principle the independence of the ECB and the NCBs would be not modified by 
transferring the seigniorage/monetary income of the Eurosystem to the EU budget, it is 
likely that in the public perception any change in the provision of the Eurosystem will 
raise questions about the ECB independence and its commitment to price stability. 
• It would involve a two-tier mechanism: A different treatment would be imposed on 
eurozone and non-eurozone Member States in the financing of the EU budget. 
• Limited revenue: The monetary income or seigniorage could only finance a small part of 
the budget and would need to be combined with other sources. The central bank profits of 
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all Eurosystem members is estimated between 4% and 30% of the EU budget in the years 
1997 to 2006 176 . And seignorage is only a part of this profit. 
Ownership issue: Because in some Member States the National Central Bank is owned by 
private shareholders (e.g. Belgium), the transfer of part of the monetary income to the EU 
budget is not straightforward. It would need to be clarified whether a notional profit could 
be distributed to the private shareholders or national governments. It could be expected 
that substantial legal and financial questions would be raised. 
Different cost structure of NCBs: In order to avoid that some national central banks would 
run deficits if they cannot count on their share in the Eurosystem's seigniorage or 
monetary income, a consolidated profit and loss account of the Eurosystem would be 
needed. This would entail complex changes in the way the Eurosystem works. 
The possibility of using seignorage as an own resource was carefully examined by the 
Commission on a number of occasions, in particular for the "Agenda 2000" and in the context 
of the preparation of the 2004 report on EU financing. At the time, it was decided not to 
include this idea in the options for alternative own resources mainly on two grounds: the 
institutional issues that it would raise and the limited corresponding revenue. It should also be 
recalled that the European Central Bank and national central banks are traditionally firmly 
opposed to such proposals. 
3. An EU communication tax 
The idea to use taxation of communication services as a source of revenue for the EU budget 
was analysed in detail by the European Parliament (1997) 177• EU-wide communications tax 
bases could include road transport, air transport, telecommunications in all its forms and, 
possibly, broadcasting. However, "sea and rail transport can probably be dismissed as being 
unevenly spread geographically, and having favourable environmental characteristics that 
[EU] governments want to encourage". 
More recently, the idea of a communication tax in the form of a SMS tax was also mentioned. 
Concretely, the European Parliament (1997) indicates that for telecommunication services, the 
tax would be a fixed amount per telephone 'line'. The EU telecommunication tax would be 
clearly identified on the bills. The tax on road transport would be a vehicle tax harmonised at 
the EU level. Member States could set surcharges on the tax, or raise other vehicle taxes. For 
air transport, a European air tax would be a per capita tax on travellers (see chapter III.4). 
This approach was not pursued further, notably because the justifications for the 
communications tax seem rather blurred. Although air travel and vehicles taxation can 
somehow be related to EU environmental objectives of limiting air pollution, it is not the case 
for a telephony tax. In the latter case, there are no clear externalities that would justify 
imposing a new tax. In fact, it would seem rather contrary to the objectives pursued by the 
EU. It should also be recalled that a charge on air transport is examined in chapter III.4 and 
energy taxation is examined in chapter III.6. 
176 
177 
Financing of the European Union budget. Study for the European Commission, DG BUDG, 2008. 
European Parliament, Directorate General for Research ( 1997), The own resources of the European 
Union: analysis and possible developments, Working Document, Budget Series, W-4, 09-1997. 
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